本文選題：農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社　切入點(diǎn)：運(yùn)行機(jī)制　出處：《東北林業(yè)大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社是近年來興起的一種新型農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)組織。農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社可以將單個(gè)農(nóng)民聯(lián)合起來,發(fā)揮出組織優(yōu)勢(shì),從而實(shí)現(xiàn)規(guī)模生產(chǎn)、獲得技術(shù)、增加融資、降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和提高農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量。農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社對(duì)于農(nóng)民增收、農(nóng)業(yè)增效及解決“三農(nóng)問題”等方面有著重要的作用與意義。河南作為農(nóng)業(yè)大省,在政府的積極推動(dòng)下農(nóng)民合作社快速發(fā)展。合作社數(shù)量增多的同時(shí),合作社內(nèi)部的運(yùn)行機(jī)制存在著諸多問題,發(fā)展質(zhì)量與規(guī)范化水平依然較低�；诖�,本文闡述了河南省農(nóng)民合作社的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,分析了其運(yùn)行機(jī)制現(xiàn)狀及存在的問題,指出了政府行為的問題所在,并通過構(gòu)建相關(guān)博弈模型,著重探究了合作社內(nèi)部的激勵(lì)機(jī)制、決策機(jī)制與監(jiān)督機(jī)制。在借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外發(fā)展農(nóng)民合作社的經(jīng)驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了若干完善河南省農(nóng)民合作社運(yùn)行機(jī)制的建議。首先,明確研究對(duì)象,介紹先進(jìn)國(guó)家與地區(qū)的發(fā)展經(jīng)驗(yàn)。界定了農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社的概念,并將它與相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行辨析,對(duì)合作社運(yùn)行機(jī)制予以描述。通過對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外發(fā)展農(nóng)民合作社的經(jīng)驗(yàn)的介紹,得到了四點(diǎn)啟示：政府應(yīng)不斷完善相關(guān)法律法規(guī)、加大政策支持力度、健全組織領(lǐng)導(dǎo)機(jī)構(gòu)、完善服務(wù)。其次,分析河南省農(nóng)民合作社運(yùn)行機(jī)制的現(xiàn)狀及問題,并對(duì)政府行為予以分析。從若干維度介紹了河南省農(nóng)民合作社的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,全面剖析了河南省農(nóng)民合作社的運(yùn)行機(jī)制,闡述了政府行為存在的五點(diǎn)問題。再次,基于博弈論,對(duì)合作社的激勵(lì)機(jī)制、決策機(jī)制與監(jiān)督機(jī)制進(jìn)行博弈分析。設(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)同質(zhì)性合作社中給予理事長(zhǎng)物質(zhì)激勵(lì)的“有效工資率”,找到了它的構(gòu)成因素及因素間的相互關(guān)系。決策機(jī)制的博弈模型分析表明,降低社員參與決策的成本,增加社員討回的利益,可以促使博弈的結(jié)果朝著“理事長(zhǎng)不謀私,社員參與決策”的方向轉(zhuǎn)變。監(jiān)督機(jī)制的博弈模型對(duì)合作社的監(jiān)督機(jī)制運(yùn)行現(xiàn)狀做出了闡釋。最后,從政府與合作社兩方面入手去完善河南省農(nóng)民合作社的運(yùn)行機(jī)制,提出政府采取激勵(lì)支持與監(jiān)督規(guī)范并重的發(fā)展政策,合作社自身重視制度建設(shè)、健全運(yùn)行機(jī)制的建議。
[Abstract]:The farmers' specialized cooperative is a new type of agricultural production organization that has arisen in recent years. The farmer's specialized cooperative can unite the individual farmer and give play to the organizational advantage, thus realize the scale production, acquire the technology, increase the financing. Reducing risks and improving the quality of agricultural products. Farmers' specialized cooperatives play an important role and significance in increasing farmers' income, increasing agricultural efficiency and solving the "three agricultural problems". While the number of cooperatives is increasing, there are many problems in the internal operating mechanism of the cooperatives, and the quality of development and the level of standardization are still low. This paper expounds the present situation of the development of the farmers' cooperative in Henan Province, analyzes its operating mechanism and existing problems, points out the problems of the government behavior, and probes into the internal incentive mechanism of the cooperative by constructing the relevant game model. Based on the experience of developing farmers' cooperatives at home and abroad, this paper puts forward some suggestions to perfect the operating mechanism of farmers' cooperatives in Henan Province. This paper introduces the development experiences of advanced countries and regions, defines the concept of farmers' specialized cooperatives, differentiates them from related concepts, and describes the operating mechanism of cooperatives. There are four revelations: the government should constantly perfect the relevant laws and regulations, strengthen the policy support, perfect the organization of the leading organization, perfect the service. Secondly, analyze the present situation and problems of the operating mechanism of the farmers' cooperative in Henan Province. From several dimensions, this paper introduces the current situation of the development of farmers' cooperatives in Henan Province, analyzes the operating mechanism of farmers' cooperatives in Henan Province, and expounds the five problems existing in government behavior. Thirdly, based on game theory, the paper analyzes the development of farmers' cooperatives in Henan Province. Incentives for cooperatives, Based on the game analysis of decision-making mechanism and supervision mechanism, this paper designs an "effective wage rate" to give material incentive to the director in a homogeneous cooperative, and finds out the relationship between its constituent factors and factors. The model analysis shows that, Reducing the cost of members' participation in decision-making and increasing the benefits of membership can lead to the result of the game being directed towards "the director does not seek personal gains." The game model of supervision mechanism explains the current situation of cooperative supervision mechanism. Finally, the author tries to perfect the operation mechanism of Henan farmer cooperative from the two aspects of government and cooperative. The paper puts forward the suggestion that the government should adopt the development policy of encouraging and supporting and supervising and standardizing, and the cooperatives should attach importance to the system construction and perfect the operation mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北林業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F321.42

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