【摘要】：信息指引著社會資金流向各實體部門，信息披露是證券市場的基石，信息披露質量決定著信息使用者能否做出有效決策�，F(xiàn)有研究表明公司治理結構的完善程度將決定著管理層權力的強弱，外部審計師可以提高上市公司的信息披露質量，那么管理層權力是否會影響審計師的監(jiān)督治理作用呢？這是一個值得深究的話題。本文引入管理層權力這一概念，按照“上市公司公司治理不完善——管理層權力的形成——管理層的機會主義行為——外部審計師監(jiān)督、制約——信息披露質量形成”這條主線，將管理層權力、審計師選擇結合起來，并著重剖析他們對上市公司信息披露質量的共同影響。 本文首先回顧了國內外管理層權力對信息披露質量影響的文獻，審計師選擇對信息披露質量影響的文獻以及管理層權力對審計師選擇的文獻，然后以委托代理等理論作為理論基礎，提出了五個研究假設，構建了兩個研究模型，，以2006-2011年間滬深兩市7293家上市公司為樣本，實證檢驗了管理層權力對信息披露質量的影響、審計師對信息披露質量的影響以及二者對信息披露質量的共同影響。實證分析共分為三部分，第一部分是管理層權力、審計師以及信息披露質量的描述性統(tǒng)計，第二部分是管理層權力、審計師選擇與信息披露質量的相關性分析和回歸分析，第三部分運用Heckman兩階段回歸的方法對審計師選擇與信息披露質量內生性問題進行了穩(wěn)健性檢驗。 實證研究結果顯示：（1）管理層權力會降低信息披露質量；（2）非國有上市公司管理層權力的增強更容易降低信息披露質量；（3）競爭性行業(yè)上市公司管理層權力的增強更容易降低信息披露質量；（4）選擇高質量的審計師能夠提高上市公司的信息披露質量；（5）管理層權力的增強能夠弱化高質量審計師對信息披露質量的提升作用。 本文的研究結論對于提高信息披露質量有一定的指導意義。在未來，上市公司應健全公司治理機制，區(qū)分公司性質和行業(yè)特征，進一步規(guī)范管理層權力，同時鼓勵國內會計師事務所合并，擴大規(guī)模，提高審計質量，增強其外部治理作用。
[Abstract]:Information guides the social capital flow to various entities, information disclosure is the cornerstone of the securities market, the quality of information disclosure determines whether information users can make effective decisions. Existing studies show that the degree of perfection of corporate governance structure will determine the strength of management power, external auditors can improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, so whether the power of management will affect the governance role of auditors? This is a topic worthy of further study. This paper introduces the concept of management power. According to the concept of "imperfect governance of listed companies-formation of management power-opportunistic behavior of management-supervision by external auditors", The main line of restricting the formation of information disclosure quality combines the power of management and the choice of auditors, and analyzes their common influence on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. This paper first reviews the literature on the influence of management power on the quality of information disclosure at home and abroad, the influence of auditor selection on the quality of information disclosure, and the literature on the choice of management power to auditor. Then, based on the principal-agent theory, five research hypotheses are put forward, and two research models are constructed. Taking 7293 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2006 to 2011 as samples, the paper empirically tests the influence of management power on the quality of information disclosure. Auditor's influence on the quality of information disclosure and their mutual influence on the quality of information disclosure. The empirical analysis is divided into three parts: the first part is the descriptive statistics of the management power, auditor and the quality of information disclosure, the second part is the management power, the correlation analysis and regression analysis between auditor selection and the quality of information disclosure. The third part uses the Heckman two-stage regression method to test the internal problem of auditor selection and information disclosure quality. The empirical results show that: (1) the power of management will reduce the quality of information disclosure, (2) the enhancement of management power of non-state-owned listed companies is easier to reduce the quality of information disclosure; (3) it is easier to reduce the quality of information disclosure by strengthening the management power of listed companies in competitive industries, (4) to select high quality auditors can improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies; (5) the enhancement of management power can weaken the effect of high-quality auditors on the quality of information disclosure. The conclusion of this paper has certain guiding significance for improving the quality of information disclosure. In the future, listed companies should improve the corporate governance mechanism, regional branch nature and industry characteristics, further standardize the power of management, at the same time encourage domestic accounting firms to merge, expand the scale, and improve audit quality. Enhance its external governance role.
【學位授予單位】：石河子大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F276.6;F233

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