本文選題：分析師關(guān)注　切入點(diǎn)：分析師職業(yè)聲譽(yù)　出處：《安徽大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：信息披露是緩解委托代理問題、降低信息不對(duì)稱程度的有效機(jī)制。信息披露的透明度是公司治理機(jī)制有效運(yùn)行的前提,能夠強(qiáng)化外部市場對(duì)企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制人行為的約束,對(duì)于保護(hù)投資者利益和促進(jìn)資源有效配置具有舉足輕重的作用。有關(guān)會(huì)計(jì)信息透明度影響因素的研究一直是財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)領(lǐng)域?qū)W術(shù)研究的熱點(diǎn)問題。本文從委托代理理論、信號(hào)傳遞理論和聲譽(yù)理論出發(fā),將證券分析師作為企業(yè)外部治理機(jī)制的一部分,運(yùn)用規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法考察了證券分析師關(guān)注及其職業(yè)聲譽(yù)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息透明的影響。 本文共分為五部分。第一部分為緒論,介紹了在現(xiàn)行背景下本文的研究意義、研究思路和研究方法、回顧了會(huì)計(jì)信息透明度影響因素和分析師行為經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)。第二部分為本文研究的理論基礎(chǔ),對(duì)研究對(duì)象的相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行界定并對(duì)委托代理理論、信號(hào)傳遞理論和聲譽(yù)理論等進(jìn)行闡述。第三部分是理論分析與假設(shè),對(duì)我國會(huì)計(jì)信息披露質(zhì)量和分析師行業(yè)發(fā)展的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了描述,論述了證券分析師關(guān)注及其職業(yè)聲譽(yù)影響會(huì)計(jì)信息透明度的作用機(jī)理并在此基礎(chǔ)上提出了本文的研究假設(shè)。第四部分為實(shí)證研究,本文選取2003-2012年深圳證券交易所上市公司的6134個(gè)觀測值作為研究樣本,運(yùn)用Logistics和Ordered Logistics回歸方法,對(duì)本文提出的假設(shè)進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。第五部分為研究結(jié)論與政策建議。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)證券分析師關(guān)注與企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)信息透明度顯著正相關(guān),說明分析師作為一種重要的公司外部治理機(jī)制,發(fā)揮了監(jiān)督與約束管理層的作用,顯著提升了上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息透明度；(2)證券分析師職業(yè)聲譽(yù)與企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)信息透明度顯著正相關(guān),說明作為一種傳遞分析師專業(yè)水準(zhǔn)和職業(yè)道德的信號(hào),分析師的職業(yè)聲譽(yù)對(duì)企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)信息透明度的提高有顯著的促進(jìn)作用。
[Abstract]:Information disclosure is an effective mechanism to alleviate the principal-agent problem and reduce the degree of information asymmetry.The transparency of information disclosure is the premise of the effective operation of the corporate governance mechanism, which can strengthen the external market constraints on the behavior of the internal controller of the enterprise, and play an important role in protecting the interests of investors and promoting the effective allocation of resources.The research on the influencing factors of accounting information transparency has always been a hot issue in the field of financial accounting.Based on the principal-agent theory, signaling theory and reputation theory, this paper regards securities analysts as part of the external governance mechanism.By combining normative research with empirical research, this paper investigates the influence of securities analysts' attention and professional reputation on accounting information transparency.This paper is divided into five parts.The first part is the introduction, which introduces the significance of the research, the research ideas and research methods, and reviews the relevant literature on the influencing factors of accounting information transparency and the economic consequences of analysts' behavior.The second part is the theoretical basis of this study, defining the related concepts of the object of study and explaining the principal-agent theory, signal transfer theory and reputation theory.The third part is the theoretical analysis and hypothesis, describes the quality of accounting information disclosure and the current situation of the development of the analyst industry in China.This paper discusses the mechanism of securities analysts' concern and their professional reputation influencing the transparency of accounting information, and puts forward the research hypotheses of this paper.The fourth part is empirical research. This paper selects 6134 observations of listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2012 as the research sample, and uses Logistics and Ordered Logistics regression method to test the hypothesis put forward in this paper.The fifth part is the research conclusions and policy recommendations.The study found that the concerns of securities analysts are significantly positively related to the transparency of corporate accounting information, indicating that analysts, as an important external governance mechanism of a company, play a role in supervising and constraining management.There is a significant positive correlation between the professional reputation of securities analysts and the transparency of corporate accounting information, indicating that as a signal of professional standards and professional ethics of analysts, securities analysts' professional reputation is positively correlated with the transparency of accounting information of listed companies.The professional reputation of analysts has a significant role in promoting the transparency of accounting information.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F233;F275

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