發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-02-12 14:56

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 商業(yè)銀行 內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu) 信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)　出處：《上海師范大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：商業(yè)銀行作為一種特殊的企業(yè),其在一國(guó)金融乃至整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體系中的地位是相當(dāng)重要的。從金融體系來(lái)說(shuō),商業(yè)銀行是中央銀行貨幣政策的首要傳遞者。從整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體系來(lái)看,商業(yè)銀行是現(xiàn)代社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的樞紐之 商業(yè)銀行能否穩(wěn)健經(jīng)營(yíng)關(guān)系到整個(gè)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的良好運(yùn)行。08年爆發(fā)于美國(guó)的次貸危機(jī),給全球經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)了嚴(yán)重的影響,其背后主要的原因是貸款機(jī)構(gòu)向次級(jí)貸款者貸款產(chǎn)生的巨大信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。商業(yè)銀行因?yàn)槌袚?dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)而存在,但是頻繁發(fā)生的銀行危機(jī)也使人們認(rèn)識(shí)到控制信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的重要性。完善的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)是銀行實(shí)現(xiàn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范的前提和基礎(chǔ),因此我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行必須建立科學(xué)、有效的內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu),才能從根本上加強(qiáng)銀行的信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范能力。 近些年來(lái),我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行紛紛上市,存貸款總額平穩(wěn)增加,截至2012年底,銀行業(yè)金融機(jī)構(gòu)本外幣各項(xiàng)存款余額為94.3萬(wàn)億元,各項(xiàng)貸款余額為67.3萬(wàn)億元：資本實(shí)力明顯上升,資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量穩(wěn)定,不良貸款率不斷下降,這些都是股份制改造產(chǎn)生的積極影響。但是我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行在公司治理方面仍存在許多問(wèn)題和不足,要想從根本上降低銀行的信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn),就必須從銀行自身的治理出發(fā),完善商業(yè)銀行的內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)。 本文基于我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,在閱讀大量相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,分析了我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響,然后選取了14家上市銀行2007至2012年的年度數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,通過(guò)面板數(shù)據(jù)模型進(jìn)行了實(shí)證分析。本文的主要內(nèi)容可以分為以下幾個(gè)方面： 第一部分是導(dǎo)論,主要介紹了本文的研究背景、目的、意義、內(nèi)容、方法,研究結(jié)構(gòu),以及本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)。 第二部分是相關(guān)理論與文獻(xiàn)綜述,該部分首先介紹了公司治理的理論基礎(chǔ),然后對(duì)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)及信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)理論進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的闡述,最后對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外關(guān)于銀行公司治理對(duì)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了歸納和闡述。 第三部分是銀行內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響的理論分析,該部分將我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行的內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)分為股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)治理、監(jiān)事會(huì)治理、激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制四個(gè)部分,在總結(jié)前人分析成果的基礎(chǔ)上分別闡述了這四部分對(duì)銀行信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響。 第四部分是銀行內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的實(shí)證分析,該部分選取我國(guó)14家上市銀行2007-2012年的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,把不良貸款率作為被解釋變量來(lái)衡量信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn),解釋變量則選取股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)構(gòu)成、董事會(huì)規(guī)模、獨(dú)立董事占比、董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)、監(jiān)事會(huì)規(guī)模、監(jiān)事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)、高管薪酬及是否持股來(lái)衡量銀行內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)。此外,還將資產(chǎn)規(guī)模作為控制變量來(lái)進(jìn)行研究。最后,本文根據(jù)前面的理論分析及實(shí)證分析結(jié)果對(duì)完善銀行內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)及防范信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提出了一些建議。 第五部分是結(jié)論,該部分首先對(duì)第四章的實(shí)證結(jié)果進(jìn)行歸納總結(jié),得出以下結(jié)論：在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)方面,前三大股東持股比例之和與銀行信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)顯著負(fù)相關(guān),國(guó)有股比例與信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)顯著正相關(guān)；在董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)方面,董事會(huì)人數(shù)與信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)顯著負(fù)相關(guān),獨(dú)立董事占比與信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的關(guān)系不明顯,董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)與信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的關(guān)系不顯著：監(jiān)事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)方面,監(jiān)事會(huì)人數(shù)與信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)顯著負(fù)相關(guān),監(jiān)事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)與信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的關(guān)系不顯著；在激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制方面,高管薪酬與信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的關(guān)系不顯著,管理層持股與信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)顯著正相關(guān)。
[Abstract]:Commercial banks as a special enterprise, its role in a country's financial system and the whole economy is very important. From the financial system, commercial bank is the first transfer of the central bank's monetary policy. From the whole economic system, commercial bank is the pivot of the modern social economy
The commercial bank could be related to the healthy operation of the entire social economy of the smooth operation of the.08 outbreak of the subprime crisis in the US, has brought the serious influence to the global economy, the main reason behind it is a huge credit risk of lending institutions to subprime borrowers of loans from commercial banks. But because of the risk, but the importance of the frequent occurrence of bank the crisis also makes people realize the control of credit risk. Perfect corporate governance structure is the precondition and foundation of bank risk prevention, so China's commercial banks must establish a scientific and effective internal governance structure, to strengthen the bank's credit risk prevention ability fundamentally.
In recent years, China's commercial banks have listed, deposits and loans increased steadily, as of the end of 2012, the balance of foreign currency deposits in the banking financial institutions 94 trillion and 300 billion yuan, the loan balance of 67 trillion and 300 billion yuan, capital strength increased significantly, stable asset quality, non-performing loan ratio continued to decline, these are the positive influence of joint-stock production the Commercial Bank of our country. But there are still many problems and shortcomings in corporate governance, in order to reduce the bank's credit risk fundamentally, we must start from the bank's own management, improve the internal governance structure of commercial banks.
In this paper, the current development of China's commercial banks based on, based on reading a lot of literature, analysis of the impact of the internal governance structure of China's commercial banks to credit risk, then selects the annual data of 14 listed banks from 2007 to 2012 as a sample, we make an empirical analysis of panel data model. The main contents of this paper can is divided into the following areas:
The first part is the introduction, which mainly introduces the background, purpose, meaning, content, method, structure and main contribution of this paper.
The second part is the related theory and literature review, this part first introduces the basic theory of corporate governance, and then expatiates on the corporate governance structure and credit risk theory, finally at home and abroad on the influence of corporate governance on bank credit risk related literatures were summarized and discussed.
The third part is the analysis of the theory of bank internal governance structure on the influence of credit risk, the part of the internal governance structure of commercial banks in China is divided into the ownership structure, board governance, governance of the board of supervisors, the four part of the incentive and restraint mechanism, the four part of the impact on the banking credit risk are discussed based on the previous analysis results the.
The fourth part is the empirical analysis of the bank's internal governance structure of credit risk, this part selects the data of 14 listed banks in China for 2007-2012 years as a sample, the non-performing loan ratio as explanatory variables to measure the credit risk, the explanatory variables from ownership concentration, equity structure, board size, proportion of independent directors. The number of meetings of the board of supervisors, the scale, the number of meetings of the board of supervisors, executive compensation and shareholding to measure the bank's internal governance structure. In addition, also to study the asset size as the control variables. Finally, this paper according to the results of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis to improve the bank's internal governance structure and put forward some prevention of credit risk advice.
The fifth part is the conclusion. The first part of the fourth chapter of the empirical results are summarized, the following conclusions: in terms of ownership structure, the proportion of top three shareholders and bank credit risk is significantly negatively correlated, positively correlated with the proportion of state-owned shares in credit risk; the structure of the board of directors, the board of directors and the credit number the risk of a significant negative correlation, independent directors accounted for less than the relationship with credit risk, the relationship between the number of meetings of the board and the credit risk is not significant: the supervisory board structure, the number of supervisors and the credit risk of a significant negative correlation between the number of meetings of the board of supervisors and the credit risk is not significant; the relationship between executive incentive and restraint mechanism. Pay with credit risk is not significant, positive correlation of managerial ownership and credit risk.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.33;F830.42

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