固定價(jià)格合同和成本加酬金合同選擇研究
[Abstract]:According to the choice of fixed price and cost plus gratuities in construction contract, this paper tries to find the fit between construction project and contract type. The aim is to avoid such phenomena as waste of resources, disputes, breach of contract, suspension of work and so on, due to improper selection of fixed price contracts and cost plus gratuities contracts, so as to reduce the huge economic losses incurred as a result of this. To maximize the benefits of both parties. Since the owner plays a decisive role in the choice of contract type, this paper studies the choice of contract type from the angle of owner. In order to solve this problem, this paper uses the system analysis method to analyze the two kinds of contracts. On the basis of theoretical research and current investigation, two contract models are established from the perspective of principal-agent theory. The main contents of this paper are as follows: through the questionnaire survey of "Construction contract selection", the use and selection of the two kinds of contracts are systematically analyzed. Combined with the basis and method of selecting two kinds of contracts, the deficiency of the selection method is summarized. On this basis, according to the principal-agent theory, this paper constructs the principal-agent model of two types of contracts, using the utility function model to analyze the choice of the two contracts by setting the parameters in the model. From two aspects of cost minimization and efficiency maximization, this paper intuitively reflects the influence of different parameters on the choice of two contract types, and makes up for the deficiency of the selection method. Based on the two kinds of contract models, the risk factors are introduced from the work content, the risk of engineering quantity and the unit price of the project, and the established utility model, and the analysis and distribution of the contract types in these four aspects are analyzed in the light of the risks existing in the two kinds of contracts. According to the owner's own risk bearing ability, it provides the basis and help for analyzing how to choose the suitable contract type.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:西安建筑科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號(hào)】:F406.7;TU723.1
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