本文選題：機(jī)構(gòu)投資者 + 會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性　； 參考：《新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：自從有了現(xiàn)代公司，所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分離的趨勢(shì)日漸凸顯，并且由此引發(fā)了公司治理中的委托—代理問(wèn)題。要克服這些廣泛存在于現(xiàn)代公司中的的委托—代理問(wèn)題，最終最小化代理成本，更加完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，那就需要有一系列的制度設(shè)計(jì)。國(guó)家針對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)提出建立“現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度”以后，其委托代理問(wèn)題引起了學(xué)者的廣泛關(guān)注，同樣要解決國(guó)有企業(yè)的委托代理問(wèn)題，也必須采取相互制衡的制度。自20世紀(jì)80年代以來(lái)，在英美等發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家，伴隨著資本市場(chǎng)在全世界范圍的快速擴(kuò)張，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者成為參與公司治理的一支重要隊(duì)伍，他們的迅速崛起對(duì)于解決普遍存在于公司治理中的的委托—代理關(guān)系問(wèn)題是一種創(chuàng)新的思維和方式。在學(xué)術(shù)界，，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在投資戰(zhàn)略上的的變化，從而對(duì)公司治理造成的影響，目前仍舊處在狀爭(zhēng)論狀態(tài)。比如有的學(xué)者研究得出機(jī)構(gòu)股東擁有上市公司的股量越大，他們從上市公司市值的提高中就會(huì)取得越高的收益，從而機(jī)構(gòu)股東監(jiān)督管理層的動(dòng)機(jī)就會(huì)隨之增強(qiáng)，積極性也會(huì)大幅提升，那么管理層就會(huì)收到約束，最終通過(guò)監(jiān)督方式促使管理者提高公司的績(jī)效水平。但是也有研究人員認(rèn)為機(jī)構(gòu)股東的積極主義不會(huì)對(duì)上市公司的績(jī)效水平產(chǎn)生顯著的正向作用。盡管理論界對(duì)于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的相關(guān)研究得出了不同的研究結(jié)論，但是機(jī)構(gòu)投資者投資策略已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)變是一個(gè)不爭(zhēng)的事實(shí)。那么機(jī)構(gòu)投資者積極參與公司治理的效果如何?這一系列問(wèn)題隨著機(jī)構(gòu)股東積極主義的興起，以及其在世界范圍內(nèi)擴(kuò)散，顯得愈發(fā)重要。 本文從會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的角度研究機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在公司治理中的作用。首先對(duì)我國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者進(jìn)行分類(lèi)，研究監(jiān)督型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的作用，然后對(duì)樣本進(jìn)行分組，研究在成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)較高的樣本中，這兩者的正相關(guān)關(guān)系是否更強(qiáng)；最后，通過(guò)建立模型，來(lái)研究監(jiān)督型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的入主公司里是否通過(guò)穩(wěn)健性提高了公司價(jià)值。具體研究結(jié)論是：第一，監(jiān)督型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性正相關(guān)，說(shuō)明我們對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者類(lèi)型的劃分是必要的，監(jiān)督型的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者確實(shí)發(fā)揮了治理作用，他們把會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性作為一種治理機(jī)制；第二，通過(guò)對(duì)樣本進(jìn)行分組，發(fā)現(xiàn)與成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)較低的公司樣本相比，監(jiān)督型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的正相關(guān)關(guān)系更強(qiáng)，這說(shuō)明對(duì)成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)多公司，直接進(jìn)行監(jiān)督是沒(méi)有效果的，因此，監(jiān)督作用的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者更可能會(huì)依賴于像穩(wěn)健性這樣的治理機(jī)制；第三，在有監(jiān)督型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股的公司里，公司價(jià)值與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性呈顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，說(shuō)明機(jī)構(gòu)投資者能夠通過(guò)改進(jìn)目標(biāo)企業(yè)公司治理狀況來(lái)提高公司價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:Since the modern company, the trend of separation of ownership and management has become more and more prominent, which has led to the principal-agent problem in corporate governance.In order to overcome these principal-agent problems, minimize agency cost and perfect corporate governance structure, we need a series of system design.Since the establishment of the "modern enterprise system" for the state-owned enterprises, the principal-agent problem has aroused the widespread concern of the scholars. In order to solve the principal-agent problem of the state-owned enterprises, it is also necessary to adopt the system of checks and balances.Since the 1980s, with the rapid expansion of capital markets around the world in developed countries such as the United States and the United States, institutional investors have become an important team to participate in corporate governance.Their rapid rise is an innovative way to solve the problem of principal-agent relationship which exists in corporate governance.In academia, the change of investment strategy of institutional investors, thus the impact on corporate governance, is still in a state of debate.For example, some scholars have found that the larger the number of shares owned by institutional shareholders in listed companies, the higher the return they will get from the improvement of market value, thus the motivation of institutional shareholders to supervise the management will increase.Motivation will also be greatly increased, and management will be constrained and ultimately supervised to improve the performance of the company.However, some researchers believe that institutional shareholder activism does not have a significant positive effect on the performance level of listed companies.Although the theorists have drawn different conclusions about institutional investors, it is an indisputable fact that the investment strategies of institutional investors have changed.What are the effects of institutional investors' active participation in corporate governance?With the rise of institutional shareholder activism and its spread all over the world, these problems become more and more important.This paper studies the role of institutional investors in corporate governance from the perspective of accounting conservatism.Firstly, it classifies the institutional investors in our country, studies the effect of the supervised institutional investors' shareholding on accounting conservatism, and then groups the samples to study whether the positive correlation between the two is stronger in the samples with higher growth opportunities.Finally, the model is established to study whether the corporate value is improved by robustness in the supervised institutional investors.The specific conclusions are as follows: first, the proportion of institutional investors holding shares is positively related to accounting conservatism, which indicates that it is necessary for us to divide the types of institutional investors, and the supervised institutional investors do play a governance role.They regard accounting conservatism as a kind of governance mechanism. Secondly, by grouping the samples, they find that the positive correlation between supervisory institutional investors and accounting conservatism is stronger than the sample of companies with lower growth opportunities.This shows that direct supervision of companies with multiple growth opportunities is ineffective. Therefore, institutional investors who have a supervisory role are more likely to rely on governance mechanisms such as robustness. Third, in companies with supervisory institutional investors,There is a significant positive correlation between corporate value and accounting conservatism, which indicates that institutional investors can improve corporate value by improving corporate governance of target enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F233;F275

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