公共權(quán)力占利分析
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-02 09:35
【摘要】：政府在調(diào)控經(jīng)濟(jì)的過(guò)程中，，不可避免地會(huì)產(chǎn)生“權(quán)力尋租”，由此促生了公共權(quán)利執(zhí)行者的腐敗行為。具體的政府部門(mén)或公務(wù)人員在履行公共管理職能的過(guò)程中所產(chǎn)生的尋租要求實(shí)質(zhì)上是一種占利需要，體現(xiàn)的是公共權(quán)力的虛擬資本屬性。公共權(quán)力是社會(huì)基于協(xié)作要求而形成的契約選擇，并通過(guò)制度、法律以及暴力強(qiáng)制實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)各種社會(huì)資源的控制。公共權(quán)力一旦建立，對(duì)特定的社會(huì)而言就成為異化的既存事實(shí)，它一方面體現(xiàn)統(tǒng)治階級(jí)的意志，實(shí)現(xiàn)統(tǒng)治階級(jí)最基礎(chǔ)的經(jīng)濟(jì)功能；另一方面，它又由于對(duì)一定資源的支配而使本身成為一種資源，從而具有泛化意義上的虛擬資本屬性，并在自身的執(zhí)行過(guò)程中衍生了占利的動(dòng)機(jī)和要求。市場(chǎng)投資者為了取得更多的平均利潤(rùn)，在已有的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)條件下，不得不尋求公共權(quán)力的介入，以取得個(gè)人的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)，由此形成集體決策矛盾，也就是說(shuō)市場(chǎng)投資者在取得擴(kuò)大投資的可能性后必須付出相應(yīng)代價(jià)，并且這個(gè)代價(jià)預(yù)期能夠被接受。假設(shè)公共權(quán)力執(zhí)行者堅(jiān)持“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”行為，則公共權(quán)力占利將導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)非效率，即不僅使一般市場(chǎng)投資者效率降低，而且事實(shí)上使要求公共權(quán)力介入的市場(chǎng)投資者本身的效率降低，使政府在配置宏觀(guān)資源時(shí)無(wú)法達(dá)到最優(yōu)化。因此，公共權(quán)力占利現(xiàn)象應(yīng)該被限制和防止。公共權(quán)力占利并非是市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下的制度缺失，而是市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下的基礎(chǔ)性矛盾，因此道德約束和法律威懾的預(yù)期效果會(huì)降低。抑制腐敗的更有效途徑是從“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”角度合理滿(mǎn)足政府官員的精神和物質(zhì)需求。市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)范的成分比重上升使得尋租者行為空間縮小，而一定程度上增加滿(mǎn)足政府官員的精神和物質(zhì)需求，使得尋租者在面臨權(quán)力尋租行為時(shí)有更大的機(jī)會(huì)成本。除此之外，應(yīng)該加強(qiáng)傳統(tǒng)道德教育，進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的作用，完善市場(chǎng)機(jī)制，完善各項(xiàng)法律、制度。
[Abstract]:In the process of regulating and controlling the economy, the government inevitably produces "power rent-seeking", which promotes the corrupt behavior of public rights executors. The rent-seeking requirement of specific government departments or public servants in the process of performing the public management function is essentially a kind of profit-taking need, which embodies the virtual capital attribute of public power. Public power is the choice of contract formed by society based on the requirement of cooperation, and the control of various social resources is enforced by system, law and violence. Once the public power is established, it becomes the existing fact of alienation for a specific society. On the one hand, it embodies the will of the ruling class and realizes the most basic economic function of the ruling class; on the other hand, Because of its domination of certain resources, it becomes a kind of resource, thus it has the attribute of virtual capital in the sense of generalization, and derives the motive and requirement of profit in the process of its own execution. In order to obtain more average profits, market investors have to seek the intervention of public power in order to obtain individual competitive advantage under the existing competitive conditions, thus forming the contradiction of collective decision-making. In other words, market investors must pay a corresponding price for the possibility of expanding their investments, and this price is expected to be acceptable. Assuming that the executor of public power insists on the behavior of "economic man", the public power gain will lead to market inefficiency, that is, not only the efficiency of general market investors, but also the efficiency of general market investors. In fact, the efficiency of market investors who require public power to intervene is reduced, which makes the government unable to optimize the allocation of macro resources. Therefore, the phenomenon of public power should be restricted and prevented. Taking advantage of public power is not the absence of system under the condition of market economy, but the basic contradiction under the condition of market economy, so the expected effect of moral restraint and legal deterrence will be reduced. The more effective way to curb corruption is to reasonably satisfy the spiritual and material needs of government officials from the angle of "economic man". The increase of the proportion of elements in market economy makes the behavior space of rent-seekers shrink, and to a certain extent increases to meet the spiritual and material needs of government officials, which makes rent-seekers have greater opportunity cost in the face of power rent-seeking behavior. In addition, we should strengthen the traditional moral education, further expand the role of the market economy, improve the market mechanism, improve the laws and systems.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2004
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F062.6
本文編號(hào)：2159012
[Abstract]:In the process of regulating and controlling the economy, the government inevitably produces "power rent-seeking", which promotes the corrupt behavior of public rights executors. The rent-seeking requirement of specific government departments or public servants in the process of performing the public management function is essentially a kind of profit-taking need, which embodies the virtual capital attribute of public power. Public power is the choice of contract formed by society based on the requirement of cooperation, and the control of various social resources is enforced by system, law and violence. Once the public power is established, it becomes the existing fact of alienation for a specific society. On the one hand, it embodies the will of the ruling class and realizes the most basic economic function of the ruling class; on the other hand, Because of its domination of certain resources, it becomes a kind of resource, thus it has the attribute of virtual capital in the sense of generalization, and derives the motive and requirement of profit in the process of its own execution. In order to obtain more average profits, market investors have to seek the intervention of public power in order to obtain individual competitive advantage under the existing competitive conditions, thus forming the contradiction of collective decision-making. In other words, market investors must pay a corresponding price for the possibility of expanding their investments, and this price is expected to be acceptable. Assuming that the executor of public power insists on the behavior of "economic man", the public power gain will lead to market inefficiency, that is, not only the efficiency of general market investors, but also the efficiency of general market investors. In fact, the efficiency of market investors who require public power to intervene is reduced, which makes the government unable to optimize the allocation of macro resources. Therefore, the phenomenon of public power should be restricted and prevented. Taking advantage of public power is not the absence of system under the condition of market economy, but the basic contradiction under the condition of market economy, so the expected effect of moral restraint and legal deterrence will be reduced. The more effective way to curb corruption is to reasonably satisfy the spiritual and material needs of government officials from the angle of "economic man". The increase of the proportion of elements in market economy makes the behavior space of rent-seekers shrink, and to a certain extent increases to meet the spiritual and material needs of government officials, which makes rent-seekers have greater opportunity cost in the face of power rent-seeking behavior. In addition, we should strengthen the traditional moral education, further expand the role of the market economy, improve the market mechanism, improve the laws and systems.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2004
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F062.6
【引證文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條
1 武付華;社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下權(quán)力尋租與公共權(quán)力異化問(wèn)題研究[D];西南大學(xué);2008年
本文編號(hào)：2159012
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