【摘要】：隨著我國證券市場的發(fā)展，預(yù)測性財(cái)務(wù)信息的重要性日益凸顯，其中盈利預(yù)測更是受到了投資者的重點(diǎn)關(guān)注。在盈利預(yù)測信息的供應(yīng)鏈中，公司管理層業(yè)績預(yù)告和證券分析師盈利預(yù)測是投資者獲取公司未來盈利信息的兩大途徑。公司業(yè)績預(yù)告是其管理層對(duì)公司特定會(huì)計(jì)期間盈利能力的預(yù)測，是重要的公共信息。分析師盈利預(yù)測是證券分析師在解讀公共和私有信息的基礎(chǔ)上，傳遞給市場的關(guān)于公司未來盈利能力的增量信息。公司管理層和證券分析師盈利預(yù)測都有助于改善信息不對(duì)稱問題，提高資本市場的資源配置效率。 現(xiàn)代公司的兩權(quán)分離，提高了信息不對(duì)稱性和代理成本，使得管理層存在違規(guī)業(yè)績預(yù)告的自利動(dòng)機(jī)，增加了分析師的信息風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。同時(shí)，分析師還面臨著供職券商和客戶公司的雙重委托壓力，可能會(huì)為了討好管理層而發(fā)布有偏預(yù)測結(jié)果。在我國新興轉(zhuǎn)型的資本市場中、在信息和監(jiān)管環(huán)境相對(duì)薄弱的制度背景下，公司管理層業(yè)績預(yù)告的違規(guī)披露會(huì)對(duì)分析師預(yù)測產(chǎn)生什么影響，是本文研究的重點(diǎn)。 本文在借鑒國內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上，結(jié)合我國特有制度背景，考察了公司管理層業(yè)績預(yù)告中出現(xiàn)的“未預(yù)告”、“錯(cuò)誤預(yù)告”、“延遲預(yù)告”和“變臉”等違規(guī)行為對(duì)分析師跟進(jìn)決策和盈利預(yù)測質(zhì)量的影響。本文選取了2009-2011年滬深A(yù)股披露業(yè)績預(yù)告并有分析師跟進(jìn)的上市公司為樣本，在描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)和相關(guān)性分析的基礎(chǔ)上，，分別以分析師跟進(jìn)人數(shù)、分析師預(yù)測誤差和分歧度為被解釋變量，以管理層業(yè)績預(yù)告是否違規(guī)為解釋變量，以公司治理、盈余質(zhì)量和公司價(jià)值等因素為控制變量進(jìn)行多元回歸分析，并以深交所信息披露考評(píng)指標(biāo)為替代變量進(jìn)行了穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)。描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)結(jié)果顯示，我國滬深A(yù)股上市公司管理層傾向于披露好消息，并且近年來違規(guī)披露比例有所下降。分析師盈利預(yù)測整體準(zhǔn)確性較高，但具有明顯的樂觀傾向。相關(guān)性分析和回歸結(jié)果顯示管理層違規(guī)預(yù)告對(duì)分析師預(yù)測行為及結(jié)果有顯著影響，主要結(jié)論為：當(dāng)管理層違規(guī)預(yù)告時(shí)，分析師跟進(jìn)這一上市公司的人數(shù)會(huì)減少，分析師盈利預(yù)測的準(zhǔn)確性下降，分歧度提高。說明我國證券分析師在一定程度上能夠識(shí)別管理層的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為，但由于業(yè)績預(yù)告信息的不確定性和固有的利益沖突，導(dǎo)致盈利預(yù)測具有普遍的樂觀偏差。
[Abstract]:With the development of China's securities market, the importance of predictive financial information is becoming more and more prominent. In the supply chain of earnings forecast information, management performance forecast and stock analyst earnings forecast are two main ways for investors to obtain future earnings information. The company performance forecast is the management's forecast of the company's profitability in a specific accounting period and is an important public information. Analysts' earnings forecasts are incremental information that securities analysts pass to the market about a company's future profitability based on the interpretation of public and private information. Both management and equity analysts' earnings forecasts help improve information asymmetry and resource allocation efficiency in capital markets. The separation of the two rights of modern companies increases the information asymmetry and agency cost, which makes the management have the self-interest motive of the illegal performance forecast, and increases the information risk of the analysts. At the same time, analysts are also under pressure from both brokerage and client firms to issue biased forecasts to please management. Under the background of weak information and regulatory environment in the newly transformed capital market of our country, what effect will the illegal disclosure of company management performance forecast have on the analyst forecast, which is the focus of this paper. On the basis of reference from relevant literature at home and abroad, combined with the background of China's unique system, this paper investigates the "unannounced", "false foretell" in the management performance forecast of the company. The impact of irregularities such as "deferred forecasts" and "face changes" on the quality of analysts' follow-up decisions and earnings forecasts. Based on descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, this paper selects the listed companies which disclose the earnings forecast of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares in 2009-2011 and has analysts to follow up with the number of analysts. The forecast error and divergence degree of the analyst are explained variables, whether the management performance forecast is irregular or not, and the factors such as corporate governance, earnings quality and company value are taken as the controlling variables to carry out multivariate regression analysis. And the Shenzhen Stock Exchange information disclosure evaluation index as a substitute variable for the robustness test. The results of descriptive statistics show that the managers of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies tend to disclose good news, and the proportion of illegal disclosure has decreased in recent years. Analyst earnings forecast overall accuracy is high, but has the obvious optimistic tendency. The correlation analysis and regression results show that the forecast behavior and results of the analyst are significantly affected by the management non-compliance forecast. The main conclusions are: when the management violates the forecast, the number of analysts following the listed company will decrease. The accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts declined and divergence improved. It shows that Chinese securities analysts can identify the opportunistic behavior of management to a certain extent, but due to the uncertainty of performance forecast information and inherent conflict of interest, the profit forecast has a general optimistic deviation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：暨南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F830.42;F832.51

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