不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)下并購對高管薪酬的影響研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-09-12 08:43
【摘要】：經(jīng)濟全球化大勢下,市場競爭日趨激烈,并購成為擴張企業(yè)產(chǎn)能、優(yōu)化公司治理、重組產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈、實現(xiàn)行業(yè)整合的有效手段。伴隨我國企業(yè)優(yōu)勝劣汰進程的加速和資本市場容量的攀升,我國企業(yè)間并購市場發(fā)展迅猛。在為我國并購市場的欣欣向榮歡欣鼓舞之時,也不禁讓我們對企業(yè)并購的初衷和效果有所疑慮。并購初期,經(jīng)濟效益和企業(yè)價值一度作為解釋并購動因的有力工具。然而,隨著并購市場的發(fā)展和研究的深入,有學者提出高管存在利用職權(quán)尋租、牟取高額收益的動機。那么并購究竟是企業(yè)提升價值的工具還是高管謀求私利的手段呢?基于以上考慮,筆者提出了并購對高管薪酬影響這一研究議題。近年來我國如火如荼的并購市場和并購后持續(xù)攀升的高管薪酬引發(fā)了筆者關(guān)于二者關(guān)系以及企業(yè)并購結(jié)果的思考。鑒于此,筆者回顧了并購對高管薪酬影響的現(xiàn)有研究,梳理了委托代理理論、產(chǎn)權(quán)理論和并購動因理論等相關(guān)理論,提出并購對高管薪酬有正向影響這一假設(shè),并歸納出如下兩條影響路徑:①并購導致公司規(guī)模擴張,進而影響薪酬;②并購導致公司業(yè)績改善,進而影響薪酬�？紤]到業(yè)績變化可能具有一定的滯后性,筆者在并購時點研究的基礎(chǔ)上,進一步檢驗了并購后高管薪酬的變化。同時,結(jié)合我國特殊的政治體制和經(jīng)濟制度,按照產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的不同,本文分別從短期貨幣性薪酬和包括股權(quán)激勵的長期薪酬兩個維度,探討并購對高管薪酬的影響這一問題。這一問題的解決,不僅對高管激勵機制、并購決策的制定以及公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的完善具有實踐意義,而且填補了學術(shù)界對于民營企業(yè)和不同控制層級下國有企業(yè)間并購對高管薪酬影響問題的研究空白。本文研究分為以下六個部分:第一部分為緒論。首先陳述了本文的選題背景、研究意義,界定了文中涉及的相關(guān)概念,介紹了本文的研究目標和研究內(nèi)容,闡述文中選用的相關(guān)研究方法,列出行文架構(gòu),指出本文創(chuàng)新點,對下文的分析起到了支持作用。第二部分為文獻綜述。筆者從高管薪酬、并購、業(yè)績和規(guī)模四個要素著眼,梳理了業(yè)績、規(guī)模對高管薪酬的影響以及并購對業(yè)績、規(guī)模和高管薪酬影響的相關(guān)研究,將五條關(guān)系鏈有機結(jié)合起來,明確目前并購對高管薪酬影響的研究進程和動態(tài),提出這一領(lǐng)域的研究空白和改進之處。第三部分為理論分析與研究假設(shè)。基于委托代理理論,筆者提出并購對高管薪酬有促進作用,且并購當年這一促進作用通過規(guī)模擴張實現(xiàn)。結(jié)合產(chǎn)權(quán)理論以及并購動因理論,筆者對并購后高管薪酬的變化路徑予以剖析,提出國有企業(yè)通過規(guī)模擴張實現(xiàn)并購后高管薪酬的提升,而民營企業(yè)則通過績效改善導致并購后高管薪酬增長這一創(chuàng)新觀點。在此基礎(chǔ)上,按照我國國有企業(yè)控制層級的差異深入探討,提出央企并購后高管薪酬的提升通過規(guī)模擴張實現(xiàn),地方國企并購后薪酬提升則與業(yè)績改善和規(guī)模擴張同時正相關(guān)。第四部分為實證研究設(shè)計。本文選取了 2010-2013年所有發(fā)生并購的A股上市公司為樣本,剔除小規(guī)模并購和一年內(nèi)非同日多次并購。由于變量計算涉及并購前后兩年,本文包含2008-2015年相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)。根據(jù)上述六個假設(shè),筆者分別構(gòu)建相應(yīng)研究模型,同時對模型涉及變量的定義和度量方式予以闡釋。第五部分為實證分析。筆者首先研究了并購對高管薪酬的影響,在此基礎(chǔ)上分別針對并購時點和并購后兩種情況予以探討。在并購后的研究中,將滬深A(yù)股上市公司劃分為國有上市公司和民營上市公司分組檢驗,再將國有上市公司按隸屬差異劃分為中央和地方細分研究。本部分采用了描述性統(tǒng)計、多元回歸等實證研究方法,驗證了本文的六個假設(shè),并采用替換變量的方式,證實了實證結(jié)果的穩(wěn)健性。第六部分為總結(jié)和建議。根據(jù)實證結(jié)果,按照并購階段和產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的不同,筆者提出本文的研究結(jié)論;同時立足于高管激勵、并購決策和公司治理三方面,針對國有企業(yè)和民營企業(yè)分別提出了改進意見和建議。最后指明文章的不足以及未來可研究的方向。在繼承現(xiàn)有研究成果的同時,本文有如下創(chuàng)新。(1)此前研究多為并購當年的短期績效比較。不同于并購后企業(yè)規(guī)模的跳躍式增長,業(yè)績的改善在短期內(nèi)具有滯后性。為使研究更加全面、結(jié)果更具說服力,本文將并購對高管薪酬的影響劃分為并購時和并購后兩階段。(2)考慮到產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對于公司治理和高管行為的影響,筆者對于上市公司按照產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的差異予以分組研究,并提出兩個創(chuàng)新觀點:①民營企業(yè)并購后高管薪酬提升通過業(yè)績改善實現(xiàn);②地方國企并購后規(guī)模擴張和績效改善共同導致高管薪酬增加。
[Abstract]:Under the trend of economic globalization, the market competition is becoming more and more intense. Mergers and acquisitions have become an effective means to expand enterprise capacity, optimize corporate governance, restructure industrial chain and realize industry integration. In the early stage of M&A, economic benefits and enterprise value were once used as powerful tools to explain the motivation of M&A. However, with the development of M&A market and the deepening of research, some scholars have proposed that senior managers have the incentive to use their power to seek rent and obtain high profits. Based on the above considerations, the author puts forward the research topic of the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation. In view of this, the author reviews the existing research on the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation, combs the related theories such as principal-agent theory, property right theory and merger motivation theory, puts forward the hypothesis that mergers and acquisitions have a positive impact on executive compensation, and sums up the following two impact paths: (1) mergers and acquisitions lead to the expansion of the company size, and then shadow Considering the lag of performance changes, the author further examines the changes of executive compensation after merger and acquisition on the basis of the study of merger and acquisition time points. At the same time, this paper divides into two parts according to the different nature of property rights according to the special political and economic systems in China. This paper discusses the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation from the perspectives of short-term monetary compensation and long-term compensation including equity incentives. This paper is divided into the following six parts: The first part is the introduction. First of all, it states the background of this paper, research significance, defines the relevant concepts involved in this paper, introduces the research objectives and content of this paper, and elaborates the relevant selected in this paper. The second part is a literature review. The author focuses on the four elements of executive compensation, mergers and acquisitions, performance and size, combs the impact of performance, size on executive compensation and the impact of mergers and acquisitions on performance, size and executive compensation. The third part is the theoretical analysis and research hypothesis. Based on the principal-agent theory, the author puts forward that M&A can promote executive compensation, and that M&A can promote executive compensation in the same year. Based on the property right theory and the motivation theory of merger and acquisition, the author analyzes the change path of executive compensation after merger and acquisition, and puts forward the innovative viewpoint that state-owned enterprises can improve executive compensation after merger and acquisition through scale expansion, while private enterprises can increase executive compensation after merger and acquisition through performance improvement. According to the differences of control levels of state-owned enterprises in China, this paper proposes that the promotion of executive compensation after mergers and acquisitions of central enterprises is realized by scale expansion, while the promotion of salary after mergers and acquisitions of local state-owned enterprises is positively related to both performance improvement and scale expansion. Listed companies are the sample, excluding small-scale mergers and acquisitions within a year and multiple non-same-day mergers and acquisitions. Because the variables involved in mergers and acquisitions before and after two years, this paper contains the relevant data from 2008 to 2015. The author first studies the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation, and then discusses the timing of mergers and acquisitions and the situation after mergers and acquisitions. This part uses descriptive statistics, multiple regression and other empirical research methods to verify the six hypotheses of this paper, and uses substitution variables to confirm the robustness of the empirical results. The sixth part is a summary and suggestions. At the same time, based on executive incentives, merger and acquisition decision-making and corporate governance, the paper puts forward suggestions for the improvement of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises respectively. In order to make the research more comprehensive and the results more convincing, this paper divides the impact of M&A on executive compensation into two stages: M&A and post-M&A. (2) Considering the nature of property rights on corporate governance and M&A. The author classifies the listed companies according to their property rights, and puts forward two innovative viewpoints: 1) the promotion of executive compensation in private enterprises after M&A is realized through performance improvement; 2) the expansion of local state-owned enterprises after M&A and performance improvement together lead to the increase of executive compensation.
【學位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F272.92;F271
本文編號：2238495
[Abstract]:Under the trend of economic globalization, the market competition is becoming more and more intense. Mergers and acquisitions have become an effective means to expand enterprise capacity, optimize corporate governance, restructure industrial chain and realize industry integration. In the early stage of M&A, economic benefits and enterprise value were once used as powerful tools to explain the motivation of M&A. However, with the development of M&A market and the deepening of research, some scholars have proposed that senior managers have the incentive to use their power to seek rent and obtain high profits. Based on the above considerations, the author puts forward the research topic of the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation. In view of this, the author reviews the existing research on the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation, combs the related theories such as principal-agent theory, property right theory and merger motivation theory, puts forward the hypothesis that mergers and acquisitions have a positive impact on executive compensation, and sums up the following two impact paths: (1) mergers and acquisitions lead to the expansion of the company size, and then shadow Considering the lag of performance changes, the author further examines the changes of executive compensation after merger and acquisition on the basis of the study of merger and acquisition time points. At the same time, this paper divides into two parts according to the different nature of property rights according to the special political and economic systems in China. This paper discusses the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation from the perspectives of short-term monetary compensation and long-term compensation including equity incentives. This paper is divided into the following six parts: The first part is the introduction. First of all, it states the background of this paper, research significance, defines the relevant concepts involved in this paper, introduces the research objectives and content of this paper, and elaborates the relevant selected in this paper. The second part is a literature review. The author focuses on the four elements of executive compensation, mergers and acquisitions, performance and size, combs the impact of performance, size on executive compensation and the impact of mergers and acquisitions on performance, size and executive compensation. The third part is the theoretical analysis and research hypothesis. Based on the principal-agent theory, the author puts forward that M&A can promote executive compensation, and that M&A can promote executive compensation in the same year. Based on the property right theory and the motivation theory of merger and acquisition, the author analyzes the change path of executive compensation after merger and acquisition, and puts forward the innovative viewpoint that state-owned enterprises can improve executive compensation after merger and acquisition through scale expansion, while private enterprises can increase executive compensation after merger and acquisition through performance improvement. According to the differences of control levels of state-owned enterprises in China, this paper proposes that the promotion of executive compensation after mergers and acquisitions of central enterprises is realized by scale expansion, while the promotion of salary after mergers and acquisitions of local state-owned enterprises is positively related to both performance improvement and scale expansion. Listed companies are the sample, excluding small-scale mergers and acquisitions within a year and multiple non-same-day mergers and acquisitions. Because the variables involved in mergers and acquisitions before and after two years, this paper contains the relevant data from 2008 to 2015. The author first studies the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation, and then discusses the timing of mergers and acquisitions and the situation after mergers and acquisitions. This part uses descriptive statistics, multiple regression and other empirical research methods to verify the six hypotheses of this paper, and uses substitution variables to confirm the robustness of the empirical results. The sixth part is a summary and suggestions. At the same time, based on executive incentives, merger and acquisition decision-making and corporate governance, the paper puts forward suggestions for the improvement of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises respectively. In order to make the research more comprehensive and the results more convincing, this paper divides the impact of M&A on executive compensation into two stages: M&A and post-M&A. (2) Considering the nature of property rights on corporate governance and M&A. The author classifies the listed companies according to their property rights, and puts forward two innovative viewpoints: 1) the promotion of executive compensation in private enterprises after M&A is realized through performance improvement; 2) the expansion of local state-owned enterprises after M&A and performance improvement together lead to the increase of executive compensation.
【學位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F272.92;F271
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