本文選題：制造業(yè) + 高新技術(shù)��； 參考：《信陽師范學(xué)院》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：本研究通過建立線性回歸方程模型分別對我國2007年至2012年問高新技術(shù)制造業(yè)及傳統(tǒng)制造業(yè)上市公司高級管理人員股權(quán)激勵機(jī)制實施效果進(jìn)行實證研究及對比研究,研究結(jié)果顯示：高級管理人員股權(quán)激勵機(jī)制的實施在我國高新技術(shù)類制造業(yè)上市公司中效果不顯著,而在傳統(tǒng)類制造業(yè)上市公司中顯著有效。 高新技術(shù)制造業(yè)上市公司擔(dān)負(fù)著科技成果產(chǎn)業(yè)化重任,在我國全面實現(xiàn)現(xiàn)代化進(jìn)程中具備及其重要的戰(zhàn)略地位,然而管理團(tuán)隊則肩負(fù)引領(lǐng)研發(fā)團(tuán)隊與制定企業(yè)重大發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的雙重責(zé)任,其激勵機(jī)制高效性至關(guān)重要。國內(nèi)諸多關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵機(jī)制有效性的研究結(jié)論存在較大爭議,而且尚無將高新技術(shù)類制造業(yè)上市公司單獨作為研究對象的針對性研究。本次研究將我國2007年至2012年于深滬上市的制造業(yè)公司樣本依照其產(chǎn)品技術(shù)密集度予以分類,分別對我國的高新技術(shù)制造業(yè)(實驗組)及傳統(tǒng)制造業(yè)(對照組)上市公司高管股權(quán)激勵機(jī)制的實施效果進(jìn)行檢驗,并將回歸分析的結(jié)果結(jié)合兩樣本群的獨立樣本T檢定,綜合分析并揭示導(dǎo)致二者差異的關(guān)鍵因素。由于原先諸多相關(guān)的實證研究往往因研究樣本數(shù)據(jù)質(zhì)量不高(樣本量不足或存在大量遺漏值)、所建模型涉及變量不全或者變量納入不當(dāng)導(dǎo)致了研究結(jié)論信度不高,且差異較大,因此本研究所構(gòu)建模型綜合所有相關(guān)研究中所涉及變量,同時剔除已被先前研究驗證過的,與結(jié)論無關(guān)的無效變量,以確保模型完善程度。通過實證分析發(fā)現(xiàn)：高新技術(shù)制造業(yè)樣本群中股權(quán)激勵實施效果不顯著,而在傳統(tǒng)制造業(yè)組中效果良好。通過對比研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：與傳統(tǒng)制造業(yè)上市公司相比,高管持股結(jié)構(gòu)分散、資產(chǎn)規(guī)模偏小、資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率低、短期市盈率高以及國有企業(yè)占比較高等因素將制約高新技術(shù)類制造業(yè)上市公司股權(quán)激勵機(jī)制的實施效果。因此在高新技術(shù)制造業(yè)上市公司中應(yīng)適度降低資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率,依據(jù)自身境況優(yōu)化股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),完善高管股權(quán)授予機(jī)制并探索其它有效激勵機(jī)制,適當(dāng)延長禁售期、大力推廣階梯式等待期激勵模式特別是加速行權(quán)激勵模式,其中中央企業(yè)均應(yīng)進(jìn)一步深化改革,完全徹底地引入市場競爭機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:Through the establishment of linear regression equation model, this paper makes an empirical and comparative study on the effect of equity incentive mechanism of senior managers in high-tech manufacturing and traditional manufacturing companies in China from 2007 to 2012. The results show that the implementation of the equity incentive mechanism for senior managers is not significant in the high-tech manufacturing listed companies in China, but significantly effective in the traditional manufacturing listed companies. The listed companies of high-tech manufacturing industry shoulder the heavy task of industrialization of scientific and technological achievements, and have an important strategic position in the process of realizing the modernization in an all-round way in our country. However, the management team shoulders the dual responsibility of leading the R & D team and formulating the major development strategy of the enterprise, and the efficiency of its incentive mechanism is very important. Many domestic research conclusions on the effectiveness of equity incentive mechanism are controversial, and there is no specific research on high-tech manufacturing listed companies as the research object. In this study, samples of manufacturing companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2007 to 2012 were classified according to their product technology intensity. The effect of executive equity incentive mechanism in Chinese high-tech manufacturing (experimental group) and traditional manufacturing (control group) is tested, and the results of regression analysis are combined with independent sample T test of two sample groups. Comprehensive analysis and reveal the key factors leading to the difference between the two. Because of the low quality of sample data (insufficient sample size or a large number of missing values) and the incomplete variables or improper inclusion of variables, the reliability of the research conclusions is not high, and the difference is great. Therefore, this study constructs a model that synthesizes all the variables involved in the relevant studies, while eliminating the invalid variables that have been verified by previous studies, which are independent of the conclusions, in order to ensure the perfection of the model. Through the empirical analysis, it is found that the effect of equity incentive in the sample group of high-tech manufacturing is not significant, but it is good in the group of traditional manufacturing. Through comparative study, we find that compared with the traditional manufacturing listed companies, the structure of executive ownership is scattered, the asset scale is small, and the ratio of assets to liabilities is low. The high short-term price-earnings ratio and the high proportion of state-owned enterprises will restrict the effect of equity incentive mechanism of high-tech manufacturing listed companies. Therefore, the listed companies in the high-tech manufacturing industry should reduce the ratio of assets and liabilities, optimize the ownership structure according to their own circumstances, perfect the mechanism of granting senior executives' equity and explore other effective incentive mechanisms, so as to extend the period of ban on sale appropriately. The incentive mode of step waiting period, especially the incentive mode of accelerating the exercise of power, should be popularized vigorously, in which the central enterprises should further deepen the reform and completely introduce the market competition mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：信陽師范學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F425;F406.7

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本文編號：1790026