地方政府土地出讓策略互動(dòng)行為的檢驗(yàn)及其影響分析
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-06-23 02:35
本文選題:地方政府 + 土地出讓; 參考:《中國(guó)人口·資源與環(huán)境》2017年07期
【摘要】:本文以山東省設(shè)區(qū)市地方政府土地出讓行為作為研究對(duì)象,通過(guò)構(gòu)建空間面板模型,從價(jià)格和數(shù)量?jī)蓚(gè)維度,全面檢驗(yàn)了地方政府商服、住宅、工業(yè)用地出讓的策略互動(dòng)行為,并利用空間計(jì)量工具,分析了地方政府土地出讓策略互動(dòng)行為的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)山東省內(nèi)地方政府商服、住宅、工業(yè)用地出讓價(jià)格以及工業(yè)用地出讓量存在顯著的策略互動(dòng),地方政府的商服、住宅、工業(yè)用地出讓價(jià)格以及工業(yè)用地出讓量,不僅會(huì)受城市自身情況的約束,還會(huì)受鄰近地區(qū)地方政府土地出讓行為的影響,外在表現(xiàn)為你漲我跌、你增我減的反向變動(dòng)格局;(2)由于未考慮策略互動(dòng),傳統(tǒng)計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)非空間面板模型對(duì)地方政府土地出讓行為影響因素的估計(jì)普遍存在偏誤。對(duì)于商服用地出讓價(jià)格,第三產(chǎn)業(yè)比重、人口密度的影響分別被低估了33.33%、13.08%;對(duì)于住宅用地出讓價(jià)格,人口城鎮(zhèn)化率、人均可支配收入的影響分別被低估了20.00%、9.98%,人口密度的影響被高估了32.34%;對(duì)于工業(yè)用地出讓價(jià)格,人均外商直接投資的影響被高估了3.68%;對(duì)于工業(yè)用地出讓量,第二產(chǎn)業(yè)比重、地均工業(yè)產(chǎn)值的影響分別被高估了13.95%、31.36%;(3)地方政府土地出讓行為的影響因素普遍存在明顯的空間溢出效應(yīng)。對(duì)于商服用地出讓價(jià)格,具有空間溢出效應(yīng)的影響因素為人口密度;對(duì)于住宅用地出讓價(jià)格,具有空間溢出效應(yīng)的影響因素為人口城鎮(zhèn)化率、人口密度、人均可支配收入;對(duì)于工業(yè)用地出讓價(jià)格,具有空間溢出效應(yīng)的影響因素為人均外商直接投資、地均固定資產(chǎn)投資;對(duì)于工業(yè)用地出讓量,具有空間溢出效應(yīng)的影響因素為第二產(chǎn)業(yè)比重、地均固定資產(chǎn)投資。
[Abstract]:This paper takes the land transfer behavior of the local government in the district of Shandong Province as the research object, through constructing the spatial panel model, from the two dimensions of price and quantity, the paper comprehensively examines the strategic interactive behavior of the local government commercial service, housing and industrial land transfer. Using spatial measurement tools, this paper analyzes the influence of the interactive behavior of local government land transfer strategy. The results are as follows: (1) there are significant strategic interactions among local government services, residential buildings, industrial land transfer prices and industrial land sales volume in Shandong Province, local government commercial services, housing, industrial land transfer prices and industrial land transfer volume. It will be bound not only by the city's own situation, but also by the behavior of local governments' land sales in neighboring regions. The external manifestation is that you rise and drop, you increase or decrease, you increase or decrease the reverse pattern of change; (2) because you do not consider strategic interaction, The traditional econometrics non-spatial panel model has a wide range of errors in estimating the factors affecting the land transfer behavior of local governments. The effects of commercial land transfer prices, tertiary industry proportions, and population density were underestimated by 33.33% and 13.08% respectively; for residential land transfer prices, the population urbanization rate, The impact of per capita disposable income was underestimated by 20.00 to 9.98, the impact of population density was overestimated by 32.34; for the price of industrial land transfer, the impact of foreign direct investment per capita was overestimated by 3.68; for industrial land transfer, the proportion of the secondary industry was overvalued. The influence of the industrial output value of local government was overestimated by 13.95% and 31.36% respectively. (3) the spatial spillover effect of local government land transfer behavior was obvious. For the price of commercial land transfer, the influencing factors with spatial spillover effect are population density, for residential land transfer price, the influencing factors with spatial spillover effect are population urbanization rate, population density, per capita disposable income. For the price of industrial land transfer, the influencing factors with spatial spillover effect are foreign direct investment per capita, fixed assets investment per capita, and secondary industry proportion with spatial spillover effect for industrial land transfer volume. Land average fixed assets investment.
【作者單位】: 山東師范大學(xué)商學(xué)院;池州學(xué)院管理與法學(xué)院;
【基金】:國(guó)家社科基金青年項(xiàng)目“農(nóng)村宅基地退出補(bǔ)償激勵(lì)機(jī)制研究”(批準(zhǔn)號(hào):15CJY047)
【分類號(hào)】:F301
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