發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-22 03:39

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 研發(fā)費(fèi)用 開(kāi)發(fā)支出 會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇 資本化 費(fèi)用化　出處：《湘潭大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：自2006年新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則頒布后，，我國(guó)對(duì)研發(fā)費(fèi)用實(shí)行有條件資本化，準(zhǔn)則將研發(fā)費(fèi)用的歸集分為兩個(gè)階段，研究階段和開(kāi)發(fā)階段，研究階段費(fèi)用直接計(jì)入當(dāng)期損益，而開(kāi)發(fā)階段費(fèi)用則實(shí)行有條件資本化，在資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中新增“開(kāi)發(fā)支出”科目，開(kāi)發(fā)費(fèi)用發(fā)生時(shí)計(jì)入“開(kāi)發(fā)支出”科目，不符合資本化條件的費(fèi)用于年末從開(kāi)發(fā)支出中轉(zhuǎn)入當(dāng)期損益，符合資本化條件部分在“開(kāi)發(fā)支出”中累積，開(kāi)發(fā)成功時(shí)將其轉(zhuǎn)入無(wú)形資產(chǎn)科目，開(kāi)發(fā)失敗則一次性轉(zhuǎn)入當(dāng)期損益。該項(xiàng)準(zhǔn)則客觀上改善了企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)和經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況。 但是，我國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則并沒(méi)有提出嚴(yán)格而詳細(xì)的執(zhí)行規(guī)定，披露研發(fā)費(fèi)用的上市公司比例還不高，對(duì)研發(fā)費(fèi)用的披露也相當(dāng)不規(guī)范，對(duì)研發(fā)費(fèi)用的會(huì)計(jì)處理更多的依賴于企業(yè)自身的判斷，所以，我們要了解企業(yè)管理層在確定研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化程度時(shí)是否存在盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)，并且受哪些因素的共同影響。 為了避免行業(yè)因素的干擾，本文選取了2010年和2011年滬深兩市中研發(fā)費(fèi)用披露較多、研發(fā)力度較強(qiáng)的信息技術(shù)業(yè)和生物醫(yī)藥業(yè)作為我們的研究范圍，并選取披露了研發(fā)支出的企業(yè)作為我們的研究樣本�；跁�(huì)計(jì)政策選擇的三大假設(shè)（債務(wù)契約假設(shè)、報(bào)酬契約假設(shè)和政治成本假設(shè)）和信息傳遞理論對(duì)研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化的影響因素進(jìn)行回歸分析。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，企業(yè)的研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化行為主要受到債務(wù)契約和政治成本的影響。債務(wù)契約的影響表現(xiàn)為財(cái)務(wù)杠桿越高的企業(yè)，資本化強(qiáng)度也越高，同時(shí)，我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，在我們所選擇的的這兩個(gè)行業(yè)中，短期資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率比資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率對(duì)模型更有解釋力，這可能是受行業(yè)因素的影響；政治成本的影響表現(xiàn)為盈利水平越高的企業(yè)，資本強(qiáng)度越低，政治成本對(duì)企業(yè)規(guī)模的影響較弱；此外，企業(yè)存在利用研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化的會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇進(jìn)行扭虧的行為，并且存在微弱的證據(jù)表明企業(yè)存在平滑利潤(rùn)的動(dòng)機(jī)。 由結(jié)論可知我國(guó)上市公司確實(shí)存在利用研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇進(jìn)行盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)。由此，我們針對(duì)企業(yè)的盈余管理行為，提出了以下建議：從操作上對(duì)研究階段和開(kāi)發(fā)階段進(jìn)行區(qū)分；在披露中建立研發(fā)相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)之間的關(guān)聯(lián)；完善研發(fā)費(fèi)用資本化的執(zhí)行準(zhǔn)則；擴(kuò)大研發(fā)費(fèi)用的資本化范圍；增大對(duì)研究與開(kāi)發(fā)費(fèi)用相關(guān)內(nèi)容的披露。
[Abstract]:Since the promulgation of the new accounting standards in 2006, our country has implemented conditional capitalization of R & D expenditure, which divides the collection of R & D expenditure into two stages: research stage and development stage. The expenses of the research stage are directly recorded into the profits and losses of the current period, while the expenses of the development phase are capitalized conditionally, and the "development expenditure" accounts are added to the balance sheet, and the development expenses are recorded into the "development expenditure" accounts when the development expenses are incurred. Fees that do not meet the capitalization conditions shall be used to transfer the profits and losses from the development expenditure to the current period at the end of the year, and the part conforming to the capitalization conditions shall be accumulated in the "development expenditure" and transferred to the intangible assets subject when the development is successful. If the development fails, it will be transferred to the profit and loss of the current period at one time. This criterion objectively improves the financial index and the operating condition of the enterprise. However, China's accounting standards have not proposed strict and detailed implementation provisions, the proportion of listed companies that disclose R & D expenses is not high, and the disclosure of R & D expenses is also quite irregular. The accounting treatment of R & D expenses depends more on the judgment of the enterprise itself. Therefore, we should understand whether there is earnings management motivation in determining the degree of capitalization of R & D expenses. And by what factors together. In order to avoid the interference of industry factors, this paper selects 2010 and 2011 in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market R & D costs disclosure is more. Research and development of the strong information technology industry and biomedical industry as our research area. And select the enterprises that disclose the R & D expenditure as our research sample. Based on the three major assumptions of accounting policy choice (debt contract hypothesis). Compensation contract hypothesis and political cost hypothesis) and information transfer theory are used to analyze the factors affecting the capitalization of R & D costs. The behavior of R & D capitalization is mainly influenced by debt contract and political cost. The influence of debt contract is that the higher the financial leverage, the higher the capitalization intensity. At the same time, we also find that the higher the financial leverage is, the higher the capitalization intensity is. In the two industries we choose, the short-term asset-liability ratio is more explanatory than the asset-liability ratio to the model, which may be influenced by the industry factors. The influence of political cost is that the higher the profit level, the lower the capital intensity, and the weaker the influence of political cost on enterprise scale; In addition, enterprises have the behavior of making use of the accounting policy choice of capitalization of R & D expenses to turn losses, and there is weak evidence that there is a motive for smooth profits. From the conclusion, we can know that the listed companies in our country do have the motive of using the capitalized accounting policy of R & D expenses to carry out earnings management. Therefore, we aim at the earnings management behavior of enterprises. The following suggestions are put forward: distinguish the research stage and the development stage from the operation; Establishing a link between R & D related data in the disclosure; Improve the implementation guidelines for capitalization of R & D costs; Expanding the scope of capitalization of R & D costs; Increase disclosure of research and development related content.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F233

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