本文選題：國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)　切入點(diǎn)：購(gòu)銷行為　出處：《南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)是國(guó)家對(duì)糧食市場(chǎng)實(shí)行宏觀調(diào)控的微觀基礎(chǔ),一直是糧食流通體制改革的核心,其經(jīng)營(yíng)性和政策性的雙重目標(biāo)的內(nèi)在沖突使企業(yè)具有逆向操作傾向。而國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)逆向操作行為在一定程度上加劇了糧食市場(chǎng)波動(dòng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。研究國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)購(gòu)銷行為的內(nèi)在機(jī)理,探討其與政府目標(biāo)的激勵(lì)相容機(jī)制,對(duì)進(jìn)一步推進(jìn)國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)改革,提高企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)效率,增強(qiáng)國(guó)家宏觀調(diào)控,穩(wěn)定糧食市場(chǎng),提高我國(guó)糧食安全有著重要的理論價(jià)值和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文在國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)改革和發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀的背景下,深入剖析了國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)逆向操作存在的內(nèi)在機(jī)理,提出研究假說(shuō),建立譜分析模型對(duì)假說(shuō)加以驗(yàn)證;然后建立企業(yè)行為與政府目標(biāo)的激勵(lì)相容機(jī)制,旨在為避免企業(yè)逆向操作提供理論指導(dǎo);最后得到本文的研究結(jié)論:國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)改革過(guò)程中關(guān)注企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益,忽視社會(huì)效益,即改革方向的偏差,造成企業(yè)的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為;產(chǎn)權(quán)不明、經(jīng)濟(jì)主體特征、雙重目標(biāo)本質(zhì)沖突,使得國(guó)有糧食逆向操作傾向嚴(yán)重,較強(qiáng)的市場(chǎng)控制力,則賦予企業(yè)逆向操作的能力。國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)糧食收購(gòu)量與糧食收購(gòu)價(jià)格指數(shù)、糧食銷售量與糧食批發(fā)價(jià)格指數(shù)間存在周期性波動(dòng)現(xiàn)象;糧食收購(gòu)價(jià)格指數(shù)、批發(fā)價(jià)格指數(shù)與糧食購(gòu)銷售量之間存在較強(qiáng)的相關(guān)性,但糧食批發(fā)市場(chǎng)上糧食銷售量與市場(chǎng)價(jià)格的相關(guān)性高于收購(gòu)市場(chǎng)上糧食收購(gòu)量與市場(chǎng)價(jià)格的相關(guān)性;批發(fā)市場(chǎng)由于其較高的市場(chǎng)化程度,其逆向操作行為表現(xiàn)強(qiáng)于糧食收購(gòu)市場(chǎng)。政府激勵(lì)國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)執(zhí)行政策性任務(wù)時(shí),最優(yōu)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度與國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避系數(shù)、不確定因素方差及國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)成本花費(fèi)系數(shù)呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,與國(guó)有糧食企業(yè)的能力水平呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:State-owned grain enterprises are the micro basis of the state's macro-control of the grain market, and have always been the core of the reform of the grain circulation system. The internal conflict of its dual objectives of management and policy makes the enterprise have the tendency of reverse operation, while the reverse operation behavior of the state-owned grain enterprise intensifies the fluctuation risk of grain market to a certain extent. The intrinsic mechanism of selling behavior, This paper probes into the incentive compatible mechanism with the government's goal, which will further promote the reform of state-owned grain enterprises, improve the efficiency of enterprises' operation, strengthen the state's macro-control, and stabilize the grain market. It is of great theoretical value and practical significance to improve the grain security in China. Under the background of the reform and development of the state-owned grain enterprises, this paper deeply analyzes the inherent mechanism of the reverse operation of the state-owned grain enterprises, and puts forward the research hypothesis. A spectral analysis model is established to verify the hypothesis, and then an incentive compatibility mechanism between enterprise behavior and government objectives is established to provide theoretical guidance for avoiding reverse operation. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is drawn: in the process of reform of state-owned grain enterprises, attention should be paid to the economic benefits of enterprises, and social benefits should be neglected, that is, the deviation of reform direction will result in opportunistic behavior of enterprises, the property right is unclear, and the characteristics of economic subjects are not clear. Because of the conflict between the two goals, the state-owned grain reverse operation tends to be serious, and the strong market control power gives the enterprise the ability to reverse the operation. The grain purchase quantity of the state-owned grain enterprise and the grain purchase price index, There is a periodic fluctuation between grain sales volume and grain wholesale price index, and there is a strong correlation between grain purchase price index, wholesale price index and grain purchase sales volume. However, the correlation between grain sales volume and market price in the wholesale market is higher than that in the purchase market. When the government encourages the state-owned grain enterprises to carry out the policy task, the optimal incentive intensity and the risk aversion coefficient of the state-owned grain enterprises are obtained. There is a negative correlation between the variance of uncertain factors and the cost and expenditure coefficient of the state-owned grain enterprises, and a positive correlation between the variance of the uncertain factors and the ability level of the state-owned grain enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F324

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