【摘要】：信息指引著社會(huì)資金流向各實(shí)體部門(mén)，信息披露是證券市場(chǎng)的基石，信息披露質(zhì)量決定著信息使用者能否做出有效決策。現(xiàn)有研究表明公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的完善程度將決定著管理層權(quán)力的強(qiáng)弱，外部審計(jì)師可以提高上市公司的信息披露質(zhì)量，那么管理層權(quán)力是否會(huì)影響審計(jì)師的監(jiān)督治理作用呢？這是一個(gè)值得深究的話題。本文引入管理層權(quán)力這一概念，按照“上市公司公司治理不完善——管理層權(quán)力的形成——管理層的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為——外部審計(jì)師監(jiān)督、制約——信息披露質(zhì)量形成”這條主線，將管理層權(quán)力、審計(jì)師選擇結(jié)合起來(lái)，并著重剖析他們對(duì)上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量的共同影響。 本文首先回顧了國(guó)內(nèi)外管理層權(quán)力對(duì)信息披露質(zhì)量影響的文獻(xiàn)，審計(jì)師選擇對(duì)信息披露質(zhì)量影響的文獻(xiàn)以及管理層權(quán)力對(duì)審計(jì)師選擇的文獻(xiàn)，然后以委托代理等理論作為理論基礎(chǔ)，提出了五個(gè)研究假設(shè)，構(gòu)建了兩個(gè)研究模型，，以2006-2011年間滬深兩市7293家上市公司為樣本，實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了管理層權(quán)力對(duì)信息披露質(zhì)量的影響、審計(jì)師對(duì)信息披露質(zhì)量的影響以及二者對(duì)信息披露質(zhì)量的共同影響。實(shí)證分析共分為三部分，第一部分是管理層權(quán)力、審計(jì)師以及信息披露質(zhì)量的描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)，第二部分是管理層權(quán)力、審計(jì)師選擇與信息披露質(zhì)量的相關(guān)性分析和回歸分析，第三部分運(yùn)用Heckman兩階段回歸的方法對(duì)審計(jì)師選擇與信息披露質(zhì)量?jī)?nèi)生性問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)。 實(shí)證研究結(jié)果顯示：（1）管理層權(quán)力會(huì)降低信息披露質(zhì)量；（2）非國(guó)有上市公司管理層權(quán)力的增強(qiáng)更容易降低信息披露質(zhì)量；（3）競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性行業(yè)上市公司管理層權(quán)力的增強(qiáng)更容易降低信息披露質(zhì)量；（4）選擇高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)師能夠提高上市公司的信息披露質(zhì)量；（5）管理層權(quán)力的增強(qiáng)能夠弱化高質(zhì)量審計(jì)師對(duì)信息披露質(zhì)量的提升作用。 本文的研究結(jié)論對(duì)于提高信息披露質(zhì)量有一定的指導(dǎo)意義。在未來(lái)，上市公司應(yīng)健全公司治理機(jī)制，區(qū)分公司性質(zhì)和行業(yè)特征，進(jìn)一步規(guī)范管理層權(quán)力，同時(shí)鼓勵(lì)國(guó)內(nèi)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所合并，擴(kuò)大規(guī)模，提高審計(jì)質(zhì)量，增強(qiáng)其外部治理作用。
[Abstract]:Information guides the social capital flow to various entities, information disclosure is the cornerstone of the securities market, the quality of information disclosure determines whether information users can make effective decisions. Existing studies show that the degree of perfection of corporate governance structure will determine the strength of management power, external auditors can improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, so whether the power of management will affect the governance role of auditors? This is a topic worthy of further study. This paper introduces the concept of management power. According to the concept of "imperfect governance of listed companies-formation of management power-opportunistic behavior of management-supervision by external auditors", The main line of restricting the formation of information disclosure quality combines the power of management and the choice of auditors, and analyzes their common influence on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. This paper first reviews the literature on the influence of management power on the quality of information disclosure at home and abroad, the influence of auditor selection on the quality of information disclosure, and the literature on the choice of management power to auditor. Then, based on the principal-agent theory, five research hypotheses are put forward, and two research models are constructed. Taking 7293 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2006 to 2011 as samples, the paper empirically tests the influence of management power on the quality of information disclosure. Auditor's influence on the quality of information disclosure and their mutual influence on the quality of information disclosure. The empirical analysis is divided into three parts: the first part is the descriptive statistics of the management power, auditor and the quality of information disclosure, the second part is the management power, the correlation analysis and regression analysis between auditor selection and the quality of information disclosure. The third part uses the Heckman two-stage regression method to test the internal problem of auditor selection and information disclosure quality. The empirical results show that: (1) the power of management will reduce the quality of information disclosure, (2) the enhancement of management power of non-state-owned listed companies is easier to reduce the quality of information disclosure; (3) it is easier to reduce the quality of information disclosure by strengthening the management power of listed companies in competitive industries, (4) to select high quality auditors can improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies; (5) the enhancement of management power can weaken the effect of high-quality auditors on the quality of information disclosure. The conclusion of this paper has certain guiding significance for improving the quality of information disclosure. In the future, listed companies should improve the corporate governance mechanism, regional branch nature and industry characteristics, further standardize the power of management, at the same time encourage domestic accounting firms to merge, expand the scale, and improve audit quality. Enhance its external governance role.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F276.6;F233

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