地方公共品供給的理論研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-24 08:48
【摘要】：隨著財政學(xué)向公共經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的發(fā)展,作為公共支出理論主體的公共品理論日益 受到理論界的重視。同時,由于政府職能的轉(zhuǎn)變,政府作為一方經(jīng)濟(jì)主體正逐漸 從一般競爭領(lǐng)域退出,重點轉(zhuǎn)向為全社會提供高質(zhì)量的公共產(chǎn)品與服務(wù)。并且由 于以財權(quán)和事權(quán)下放為標(biāo)志的分權(quán)化改革的逐漸深入,這些公共產(chǎn)品與服務(wù)大多 是由地方政府供給的。因此,在此種宏觀背景下研究地方公共品供給相關(guān)問題, 就顯得尤為迫切和必要。 傳統(tǒng)的公共品理論研究重在提出實現(xiàn)公共品有效供給的帕累托條件,如薩繆 爾森規(guī)則及其擴(kuò)展形式。但對地方公共品來說,由于其本身具有的地域性、地方 政府的多樣性以及各種要素在地區(qū)間的流動性,僅僅從規(guī)范研究的角度進(jìn)行分析, 就顯得過于單薄了。近現(xiàn)代的理論發(fā)展表明,對地方公共品的理論研究,大多是 圍繞各種不同假設(shè)下地方公共品是否供給不足這個實證問題展開的。本文在理論 上的貢獻(xiàn),也是創(chuàng)新點之一,就在于從總體上對現(xiàn)有研究進(jìn)行綜合把握,發(fā)展出 一個包含流動性、稅收競爭等因素的新古典一般均衡模型,不僅從理論上說明地 方公共品供給不足的問題,而且通過修正流動性等有關(guān)前提假設(shè),闡明要素流動 性和政府間競爭對于克服地方公共品供給不足問題的重要意義。 本文對中國地方公共品供給現(xiàn)狀的考察表明,中國地方政府在提供地方公共 品時具有系統(tǒng)的選擇性偏差,即對某些地方公共品供給過度,而對另一些地方公 共品則供給不足。這種并非總量不足、而是結(jié)構(gòu)失衡的特殊現(xiàn)象,通過新古典模 型方法是很難作出解釋的。因此,作為本文主要創(chuàng)新點,我們將地方公共品分為 易于傳遞政績信息的顯性地方公共品(如開發(fā)區(qū)、城市廣場等)與周期長、收效 慢、“百年樹人”型的隱性地方公共品(如教育、醫(yī)療等),并摒棄了新古典模型 中關(guān)于“善良”政府的假設(shè),轉(zhuǎn)而在中國特殊國情背景下重新考察地方政府官員 的行為目標(biāo)與約束機(jī)制。主要觀點為:以中央和上級為中心的目標(biāo)函數(shù)以及以政 績?yōu)橹饕獦?biāo)準(zhǔn)的干部考核機(jī)制,促使地方政府(官員)更加偏好于供給顯性地方 公共品,從而出現(xiàn)地方公共品供給中的選擇性偏差。 一個很明顯的邏輯問題是,對顯性地方公共品的供給是需要花費巨額成本的, 就算是各地方政府都有激勵大量供給顯性公共品(如“大干”、“快上”各種政績 工程),但受到自身財力與預(yù)算的約束,這種現(xiàn)象理應(yīng)不是一種全國性的普遍現(xiàn)象, I WP=4 否則有些較窮地區(qū)的地方財政豈非早就破產(chǎn)了?本文另一創(chuàng)新點就在于提出了地 方政府的成本軟約束概念,指出選擇性偏差所造成的福利損失根本不是由地方政 府(官員)本身負(fù)擔(dān)的,它被居于強(qiáng)勢地位的地方政府以各種形式和手段(如亂 攤派、亂集資等)轉(zhuǎn)嫁給了地區(qū)公眾。從這一點出發(fā),我們就不難理解,在中國 有時候反而是越窮的地方越喜歡做“表面文章”了。與此相對應(yīng),我們通過運用 信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中的信號傳遞模型,用形式化的語言闡明,在各地方政府競相供給顯 性地方公共品、并以此向中央政府傳遞政績信息的過程中,一般理論所預(yù)測的分 離均衡并不存在,各地方政府實際上都陷入一種“囚徒困境”式的混同均衡。本 文進(jìn)一步指出,造成地方政府成本軟約束的根本原因在于地方公眾對地方政府壓 力機(jī)制的缺乏,這歸根結(jié)底是民主制度特別是基層民主制度的問題。
[Abstract]:With the development of finance to public economics, public goods theory, as the main body of public expenditure theory, is becoming more and more important.
At the same time, due to the transformation of government functions, the government is gradually becoming an economic entity.
From the field of general competition, the focus shifted to the provision of high-quality public goods and services for the whole society.
With the gradual deepening of decentralization reform marked by the devolution of financial and administrative power, most of these public goods and services
It is provided by local governments. Therefore, in this macro context, we should study the supply of local public goods.
It is particularly urgent and necessary.
The traditional theory of public goods focuses on putting forward Pareto's condition for effective supply of public goods, such as Samuel.
The rule of "Er son" and its extended form. But for local public goods, because of its regional characteristics,
The diversity of government and the mobility of various factors in different regions are analyzed only from the perspective of normative research.
The development of modern theories shows that most of the theoretical researches on local public goods are
This paper focuses on the empirical problem of whether local public goods are insufficient under various assumptions.
One of the innovations is to comprehensively grasp the existing research and develop it.
A neoclassical general equilibrium model with liquidity, tax competition and other factors is not only theoretically illustrative.
The problem of insufficient supply of public goods and the flow of factors are clarified by revising relevant assumptions such as liquidity.
The importance of sex and intergovernmental competition to overcome the problem of insufficient supply of local public goods.
This article examines the current situation of the supply of local public goods in China, which shows that local governments in China are providing local public services.
There is systematic selectivity bias, i.e. over-supply of public goods in some places and over-supply of public goods in others.
The total supply is insufficient. This is not a special phenomenon of insufficient aggregate but a structural imbalance.
Therefore, as the main innovation of this article, we divide local public goods into
Dominant local public goods (such as development zones, city squares, etc.) that are easy to convey performance information are long and effective.
Slow, "100 year old" hidden local public goods (such as education, medical treatment, etc.), and abandoned the neoclassical model.
China's assumption of a "good" government has shifted to re-examining local government officials in the context of China's special national conditions
Behavioral Goals and Restriction Mechanisms. The main viewpoints are as follows: the central and higher-level-centered objective function and the government-centered objective function
The cadre assessment mechanism, which is the main performance criterion, makes local governments (officials) more inclined to supply dominant places.
Public goods result in selective bias in the supply of local public goods.
One obvious logical problem is that the supply of dominant local public goods is costly.
Even local governments have incentives to supply large quantities of dominant public goods (e.g. big jobs and quick successes).
But constrained by its own financial and budgetary resources, this phenomenon should not be a universal national phenomenon.
I
WP=4
Otherwise, the local finance of some poorer areas will not have gone bankrupt long ago. Another innovation of this paper lies in the proposed land
The concept of cost soft constraints of local governments, pointing out that welfare losses caused by selective bias are not caused by local governments at all
The local government, which is responsible for its own position, is in various forms and means, such as chaos.
From the point of view, we can easily understand that in China
Sometimes the poorer the place, the more likely it is to be "superficial." In contrast, we use it
The signaling model in information economics, illustrated in formal language, is competing for prominence among local governments.
The score predicted by the general theory in the process of transferring performance information to the central government from local public goods
De-equilibrium does not exist, and local governments are in fact in a "prisoner's dilemma" of mixed equilibrium.
The paper further points out that the fundamental reason for the soft constraint of local government cost lies in the pressure of local public on local government.
The lack of force mechanism, in the final analysis, is the problem of democratic system, especially the democratic system at the grassroots level.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2004
【分類號】：F062.6
本文編號：2200260
[Abstract]:With the development of finance to public economics, public goods theory, as the main body of public expenditure theory, is becoming more and more important.
At the same time, due to the transformation of government functions, the government is gradually becoming an economic entity.
From the field of general competition, the focus shifted to the provision of high-quality public goods and services for the whole society.
With the gradual deepening of decentralization reform marked by the devolution of financial and administrative power, most of these public goods and services
It is provided by local governments. Therefore, in this macro context, we should study the supply of local public goods.
It is particularly urgent and necessary.
The traditional theory of public goods focuses on putting forward Pareto's condition for effective supply of public goods, such as Samuel.
The rule of "Er son" and its extended form. But for local public goods, because of its regional characteristics,
The diversity of government and the mobility of various factors in different regions are analyzed only from the perspective of normative research.
The development of modern theories shows that most of the theoretical researches on local public goods are
This paper focuses on the empirical problem of whether local public goods are insufficient under various assumptions.
One of the innovations is to comprehensively grasp the existing research and develop it.
A neoclassical general equilibrium model with liquidity, tax competition and other factors is not only theoretically illustrative.
The problem of insufficient supply of public goods and the flow of factors are clarified by revising relevant assumptions such as liquidity.
The importance of sex and intergovernmental competition to overcome the problem of insufficient supply of local public goods.
This article examines the current situation of the supply of local public goods in China, which shows that local governments in China are providing local public services.
There is systematic selectivity bias, i.e. over-supply of public goods in some places and over-supply of public goods in others.
The total supply is insufficient. This is not a special phenomenon of insufficient aggregate but a structural imbalance.
Therefore, as the main innovation of this article, we divide local public goods into
Dominant local public goods (such as development zones, city squares, etc.) that are easy to convey performance information are long and effective.
Slow, "100 year old" hidden local public goods (such as education, medical treatment, etc.), and abandoned the neoclassical model.
China's assumption of a "good" government has shifted to re-examining local government officials in the context of China's special national conditions
Behavioral Goals and Restriction Mechanisms. The main viewpoints are as follows: the central and higher-level-centered objective function and the government-centered objective function
The cadre assessment mechanism, which is the main performance criterion, makes local governments (officials) more inclined to supply dominant places.
Public goods result in selective bias in the supply of local public goods.
One obvious logical problem is that the supply of dominant local public goods is costly.
Even local governments have incentives to supply large quantities of dominant public goods (e.g. big jobs and quick successes).
But constrained by its own financial and budgetary resources, this phenomenon should not be a universal national phenomenon.
I
WP=4
Otherwise, the local finance of some poorer areas will not have gone bankrupt long ago. Another innovation of this paper lies in the proposed land
The concept of cost soft constraints of local governments, pointing out that welfare losses caused by selective bias are not caused by local governments at all
The local government, which is responsible for its own position, is in various forms and means, such as chaos.
From the point of view, we can easily understand that in China
Sometimes the poorer the place, the more likely it is to be "superficial." In contrast, we use it
The signaling model in information economics, illustrated in formal language, is competing for prominence among local governments.
The score predicted by the general theory in the process of transferring performance information to the central government from local public goods
De-equilibrium does not exist, and local governments are in fact in a "prisoner's dilemma" of mixed equilibrium.
The paper further points out that the fundamental reason for the soft constraint of local government cost lies in the pressure of local public on local government.
The lack of force mechanism, in the final analysis, is the problem of democratic system, especially the democratic system at the grassroots level.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2004
【分類號】：F062.6
【引證文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前5條
1 韓建;;優(yōu)化我國地方公共品供給結(jié)構(gòu)的財政政策研究[J];河南財政稅務(wù)高等�？茖W(xué)校學(xué)報;2012年01期
2 李郁芳;孫海婧;;代際公平與代際公共品供給[J];廣東社會科學(xué);2009年03期
3 彭正波;;地方公共產(chǎn)品供給決策中的公眾參與研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革;2009年03期
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相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前3條
1 王紅巖;公共項目經(jīng)濟(jì)評價體系研究[D];東北財經(jīng)大學(xué);2007年
2 儲祖旺;中國高�；I資問題研究[D];華中科技大學(xué);2006年
3 余璐;生態(tài)補(bǔ)償?shù)恼g供給議價[D];暨南大學(xué);2009年
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前8條
1 郭旭姣;區(qū)域間公共品利益外溢的財政分析[D];云南財經(jīng)大學(xué);2011年
2 黃信恒;我國獨立學(xué)院籌資問題與對策研究[D];中南民族大學(xué);2011年
3 樓靜;改進(jìn)財政支出方式：理論分析與政策建議[D];浙江大學(xué);2007年
4 孫海婧;代際公共品供給與地方政府競爭的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析[D];暨南大學(xué);2007年
5 丁春玲;我國地方政府無序競爭行為的制度分析[D];內(nèi)蒙古師范大學(xué);2008年
6 黃河?xùn)|;廣西城市公共物品有效供給評價與對策研究[D];廣西師范大學(xué);2008年
7 劉擎;農(nóng)村公共文化服務(wù)供給存在問題的對策研究[D];湖南師范大學(xué);2012年
8 張鳳彪;天津市全民健身公共支出研究[D];北京體育大學(xué);2007年
，本文編號：2200260
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