本文選題：旅游服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈 + 機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)��； 參考：《湖南工業(yè)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著服務(wù)經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)代的到來(lái),旅游業(yè)在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中的占比越來(lái)越大,旅游服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈作為一個(gè)新的研究領(lǐng)域也逐漸興起。旅游產(chǎn)品綜合性的特點(diǎn)決定了旅游服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的運(yùn)作離不開(kāi)旅行社和服務(wù)供應(yīng)商之間的銜接和協(xié)調(diào),然而,旅游業(yè)中企業(yè)異質(zhì)性的特征決定了它們的利益目標(biāo)并不一致。服務(wù)供應(yīng)商一般不會(huì)主動(dòng)向旅行社匯報(bào)它所擁有的諸如旅游市場(chǎng)狀況和服務(wù)能力等私有信息,此外,在為游客服務(wù)過(guò)程中的偷懶和怠工等行為將共同導(dǎo)致旅行社的利益受損。因此,如何對(duì)服務(wù)供應(yīng)商實(shí)施有效激勵(lì)是旅行社面臨的實(shí)際問(wèn)題。本文綜合運(yùn)用管理學(xué)、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、博弈論、委托代理理論和機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論等多學(xué)科理論與方法,對(duì)旅行社如何運(yùn)用激勵(lì)機(jī)制來(lái)防范上述問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)研究。 首先,闡述了旅游服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的研究背景,指出了加強(qiáng)旅游服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)研究的必要性；回顧與述評(píng)了相關(guān)研究,理清了旅游服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈中的委托代理關(guān)系,論證了旅行社的核心地位。 其次,提出了防范服務(wù)供應(yīng)商道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的旁支付激勵(lì)機(jī)制。證明了旁支付激勵(lì)機(jī)制不僅能誘導(dǎo)服務(wù)供應(yīng)商提高服務(wù)努力水平,還能增加旅行社的收益并提高旅游服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的運(yùn)作效率。 此外,針對(duì)旅行社如何激勵(lì)服務(wù)供應(yīng)商努力工作并獲取真實(shí)旅游市場(chǎng)信息,進(jìn)而制定旅游報(bào)價(jià)問(wèn)題,設(shè)計(jì)了具有多目標(biāo)激勵(lì)功能的甄別合約,并分析了各因素對(duì)博弈方最優(yōu)策略和收益的影響。 進(jìn)一步,以服務(wù)供應(yīng)商的服務(wù)能力具有連續(xù)特征為拓展假設(shè),設(shè)計(jì)了既能甄別服務(wù)供應(yīng)商的真實(shí)能力信息,又能激勵(lì)其提高服務(wù)努力水平的混合型激勵(lì)機(jī)制；提出了一種限制策略實(shí)現(xiàn)了對(duì)部分低能力服務(wù)供應(yīng)商的排除,并討論了由該策略而導(dǎo)致的類(lèi)“檸檬市場(chǎng)”現(xiàn)象。 最后,總結(jié)了全文并指出了幾個(gè)進(jìn)一步研究的方向。
[Abstract]:With the arrival of service economy, tourism accounts for more and more in the global economy. As a new research field, tourism service supply chain (TSC) is emerging gradually. The comprehensive characteristics of tourism products determine that the operation of tourism service supply chain can not be separated from the connection and coordination between travel agencies and service providers. However, the heterogeneity of enterprises in tourism determines their interests and objectives are not the same. Service providers generally do not actively report private information such as tourism market conditions and service capabilities to travel agencies. In addition, idle and idle activities in the process of serving tourists will jointly cause damage to travel agencies' interests. Therefore, how to implement effective incentives to service providers is a practical problem faced by travel agencies. Based on the theories and methods of management, economics, game theory, principal-agent theory and mechanism design, this paper makes a systematic study on how travel agencies use incentive mechanism to prevent these problems. First of all, the research background of tourism service supply chain is expounded, and the necessity of strengthening the incentive mechanism design of tourism service supply chain is pointed out, and the principal-agent relationship in tourism service supply chain is clarified by reviewing and reviewing relevant research. The core position of travel agency is demonstrated. Secondly, it puts forward the side payment incentive mechanism to prevent the moral hazard of service providers. It is proved that the incentive mechanism of side payment can not only induce service providers to improve their service efforts, but also increase the income of travel agencies and improve the operational efficiency of tourism service supply chain. In addition, aiming at how travel agencies motivate service providers to work hard and obtain real tourism market information, and then formulate tourism quotation, a screening contract with multi-objective incentive function is designed. The influence of various factors on the game party's optimal strategy and income is analyzed. Furthermore, based on the hypothesis that the service provider's service capability has continuous characteristics, a hybrid incentive mechanism is designed, which can not only discriminate the true capability information of service provider, but also stimulate the service provider to improve the level of service effort. In this paper, a restriction strategy is proposed to eliminate some low-capacity service providers, and the "lemon market" phenomenon caused by this strategy is discussed. Finally, the paper summarizes the full text and points out several further research directions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F590

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