本文選題：上游壟斷企業(yè) + 下游壟斷企業(yè)　； 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2003年博士論文

【摘要】：發(fā)達(dá)國家在1970年代以來，在政府規(guī)制經(jīng)濟(jì)理論方面所取得的巨大進(jìn)展，直接導(dǎo)致了1970年代末期美國、英國、日本等經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)達(dá)國家對(duì)本國電信、電力、自來水、鐵路運(yùn)輸?shù)茸匀粔艛喈a(chǎn)業(yè)的政府規(guī)制體制改革，打破了長期以來政府或企業(yè)壟斷經(jīng)營的格局，提高了經(jīng)濟(jì)效率，降低了高昂的價(jià)格。 我國改革開放20多年來，政府逐漸放松了指令性控制，并且已退出了許多競爭性領(lǐng)域。在一般消費(fèi)品市場上，基本上已形成了競爭的局面，消費(fèi)者從中獲得了很大的收益。而對(duì)于壟斷行業(yè)的改革，尤其是電信、電力、自來水、鐵路等關(guān)系到國計(jì)民生的自然壟斷行業(yè)的改革，雖然取得了一定的成效，但總的來看效果并不明顯。本文針對(duì)上游企業(yè)和下游企業(yè)均為壟斷企業(yè)的情況，對(duì)上游或下游壟斷企業(yè)實(shí)施價(jià)格規(guī)制，以比較分析價(jià)格規(guī)制前后的價(jià)格、消費(fèi)者剩余和社會(huì)福利。除了第一章緒論和第八章結(jié)論外，本文的研究分為六個(gè)部分，研究內(nèi)容和結(jié)論如下： 第一部分對(duì)國內(nèi)外學(xué)者關(guān)于壟斷、自然壟斷以及縱向壟斷市場結(jié)構(gòu)的觀點(diǎn)作了較為詳細(xì)的理論綜述；同時(shí)也分別介紹了哈佛學(xué)派、芝加哥學(xué)派和奧地利學(xué)派等不同學(xué)派關(guān)于政府規(guī)制的理論成果，以及我國學(xué)者對(duì)政府規(guī)制的理論貢獻(xiàn)。 第二部分分析了我國目前特殊的政企關(guān)系之下，規(guī)制機(jī)構(gòu)與被規(guī)制企業(yè)間的博弈。另外，這部分還介紹了Stigler、Peltzman以及Becker關(guān)于政府規(guī)制俘虜?shù)睦碚摚治隽宋覈?guī)制機(jī)構(gòu)、壟斷企業(yè)、消費(fèi)者三者之間的關(guān)系以及提出了解決三者之間關(guān)系的方法，最后，提出了幾點(diǎn)怎樣有效防范政府規(guī)制俘虜?shù)慕ㄗh。 第三部分對(duì)拉姆齊定價(jià)和二部定價(jià)的經(jīng)濟(jì)原理作了簡單的介紹；對(duì)收益率規(guī)制定價(jià)的經(jīng)濟(jì)原理以及未考慮技術(shù)進(jìn)步下的成本效率作了比較詳細(xì)的介紹，并分析了該種定價(jià)模式在技術(shù)進(jìn)步下的成本效率。同時(shí)，在介紹了價(jià)格上限規(guī)制的經(jīng)濟(jì)原理以及基本模型的基礎(chǔ)上，分別分析了在技術(shù)進(jìn)步下，規(guī)制機(jī)構(gòu)所制定的價(jià)格上限與企業(yè)的技術(shù)進(jìn)步率無關(guān)時(shí)的成本效率，以及規(guī)制機(jī)構(gòu)完全按照企業(yè)的技術(shù)進(jìn)步率來規(guī)制企業(yè)的價(jià)格上限時(shí)的成本效率。 第四部分對(duì)上下游均為壟斷企業(yè)時(shí)的產(chǎn)品定價(jià)作了簡單的介紹，也介紹了Spengler關(guān)于解決“雙重加價(jià)”的有效方法，即上下游壟斷企業(yè)垂直一體化后，將使市場價(jià)格下降而總利潤增加。同時(shí)，本部分對(duì)連續(xù)壟斷的上下游企業(yè)分別實(shí)施價(jià)格上限規(guī)制時(shí)的消費(fèi)者剩余、社會(huì)福利與上下游壟斷企業(yè)未受規(guī)制下和垂直一體化時(shí)的消費(fèi)者剩余、社會(huì)福利作了比較分析，并且對(duì)上游或下游壟斷企業(yè)分別實(shí)施價(jià)格上限規(guī)制時(shí)的利潤、消費(fèi)者剩余、社會(huì)福利作了比較分析，得出了一些新的結(jié)論。 第五部分對(duì)美國和香港的收益率規(guī)制模式作了簡單的介紹，并對(duì)這兩種收益 WP=6 率規(guī)制模式的優(yōu)缺點(diǎn)作了比較分析，在此基礎(chǔ)上，就我國壟斷行業(yè)的規(guī)制模式作了深入的探討，并提出了改革我國價(jià)格規(guī)制模式的幾點(diǎn)建議。同時(shí)，還對(duì)上游壟斷企業(yè)單獨(dú)實(shí)施收益率規(guī)制作了比較詳細(xì)的分析，對(duì)在收益率規(guī)制下的消費(fèi)者剩余、社會(huì)福利與上下游壟斷企業(yè)未受規(guī)制和垂直一體化時(shí)的消費(fèi)者剩余、社會(huì)福利進(jìn)行了比較，得出了一些新的結(jié)論。 第六部分介紹了我國民航業(yè)體制改革的幾個(gè)階段，以及最近20年民航業(yè)的發(fā)展?fàn)顩r。深入分析了我國民航業(yè)的產(chǎn)業(yè)組織結(jié)構(gòu)，，在我國民航業(yè)的產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈中，作為產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈的上游企業(yè)，機(jī)場、中國航空油料集團(tuán)公司、中國航空器材進(jìn)出口集團(tuán)公司均為完全壟斷的企業(yè)，除機(jī)場屬于自然壟斷企業(yè)外，其他兩個(gè)集團(tuán)公司均為行政壟斷；而作為產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈下游直接向消費(fèi)者提供航空服務(wù)的航空公司，則是以三大航空集團(tuán)公司為主導(dǎo)的寡頭壟斷。因此，我國民航機(jī)票價(jià)格居高不下的最主要原因是這種縱向壟斷市場結(jié)構(gòu)的“層層加價(jià)”，要降低機(jī)票價(jià)格就必須改革我國民航業(yè)中存在的“壟斷鏈”。另外，這一部分還對(duì)民航業(yè)的成本構(gòu)成作了簡單的分析，介紹了客座率和平均成本、機(jī)票價(jià)格的反比例關(guān)系。作者認(rèn)為，提高客座率最有效的方法是實(shí)施多等級(jí)、多種折扣的機(jī)票價(jià)格，并且運(yùn)用三度價(jià)格歧視的理論對(duì)此作了較為詳細(xì)的分析，同時(shí)也對(duì)旅行社在提高航空公司客座率方面所起的作用作了分析。 本論文有以下創(chuàng)新之處： 一是用博弈論的分析方法分析我國政府規(guī)制機(jī)構(gòu)與壟斷行業(yè)目標(biāo)的一致性，得出了不管被規(guī)制企業(yè)行賄還是不行賄，規(guī)制機(jī)構(gòu)都將制定高價(jià)以使自身效用最大化的結(jié)論，最終使被規(guī)制企業(yè)受益而使消費(fèi)者受損；并且提出了解決我國政府規(guī)制機(jī)構(gòu)、壟斷企業(yè)、消費(fèi)者三者之間關(guān)系的方法。 二是針對(duì)收益率規(guī)制定價(jià)缺乏效率而價(jià)格上限規(guī)制定價(jià)效率較高的傳統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)，分別分析了在技術(shù)進(jìn)步的條件下收益率規(guī)制定價(jià)和價(jià)格上限規(guī)制定價(jià)的成本效率，得出了一些新的結(jié)論。 三是傳統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，上下游壟斷企業(yè)垂直一體化是解決“雙重加價(jià)”的最優(yōu)方法。由于傳統(tǒng)分析方法在分析上下游壟斷企業(yè)垂直一體化時(shí)未考慮一體化的交易成本，缺乏可操作性。本文針對(duì)交易成本過高而不適宜一體化的情形，分析了對(duì)上下游壟斷企業(yè)分別實(shí)施價(jià)格上限規(guī)制（僅對(duì)上游壟斷企業(yè)實(shí)施收益率規(guī)制）情形下的產(chǎn)品定價(jià)、消費(fèi)者剩余和社會(huì)福利，得出了一些新的結(jié)論。 四是從產(chǎn)業(yè)組織的角度來分析我國民航業(yè)機(jī)票價(jià)格過高的原因——上下游“壟斷鏈”所導(dǎo)致
[Abstract]:Since the 1970s , developed countries have made great progress in government regulation of economic theory , which directly led to the reform of government regulation system of natural monopoly industries such as the United States , Britain and Japan in the late 1970s , breaking the pattern of government or enterprise monopoly operation for a long time , improving economic efficiency and lowering the high price .








For more than 20 years of reform and opening - up , the government has gradually relaxed instruction control and has withdrawn many competitive fields . In the general consumer goods market , the competition has been basically formed , and the consumers have obtained great benefits . In view of the reform of monopoly industries , especially telecommunication , electricity , tap water , railway and so on , it is not obvious . In addition to the introduction of the first chapter and the conclusion of Chapter 8 , the study is divided into six parts . The research contents and conclusions are as follows :








The first part makes a detailed theoretical review on the views of scholars at home and abroad on monopoly , natural monopoly and longitudinal monopoly market structure .
At the same time , it also introduces the theoretical achievements of different schools such as the Harvard School , the Chicago School and the Austrian School on the government regulation , and the theoretical contribution of Chinese scholars to government regulation .








The second part analyzes the game between the regulation institution and the regulated enterprise under the current special political and enterprise relation of our country . In addition , this part introduces Stigler , Peltzman and Becker ' s theory about the government regulation captive , analyses the relationship between government regulation institution , monopoly enterprise and consumer , and puts forward some ways to solve the relationship among them . Finally , some suggestions on how to effectively prevent the government regulation of prisoners are put forward .








The third part makes a brief introduction to the economic principle of the pricing of Ramsay and the second pricing .
On the basis of the introduction of the economic principle and the basic model of the price cap regulation , the cost efficiency of the price cap established by the regulation institution and the technical progress rate of the enterprise are analyzed .








In the fourth part , the article introduces the product pricing of the monopoly enterprises in the upstream and downstream , and introduces Spengler ' s effective method to solve the " double premium " , that is , after the vertical integration of the upstream and downstream monopoly enterprises , the consumer surplus , the social welfare and the consumer surplus and social welfare of the upstream and downstream monopoly enterprises are compared and analyzed , and the profit , the surplus and the social welfare of the upstream or downstream monopoly enterprises are compared and analyzed , and some new conclusions are drawn .








The fifth part makes a brief introduction to the American and Hong Kong rate of return regulation , and the two kinds of income








WP=6








This paper makes a comparative analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of the rate regulation mode . On the basis of this , some suggestions are put forward on the regulation mode of the monopoly industry in China . At the same time , some suggestions on the reform of the price regulation mode in China are put forward . At the same time , some new conclusions are drawn on the comparison of consumer surplus and social welfare when the consumer surplus , the social welfare and the upstream monopoly enterprise are not regulated and vertical integration under the regulation of the yield rate .








The sixth part introduces several stages of the reform of the civil aviation industry in China , and the development of the civil aviation industry in the last 20 years . In the industry chain of the civil aviation industry in China , as the upstream enterprise of the industry chain , the airport , China Aviation Oil Corporation and China Aviation Equipment Import and Export Corporation are all the enterprises with complete monopoly , except that the airport belongs to the natural monopoly enterprise , and the other two companies are administrative monopoly ;
In addition , the author thinks that the most effective way to improve the passenger seat rate is to implement multi - level , multi - discount ticket prices , and to use the theory of three - degree price discrimination to analyze it . At the same time , it also analyzes the role of travel agency in improving airline passenger seat rate .








This paper has the following innovations :








Firstly , the consistency of government regulation institution and monopoly industry goal is analyzed by game theory .
And a new way to solve the relationship between government regulation institution , monopoly enterprise and consumer is put forward .








Second , the paper analyzes the cost efficiency of the pricing of the yield regulation pricing and the price cap pricing under the condition of technological progress , and draws some new conclusions .








Three is the traditional view that the vertical integration of the upstream and downstream monopoly enterprises is the best way to solve the " double premium " . Because the traditional analysis method does not take into consideration the transaction cost of integration when analyzing the vertical integration of the upstream and downstream monopoly enterprises , the article analyzes the product pricing , the consumer surplus and the social welfare of the upper and lower monopoly enterprises respectively , and obtains some new conclusions .








The fourth is to analyze the reason of too high ticket price in China ' s civil aviation industry from the angle of industrial organization .
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2003
【分類號(hào)】：F062.9

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 傅玲;雍軍;;價(jià)格管制在軌道交通定價(jià)中的運(yùn)用[J];四川建筑;2008年05期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 劉海鶯;中國鐵路業(yè)規(guī)制改革研究[D];遼寧大學(xué);2007年

2 孫妍;基于S-C-P范式的中國勞動(dòng)力市場結(jié)構(gòu)解析[D];西北大學(xué);2010年

3 譚楊;我國電信業(yè)改革及其改革績效研究[D];電子科技大學(xué);2009年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 蔡建剛;基于價(jià)格上限的我國輸配電價(jià)格規(guī)制模型研究[D];長沙理工大學(xué);2010年

2 陳晨;中國食用油產(chǎn)業(yè)的國際地位及進(jìn)口安全研究[D];浙江大學(xué);2011年

3 向倩;壟斷經(jīng)營行為感知的概念及量表開發(fā)研究[D];長沙理工大學(xué);2013年

本文編號(hào)：2018342