本文關(guān)鍵詞：我國金融業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)績效相關(guān)性實證研究　出處：《北京交通大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 高管薪酬 金融業(yè) 企業(yè)績效 限薪令

【摘要】：首先,本文總結(jié)性地回顧了研究中所涉及到的重要理論,包括委托代理理論、內(nèi)部人控制理論、人力資本理論、期望理論和權(quán)變理論,為后續(xù)的實證研究奠定理論基礎(chǔ)。然后通過歸納在此之前國內(nèi)外學(xué)者對于高管薪酬與公司績效相關(guān)性的研究成果,筆者發(fā)現(xiàn)國內(nèi)外學(xué)者雖然對企業(yè)高級管理人員薪酬問題經(jīng)過了多年密集的研究,卻并未能得出一個完整、連貫的知識體系。在二十世紀(jì)八十年代前,僅有小部分文獻涉及這個問題,之后每年都有很多關(guān)于這個問題研究的新成果。但是由于時間階段不同、選取行業(yè)不同等因素影響,國內(nèi)外學(xué)者在公司績效和高管薪酬之間關(guān)系的實證研究結(jié)果存在著較大的分歧,有的研究結(jié)果表明二者之間存在顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系,有的則認(rèn)為二者之間根本不相關(guān)。 在理論歸納和文獻回顧的基礎(chǔ)上,筆者對我國金融行業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬的現(xiàn)狀進行了概述,包括我國金融行業(yè)特點和金融業(yè)高管薪酬的構(gòu)成和水平,以及進一步分析了2009年我國出臺的針對金融業(yè)“限薪令”的要點等。 在實證研究部分,本文運用橫截面回歸模型對2007-2013年國內(nèi)41家金融類上市公司相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)進行回歸,探索了國內(nèi)金融類上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效的相關(guān)性,并通過添加虛擬變量研究了“限薪令”對金融業(yè)高管薪酬與企業(yè)績效相關(guān)性的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),國內(nèi)金融業(yè)上市公司經(jīng)營績效與其高管薪酬之間的正相關(guān)關(guān)系不顯著,說明企業(yè)在制定高管薪酬激勵機制時沒有充分考慮企業(yè)的經(jīng)營績效；此外,“限薪令”在降低了金融行業(yè)過高的薪酬的同時,對其高管薪酬與企業(yè)績效的相關(guān)性印象不大,說明政府出臺的“限薪令”在一定程度上并未起到預(yù)期的效果。
[Abstract]:First of all, this paper reviewing important theories which are involved in the study, including the principal-agent theory, internal control theory, human capital theory, expectation theory and contingency theory, laid the theoretical foundation for subsequent empirical research. And then this paper before the domestic and foreign scholars for the correlation between executive compensation and Corporate Performance Research I found that, although the domestic and foreign scholars for senior executives to pay after years of intensive research, but failed to get a complete, coherent knowledge system. In 1980s, this problem involves only a small part of the literature, after every year there are many new results about this problem. But because of the different time stage influence of different factors, including the industry, domestic and foreign scholars in between company performance and executive compensation between the empirical research results There are large differences, and some results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the two, while others are not related to the two.
Based on theory and literature review, the author summarizes the current situation of executive compensation of listed companies on China's financial industry, including the composition and characteristics and level of executive pay in the financial sector of China's financial industry, and further analysis of China in 2009 for the introduction of the financial industry "limit pay points".
In the part of empirical research, this paper use the cross-sectional regression model regression data of listed companies for 2007-2013 years 41 domestic financial class, to explore the relationship between the domestic financial listed company executive compensation and corporate performance, and by adding a dummy variable of "salary limit order" effect on the relationship between financial industry executive compensation and corporate performance the study found a positive correlation between the domestic financial sector listed companies operating performance and executive compensation is not significant, indicating that companies in the development of executive compensation incentive mechanism is not fully consider the performance of the enterprise; in addition, the "salary limit order" in reducing excessive pay in the financial industry at the same time, the executive compensation and enterprise the performance of correlation shows that the government introduced a little impression, "salary limit order" to a certain extent, did not play the desired effect.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F832.3;F272.92;F830.42

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