【摘要】：2008年美國(guó)金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)后,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性在企業(yè)中發(fā)揮的作用以及高管薪酬契約的有效性這兩個(gè)問(wèn)題引發(fā)了人們的關(guān)注。會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性需求主要來(lái)自于契約,其中高管薪酬契約是產(chǎn)生會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性需求的原因之一。隨著資本主義經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度逐步確立,所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)的分離產(chǎn)生了委托-代理關(guān)系。由于信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)以及利己主義,會(huì)產(chǎn)生代理人的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和逆向選擇。委托人為了減輕代理人的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和自利行為,便在企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)和薪酬制定方面引入了會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性。但會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性在高管薪酬契約中的運(yùn)用并沒(méi)有達(dá)到“最佳水平”,高管薪酬契約“好消息”和“壞消息”的不對(duì)稱(chēng)反映的薪酬設(shè)計(jì)理念應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。這種高管薪酬契約的設(shè)計(jì)從一個(gè)側(cè)面反映了會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性存在于管理層薪酬契約中。目前我國(guó)上市公司基本建立了以會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)?yōu)榛A(chǔ)的高管薪酬評(píng)價(jià)體系,但是由于信息不對(duì)稱(chēng),管理層為了實(shí)現(xiàn)自身利益的最大化,產(chǎn)生盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī),進(jìn)而會(huì)影響到企業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性水平。 首先對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性和高管薪酬契約方面的研究成果進(jìn)行回顧,接著是對(duì)相關(guān)理論的闡述。通過(guò)以上的回顧和分析,提出本文的假設(shè)并進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。本文選取了2004-2011年的我國(guó)上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù),對(duì)假設(shè)一和假設(shè)二分別運(yùn)用Basu (1997)盈余-股票報(bào)酬計(jì)量方法和Basu(1997)盈余持續(xù)性計(jì)量方法對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性進(jìn)行度量。借鑒Leone,Wu和Zmi merman的方法,構(gòu)建了假設(shè)一模型；借鑒Basu (1997)盈余持續(xù)性模型構(gòu)建了假設(shè)二的模型。通過(guò)對(duì)數(shù)據(jù)回歸分析,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)在我國(guó)上市公司的高管薪酬契約中存在會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性,因?yàn)楫?dāng)公司出現(xiàn)“好消息”時(shí),管理層薪酬與公司業(yè)績(jī)的相關(guān)性程度低于當(dāng)公司出現(xiàn)“壞消息”時(shí)。(2)在我國(guó)上市公司中,高管薪酬與會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)的相關(guān)性程度越高,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性越差。
[Abstract]:After the outbreak of the American financial crisis in 2008, the role of accounting conservatism in enterprises and the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts have attracted people's attention. Accounting conservatism demand mainly comes from contract, among which executive compensation contract is one of the reasons for accounting conservatism demand. With the development of capitalist economy, modern enterprise system has been gradually established, and the separation of ownership and management has produced principal-agent relationship. Because of information asymmetry and egoism, agent moral hazard and adverse selection will be produced. In order to reduce the moral hazard and self-interest of the agent, the principal introduces the accounting conservatism in the aspects of enterprise accounting and salary formulation. However, the application of accounting conservatism in executive compensation contract has not reached the "best level", and the asymmetric compensation design concept of "good news" and "bad news" of executive compensation contract emerges as the times require. The design of executive compensation contract reflects accounting conservatism in management compensation contract. At present, the listed companies in our country have basically established an executive compensation evaluation system based on accounting performance. However, because of the asymmetry of information, in order to maximize their own interests, the management has the motive of earnings management. In turn, it will affect the accounting conservatism level of enterprises. Firstly, it reviews the domestic and foreign research results on accounting conservatism and executive compensation contract, and then expounds the relevant theories. Through the above review and analysis, this paper puts forward the hypothesis and carries on the empirical analysis. This paper selects the financial data of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2011 and measures accounting conservatism using Basu (1997) earnings-stock return measurement method and Basu (1997) earnings persistence measurement method respectively. Using the methods of Leone,Wu and Zmi merman to construct a hypothesis-one model, and Basu (1997) earnings persistence model to construct a hypothesis-2 model. Through regression analysis of data, we find that: (1) Accounting conservatism exists in executive compensation contracts of listed companies in China, because when there is "good news" in companies, The correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance is lower than that when there is "bad news". (2) in Chinese listed companies, the higher the correlation between executive compensation and accounting performance, the worse accounting conservatism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275.2;F272.9

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