本文選題：旅游企業(yè) + 地方政府　； 參考：《北京工業(yè)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：受管理與資金兩方面的制約，許多旅游景區(qū)都走上了轉(zhuǎn)讓經(jīng)營權(quán)的行列，使景區(qū)資源得到了有效的開發(fā)，經(jīng)營權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓已成為全國旅游景區(qū)發(fā)展的趨勢。雖然旅游景區(qū)經(jīng)營權(quán)成功轉(zhuǎn)讓的案例很多，但在具體實踐中也產(chǎn)生了許多問題。例如不合理開發(fā)造成的環(huán)境污染、國有資產(chǎn)的流失與毀損、旅游企業(yè)可能為了逃避處罰或獲得政策優(yōu)惠而向地方政府展開尋租引起社會資源浪費、甚至景區(qū)經(jīng)營權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓計劃還會出現(xiàn)中途流產(chǎn)等。學(xué)者們對景區(qū)經(jīng)營權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓的關(guān)注越來越高，并已經(jīng)開始利用博弈論來分析相關(guān)問題，其核心的博弈主體是地方政府與獲得經(jīng)營權(quán)的旅游企業(yè)，具體的博弈問題有旅游企業(yè)在經(jīng)營權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓后是否會進(jìn)行合理開發(fā)以及是否為了獲得政策優(yōu)惠或規(guī)避處罰而向地方政府進(jìn)行游說，地方政府是否會有效監(jiān)管旅游企業(yè)的違規(guī)開發(fā)以及是否會為了短期政績和個人私利而受賄等等。 文章在借鑒現(xiàn)代產(chǎn)權(quán)理論、尋租理論及演化博弈理論的基礎(chǔ)上，以對旅游景區(qū)市場化經(jīng)營的必要性與可行性、旅游景區(qū)市場化經(jīng)營中出現(xiàn)的主要問題進(jìn)行分析為切入點，通過建立地方政府與獲得經(jīng)營權(quán)的旅游企業(yè)間的演化博弈模型，對地方政府與旅游企業(yè)的行為策略進(jìn)行分析，并利用復(fù)制動態(tài)方程與演化穩(wěn)定策略的方法求出二者在這些問題中的優(yōu)勢策略組合以及實現(xiàn)優(yōu)勢策略組合所需要的條件，，進(jìn)而提出相應(yīng)的政策建議，為今后旅游景區(qū)資源的開發(fā)規(guī)劃提供理論與實踐指導(dǎo)。
[Abstract]:Restricted by two aspects of management and capital, many tourist attractions have taken the ranks of the right of transfer and management, which have made the resources of scenic spots effectively developed, and the transfer of management rights has become the trend of the development of the national tourist attractions. Although there are many cases of the successful transfer of the management rights of tourist attractions, many problems have also been produced in concrete practice. For example, there are many problems in the specific practice. The environmental pollution caused by irrational development, the loss and damage of state-owned assets, tourism enterprises may seek rent from local governments to escape punishment or obtain preferential policy, and cause the waste of social resources, even the transfer plan of the scenic spots will appear midway abortion, etc. scholars pay more and more attention to the transfer of management rights in scenic spots, The game theory has begun to use the game theory to analyze the related issues. The core of the game is the local government and the tourist enterprises that obtain the right to operate. The specific game problem is whether the tourism enterprise will develop the reasonable development after the transfer of the management rights and whether the local government is lobbying for the preferential policy or the avoidance of punishment. Whether the government will effectively supervise the illegal development of tourism enterprises and whether it will accept bribes for short-term performance and personal interests and so on.
On the basis of modern property rights theory, rent-seeking theory and evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the necessity and feasibility of the market management of tourist attractions, analyzes the main problems in the market management of tourist attractions, and establishes an evolutionary game model between local government and tourist enterprises. The behavior strategy of local government and tourism enterprise is analyzed, and the method of replicating dynamic equation and evolutionary stabilization strategy is used to find out the combination of advantages and Strategies of the two in these problems and the conditions needed to realize the combination of advantages strategy, and then the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward to provide a rational plan for the development and planning of tourist attractions in the future. The guidance of the theory and practice.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：D630;F592.7;F224.32

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