【摘要】：華為技術(shù)有限公司是一家大型的綜合通信設(shè)備制造企業(yè)，從1987年成立到現(xiàn)在，公司遇到了一系列的窘境和困難。比如，發(fā)展初期的融資困難，2003年非典時(shí)期出口受阻，骨干員工流失，2008年全球金融危機(jī)時(shí)期經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條，全球需求下降，員工股票大批贖回以及2012年后通信行業(yè)大洗牌，2013年國(guó)內(nèi)銀行停止為員工提供貸款等。在這期間一些耳熟能詳?shù)拇笮蛧?guó)外通信企業(yè)（例如:西門(mén)子，北電，摩托羅拉等）都已經(jīng)紛紛退出了歷史舞臺(tái)，，愛(ài)立信、諾基亞西門(mén)子和朗訊-阿爾卡特等國(guó)際巨頭的整體市場(chǎng)占有率都不同程度的萎縮了，但是華為公司卻大踏步的向前發(fā)展，銷(xiāo)售額從1987年的100多萬(wàn)元增長(zhǎng)到2013年的2200多億元，已經(jīng)全面超越愛(ài)立信成為全球銷(xiāo)售額排名第一的通信公司，員工也已經(jīng)從當(dāng)初的國(guó)內(nèi)幾十人發(fā)展到現(xiàn)在的遍布全球的十幾萬(wàn)人，這不得不讓我們深思華為公司成功背后的原因。本文認(rèn)為華為公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度是其成功的最重要的原因，在不同的發(fā)展時(shí)期起到了舉足輕重的作用，有它獨(dú)特的內(nèi)容和形式，本文將對(duì)華為公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度進(jìn)行研究。 本文首先從股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度與公司業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)系的視角對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的相關(guān)研究進(jìn)行了總結(jié)，并闡述了股權(quán)激勵(lì)理論及主要的實(shí)施模式；其次，結(jié)合不同背景下華為公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的發(fā)展歷程，總結(jié)出華為公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的主要特點(diǎn)，并從股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的理論和實(shí)施模式角度出發(fā)，分析了華為公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度成功的內(nèi)在原因及其適用性；最后，把華為和中興通訊公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度進(jìn)行了對(duì)比分析，并結(jié)合上市公司的面板數(shù)據(jù)，運(yùn)用T檢驗(yàn)的方法證明了股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度與公司業(yè)績(jī)具有正相關(guān)性。 本文研究了華為公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的主要特點(diǎn)以及實(shí)施模式，華為公司實(shí)施了高強(qiáng)度和廣度的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度，稀釋了大股東的比例，在飽和配股的同時(shí)，實(shí)現(xiàn)了分配的公平和效率，并且把股權(quán)激勵(lì)和公司的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益掛鉤，大大激發(fā)了員工的工作積極性。希望華為公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的特點(diǎn)和實(shí)施模式能夠?qū)ζ渌髽I(yè)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度起到有效的借鑒作用。
[Abstract]:Huawei Technology Co., Ltd. is a large integrated communications equipment manufacturing company, from its establishment in 1987 to now, the company has encountered a series of difficulties and difficulties. For example, financing difficulties in the early stages of development, export disruptions during the SARS period in 2003, loss of key staff, economic depression during the global financial crisis in 2008, and declining global demand, Massive stock redemptions by employees and a shake-up in the communications industry after 2012 stopped domestic banks from lending to employees in 2013. During this period, a number of well-known foreign telecommunications enterprises (such as Siemens, Nortel, Motorola, etc.) have withdrawn from the historical stage one after another, Ericsson, While the overall market share of international giants such as Nokia Siemens and Lucent Alcatel has shrunk to varying degrees, Huawei has made great strides forward, with sales increasing from more than 10 million yuan in 1987 to more than 22 billion yuan in 2013. Has overtaken Ericsson to become the world's largest communications company by sales, and its employees have grown from dozens at home to more than 100, 000 worldwide, which has led us to ponder the reasons behind Huawei's success. This paper holds that the equity incentive system of Huawei Company is the most important reason for its success. It plays an important role in different periods of development and has its unique content and form. This paper will study the stock right incentive system of Huawei Company. Firstly, this paper summarizes the research on the equity incentive system at home and abroad from the perspective of the relationship between equity incentive system and company performance, and expounds the equity incentive theory and the main implementation mode. Combined with the development course of the stock right incentive system of Huawei Company under different background, this paper summarizes the main characteristics of the equity incentive system of Huawei Company, and sets out from the angle of the theory and implementation mode of the stock right incentive system. This paper analyzes the internal reasons for the success of the equity incentive system of Huawei and its applicability. Finally, the paper compares the equity incentive system of Huawei and ZTE, and combines the panel data of listed companies. The method of T-test is used to prove the positive correlation between equity incentive system and corporate performance. This paper studies the main characteristics and implementation mode of Huawei's equity incentive system. Huawei has implemented a high intensity and wide equity incentive system, which dilutes the proportion of large shareholders and saturates the rights issue at the same time. The fairness and efficiency of distribution are realized, and the equity incentive is linked with the economic benefit of the company, which greatly stimulates the enthusiasm of the staff. It is hoped that the characteristics and implementation mode of Huawei's equity incentive system can be used as an effective reference for other enterprises' equity incentive system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F426.6;F406.7

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