本文選題：代理成本 + 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)�。� 參考：《海南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)一直是公司治理研究的核心問題,由股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)引發(fā)的兩類利益侵害也是學(xué)術(shù)界備受關(guān)注的重要論題。一類是股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)高度分散的情況下,Jensen與Meckling(1976)認(rèn)為代理成本是經(jīng)營者與股東利益不完全一致造成的利益損失。二是股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)較為集中的情況下,Shleifer與Vishny(1997)在前人的成果上明確指出大股東侵害中小股東的可能性。我國獨(dú)特的制度背景致使這兩種利益侵占即經(jīng)理人代理成本(第一類代理成本)與控股股東代理成本(第二類代理成本)同時(shí)存在于一個(gè)上市公司,這使得綜合研究股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與兩類代理成本的關(guān)系成為可能。我國經(jīng)濟(jì)體制向市場經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)化的過程中,壟斷行業(yè)改革必然要引入競爭機(jī)制,我國的相關(guān)政策也明確指出要進(jìn)行市場化改革并積極引入競爭,旅游業(yè)作為壟斷競爭行業(yè),能為我國公司治理機(jī)制改革提供一些借鑒與啟示。 本文基于1998-2011年我國32家旅游業(yè)上市公司數(shù)據(jù),分別研究股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對兩類代理成本的作用機(jī)制和效果,并考慮兩類代理問題的整合。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：有控股股東的旅游業(yè)上市公司其代理成本顯著低于無控股股東的旅游業(yè)上市公司；控股股東持股比例與代理成本存在顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；國有控股上市公司比私人控股上市公司的代理成本低；而對于董事會(huì)性質(zhì),董事長與經(jīng)理人兩職分離能起到降低代理成本的作用,但是董事會(huì)規(guī)模卻對代理成本起支持作用。
[Abstract]:Ownership structure has always been the core issue in the research of corporate governance. The two kinds of interest infringement caused by ownership structure are also an important topic in academic circles. One is that when the ownership structure is highly dispersed, Jensen and Mecklinglinger think that agency cost is the loss of interest caused by the incongruity of the interests of managers and shareholders. The second is that Shleifer and Vishny1997 clearly point out the possibility of large shareholders encroaching on minority shareholders on the basis of previous achievements. Because of the unique institutional background of our country, these two kinds of interests usurpation, that is, the agent cost of the manager (the first kind of agency cost) and the agency cost of the controlling shareholder (the second kind of agency cost) exist simultaneously in a listed company. This makes it possible to study the relationship between ownership structure and two kinds of agency cost. In the process of transforming our country's economic system to market economy, the reform of monopoly industry is bound to introduce competition mechanism. The relevant policies of our country also point out clearly that we should carry out market-oriented reform and actively introduce competition, and that tourism is the monopolistic competition industry. It can provide some reference and inspiration for the reform of corporate governance mechanism in China. Based on the data of 32 listed tourism companies in China from 1998 to 2011, this paper studies the mechanism and effect of equity structure on the two types of agency costs, and considers the integration of the two types of agency problems. It is found that the agency cost of tourism listed companies with controlling shareholders is significantly lower than that of tourism listed companies without controlling shareholders, and there is a significant negative correlation between the proportion of controlling shareholders and agency costs. The agency cost of the state-owned listed company is lower than that of the private listed company. For the nature of the board of directors, the separation of the chairman and the manager can reduce the agency cost, but the size of the board of directors plays a supporting role in the agency cost.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：海南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F592.6

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