【摘要】：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性是關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)盈余確認(rèn)和計(jì)量的一項(xiàng)重要原則,是財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)研究領(lǐng)域中的一個(gè)重要組成部分。在市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性作為衡量會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)之一,不僅能夠抑制企業(yè)管理層高估盈余的動(dòng)機(jī),還有助于緩解資本市場(chǎng)的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng),進(jìn)而降低企業(yè)的融資成本和投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此,對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性影響因素的研究一直都是國(guó)內(nèi)外理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界廣泛關(guān)注的問(wèn)題。CEO和CFO作為對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量負(fù)最高責(zé)任和直接責(zé)任的關(guān)鍵高管,根據(jù)高階理論,他們的個(gè)人背景特征如性別、年齡、學(xué)歷、任期等,無(wú)疑都會(huì)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性產(chǎn)生重要影響。但高管任期與高管其他背景特征相比,是影響企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)行為和財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告質(zhì)量的關(guān)鍵因素。因此,本文認(rèn)為研究高管任期與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性之間的關(guān)系有重要的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文通過(guò)理論分析和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法,旨在研究高管任期對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的影響以及不同公司治理機(jī)制對(duì)二者關(guān)系的調(diào)節(jié)作用。在對(duì)2009-2016年深滬A股上市公司進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)后,本文得出以下結(jié)論:(1)高管(CEO/CFO)現(xiàn)有任期與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性呈倒U型關(guān)系,高管(CEO/CFO)預(yù)期任期與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性正相關(guān),并均在國(guó)有樣本中表現(xiàn)更加明顯。(2)CEO和CFO任期異質(zhì)性可以提高會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性水平,CEO和CFO任期異質(zhì)性程度越高,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性水平越高,CFO任職早于CEO更有利于企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性水平的提高,并均在非國(guó)有樣本中表現(xiàn)的更加明顯。(3)從全樣本來(lái)看,董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性在高管(CEO/CFO)任期(現(xiàn)有任期、預(yù)期任期和兩者任期異質(zhì)性)與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系中沒(méi)有顯著的調(diào)節(jié)作用;但在非國(guó)有樣本中有正向的調(diào)節(jié)作用。(4)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股在高管(CEO/CFO)現(xiàn)有任期及CEO與CFO任期異質(zhì)性與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系中有正向的調(diào)節(jié)作用,這一關(guān)系在國(guó)有樣本中表現(xiàn)的更加明顯;在高管(CEO/CFO)預(yù)期任期與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系中,在全樣本中機(jī)構(gòu)投資者沒(méi)有顯著的調(diào)節(jié)作用,但在非國(guó)有樣本中有正向的調(diào)節(jié)作用。
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism is an important principle of accounting earnings recognition and measurement. It is an important part of financial accounting research field. Under the condition of market economy, accounting conservatism, as one of the standards to measure the quality of accounting information, can not only restrain the motivation of overvaluing earnings of enterprise management, but also help to alleviate the information asymmetry in capital market. Then reduce the financing cost and investment risk of the enterprise. Therefore, the research on the influencing factors of accounting conservatism has always been a widespread concern of the theoretical and practical circles at home and abroad. CEO and CFO, as the key executives with the highest and direct responsibility for the quality of accounting information, are based on the higher order theory. Their personal background, such as gender, age, education, tenure and so on, will undoubtedly have an important impact on accounting conservatism. However, executive tenure is a key factor affecting financial behavior and financial reporting quality compared with other background characteristics of executives. Therefore, the study of the relationship between executive tenure and accounting conservatism has important theoretical and practical significance. Through the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper aims to study the impact of executive tenure on accounting conservatism and the regulatory effect of different corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between them. Based on the empirical test of Shenzhen-Shanghai A-share listed companies in 2009-2016, this paper draws the following conclusions: (1) the current tenure of senior executives (CEO/CFO) is inversely U-shaped in relation to accounting conservatism. The expected tenure of senior executives (CEO/CFO) is positively correlated with accounting conservatism, and both of them are more obvious in state-owned samples. (2) CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity can improve accounting conservatism, and the higher the CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity is, The higher the level of accounting conservatism, the earlier CFO holds office than CEO, which is more favorable to the improvement of accounting conservatism in enterprises, and all of them are more obvious in non-state-owned samples. (3) from the perspective of the whole sample, The independence of the board of directors has no significant moderating role in the relationship between the term of CEO/CFO (current term, expected term and heterogeneity of tenure) and accounting conservatism; But there is a positive regulatory role in the non-state-owned sample. (4) Institutional investors hold shares in the current tenure of senior executives (CEO/CFO) and the relationship between CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity and accounting conservatism. (4) Institutional investors hold shares in the current tenure of senior management (CEO/CFO) and the relationship between CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity and accounting conservatism. This relationship is more obvious in the state-owned sample; In the relationship between expected tenure of CEO/CFO and accounting conservatism, institutional investors have no significant moderating role in the whole sample, but positive regulation in non-state-owned samples.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：桂林電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F272.91

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