【摘要】：隨著全球金融業(yè)混業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)大趨勢(shì)的不斷發(fā)展和我國(guó)金融業(yè)逐步放開(kāi)，在這種內(nèi)在的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和驅(qū)動(dòng)之下，我國(guó)金融集團(tuán)（Financial Conglomerate）的數(shù)量和規(guī)模發(fā)展迅猛，我國(guó)已有如平安集團(tuán)、招商集團(tuán)、中信集團(tuán)等大型金融集團(tuán)成立，金融混業(yè)的模式初見(jiàn)端倪。金融混業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)下的利益沖突問(wèn)題備受投資者、監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的關(guān)注。所以本論文以金融混業(yè)為背景，基于證券公司控制與存在隸屬關(guān)系的基金管理公司和證券公司自身資產(chǎn)管理部門(mén)的證券分析師行為影響關(guān)系作為研究對(duì)象，揭示其中存在的利益沖突可能對(duì)分析師研究報(bào)告的質(zhì)量存在沖擊，進(jìn)一步地，考察聲譽(yù)機(jī)制是否能緩解這種影響。 文章分為理論與實(shí)證兩部分，形成邏輯框架，首先從理論上分析了券商旗下分析師、證券公司以及基金管理公司之間相互的關(guān)系；其次運(yùn)用實(shí)證研究方法，探討了關(guān)聯(lián)分析師對(duì)券商附屬基金所持股票盈余預(yù)測(cè)樂(lè)觀性方面的行為研究。此外，，還研究了聲譽(yù)機(jī)制對(duì)當(dāng)選為明星分析師的這類(lèi)人群盈余預(yù)測(cè)樂(lè)觀程度的行為影響。 通過(guò)研究分析，本文得到以下結(jié)論，相較于非關(guān)聯(lián)券商旗下分析師，關(guān)聯(lián)分析師對(duì)附屬基金持有的股票傾向于樂(lè)觀的盈余預(yù)測(cè)；更進(jìn)一步地發(fā)現(xiàn)，附屬基金所持股票比重越高，尤其對(duì)基金重倉(cāng)股時(shí)，關(guān)聯(lián)分析師提供的盈余預(yù)測(cè)越樂(lè)觀。最后我們還研究表明明星分析師會(huì)考慮自身聲譽(yù)因素，相較于關(guān)聯(lián)分析師中的非明星分析師，對(duì)附屬基金所持的股票盈余的預(yù)測(cè)更精準(zhǔn)。我國(guó)每年花大量物力財(cái)力去評(píng)選各個(gè)行業(yè)的最佳分析師是有必要的。 最后，本文指出完善金融監(jiān)管等政策建議和肯定了每年評(píng)選明星分析師這一舉措的必要性。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of the mixed operation of global financial industry and the gradual liberalization of China's financial industry, under this internal competition and drive, the number and scale of China's financial group (Financial Conglomerate) has developed rapidly, such as Ping an Group in our country. China Merchants Group, CITIC Group and other large financial groups established, financial mixed industry model first appeared. The conflict of interest under the mixed operation of financial industry has been paid close attention to by investors and regulators. Therefore, this paper is based on the background of financial mixed industry, based on the relationship between securities companies' control and the existence of subordinate relationship between fund management companies and their own asset management departments of securities analysts' behavior impact relationship as the research object. To reveal that the conflicts of interest may have an impact on the quality of analysts' research reports, and further to examine whether the reputation mechanism can mitigate this impact. The paper is divided into two parts: theoretical and empirical, forming a logical framework. Firstly, it analyzes the relationship among the analysts, securities companies and fund management companies of securities companies from the theoretical point of view. Secondly, by using the empirical research method, this paper discusses the behavior of related analysts in predicting the earnings of stock held by securities affiliated funds. In addition, the influence of reputation mechanism on the degree of optimism in earnings prediction of such a group of people elected as star analysts was also studied. Through the research and analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: compared with the analysts of non-affiliated securities firms, the affiliated analysts tend to forecast earnings optimistically on the stocks held by subsidiary funds; Further, it was found that the higher the share of shares held by affiliated funds, the more optimistic the earnings forecasts provided by associated analysts, especially when it came to heavy positions in funds. Finally, our research shows that star analysts take their reputation into account and predict earnings from equity held by affiliated funds more accurately than non-star analysts among related analysts. It is necessary for China to spend a great deal of material and financial resources each year to select the best analysts in various industries. Finally, this paper points out some policy suggestions such as perfecting financial supervision and affirms the necessity of selecting star analysts every year.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.39;F830.42

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