本文選題：財(cái)務(wù)困境 + 應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理��； 參考：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：公司財(cái)務(wù)困境一直是投資者、債權(quán)人、政府以及經(jīng)理層所關(guān)注的問(wèn)題。有許多原因致使公司財(cái)務(wù)成果惡化,一定程度上將會(huì)導(dǎo)致公司破產(chǎn)或者被其他企業(yè)兼并重組。如果一個(gè)公司面臨財(cái)務(wù)困境,其價(jià)值將會(huì)下降,投資者因無(wú)法達(dá)到原有的投資所得而增大風(fēng)險(xiǎn);債權(quán)人可能無(wú)法全額收回貸款,從而呆賬壞賬增加;政府作為國(guó)家宏觀調(diào)控以及國(guó)家政策的干預(yù)者,財(cái)務(wù)困境會(huì)對(duì)稅收、資源配置以及整個(gè)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展帶來(lái)重要不利影響;經(jīng)理將會(huì)面臨減少獎(jiǎng)金,被別的經(jīng)理人替換以及遭受名譽(yù)損失等重大威脅。那么,在面臨財(cái)務(wù)困境時(shí),經(jīng)理是否有動(dòng)機(jī)通過(guò)操縱應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目或者真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理行為來(lái)隱藏這樣的惡化成果呢?同時(shí),2007年新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的實(shí)施,學(xué)者們普遍認(rèn)為應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理的操縱空間越來(lái)越小,出現(xiàn)顯著下降的趨勢(shì),由此管理層逐漸由應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理方式轉(zhuǎn)為真實(shí)盈余管理方式。2008年五部委聯(lián)合頒布《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制基本規(guī)范》,2010年又接連頒布《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制配套指引》,從而完善了我國(guó)的內(nèi)部控制體系,加強(qiáng)了對(duì)內(nèi)控信息披露的要求。在這種情況下,內(nèi)部控制的加強(qiáng)是否會(huì)抑制財(cái)務(wù)困境公司的盈余管理行為呢?國(guó)內(nèi)外關(guān)于這兩個(gè)問(wèn)題的研究并不充分,現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)主要從應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理角度對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)困境和內(nèi)部控制分別進(jìn)行了探討。首先,大部分學(xué)者從動(dòng)機(jī)論出發(fā),以國(guó)家制度為背景,認(rèn)為財(cái)務(wù)困境公司會(huì)進(jìn)行更多的應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理。其次,對(duì)內(nèi)部控制和盈余管理的研究存在分歧,部分學(xué)者認(rèn)為內(nèi)部控制能夠抑制盈余管理行為,但是還有學(xué)者認(rèn)為內(nèi)部控制對(duì)盈余管理的影響并不顯著。本文從應(yīng)計(jì)和真實(shí)盈余管理兩個(gè)方面出發(fā),分別研究財(cái)務(wù)困境與二者的具體關(guān)系,并在此基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)一步探討,內(nèi)部控制對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)困境和盈余管理關(guān)系的影響。綜上,本文提出研究問(wèn)題:(1)在新的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則頒布之后,與非財(cái)務(wù)困境公司相比,財(cái)務(wù)困境公司會(huì)進(jìn)行更多的應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理還是真實(shí)盈余管理呢?(2)在新的內(nèi)部控制要求下,內(nèi)部控制是否會(huì)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)困境公司的盈余管理行為產(chǎn)生影響?其對(duì)應(yīng)計(jì)和真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理都會(huì)產(chǎn)生影響嗎?(3)在(2)的基礎(chǔ)上,將內(nèi)部控制缺陷按照嚴(yán)重程度分為重大缺陷、重要缺陷和一般缺陷,從小樣本出發(fā),研究不同缺陷類型是否對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)困境和盈余管理有影響?影響的作用力如何?(4)在(3)的基礎(chǔ)上,進(jìn)一步研究上年存在內(nèi)部控制缺陷,但當(dāng)年度內(nèi)控缺陷得到整改的公司,是否會(huì)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)困境和應(yīng)計(jì)、真實(shí)盈余管理產(chǎn)生影響?(5)根據(jù)內(nèi)部控制建設(shè),內(nèi)控信息披露意愿分為自愿披露和強(qiáng)制披露,在此基礎(chǔ)上研究不同披露意愿是否會(huì)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)困境和應(yīng)計(jì)、真實(shí)盈余管理產(chǎn)生影響,兩者的誰(shuí)的作用力更大?文本的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)為:(1)盡管有學(xué)者研究了財(cái)務(wù)困境與應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理之間的關(guān)系,但是對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)困境公司真實(shí)盈余管理的研究相對(duì)較少,本文則主要研究真實(shí)盈余管理與財(cái)務(wù)困境之間的關(guān)系,同時(shí)加入應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理指標(biāo)作為對(duì)比,來(lái)進(jìn)一步衡量財(cái)務(wù)困境公司對(duì)應(yīng)計(jì)和真實(shí)盈余管理的選擇,以及選擇的動(dòng)機(jī)是什么,以此驗(yàn)證新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的實(shí)施效度;(2)目前對(duì)于內(nèi)部控制的研究雖然比較多,但是都只關(guān)注其中一個(gè)視角,而本文從內(nèi)部控制缺陷、缺陷類型、缺陷整改、內(nèi)控信息披露的意愿等不同角度,并按照一定的邏輯遞進(jìn)性展開(kāi),對(duì)內(nèi)部控制的研究較為全面,也充分展現(xiàn)了政策的實(shí)施效度。(3)在變量的定義上,本文對(duì)主變量從多個(gè)角度進(jìn)行定義和計(jì)量,有利于結(jié)果的可靠性。
[Abstract]:The financial distress of a company has always been a concern for investors, creditors, government and managers. There are many reasons for the deterioration of the company's financial results, which will cause the company to go bankrupt or be annexed and reorganized by other companies. If a company faces financial difficulties, its value will decline and investors can not reach the original. The investment income increases the risk; the creditor may not be able to recover the loan in full, thus increasing the bad debt and bad debts; the government as the state macro regulation and the state policy interferer, the financial distress will bring about the important adverse effects on the tax, the resource allocation and the whole social economic development; the manager will face the reduction of bonuses and the other managers. In the face of financial difficulties, do managers have a motive to hide such deterioration by manipulating accrual or real activity earnings management? At the same time, in the implementation of the new accounting standards in 2007, scholars generally believe that the control space of accrual earnings management is becoming smaller and smaller. The trend of a significant decline, from which the management layer is gradually transferred from accrued earnings management to real earnings management, the five ministries and commissions in.2008 jointly promulgated < the basic norms for internal control of enterprises > in 2010. In 2010, the internal control supporting guidelines of enterprises have been promulgated. Thus the internal control system of China has been perfected and the information disclosure of internal control has been strengthened. In this case, does the strengthening of the internal control restrain the earnings management behavior of the financial distress companies? The research on these two problems is not sufficient at home and abroad. The existing literature mainly discusses the financial difficulties and internal control from the angle of accrued earnings management. With the family system as the background, we think that financial distress companies will carry out more accruals management. Secondly, there are differences in the study of internal control and earnings management. Some scholars believe that internal control can inhibit earnings management behavior, but some scholars believe that internal control has no significant impact on earnings management. On the two aspects of earnings management, we study the specific relationship between financial distress and the two, and further discuss the influence of internal control on the relationship between financial distress and earnings management. In this paper, the research questions are put forward: (1) after the promulgation of the new accounting standards, the financial distress companies will carry out compared to the non financial distress companies. More accrued earnings management or real earnings management? (2) will internal control have an impact on the earnings management behavior of financial distress companies under the new internal control requirements? Does its counterplan and real activity earnings management have an impact? (3) on the basis of (2), the internal control defects are divided into significant levels of gravity. Defects, important defects and general defects, starting from small samples, whether different types of defects have an impact on financial distress and earnings management? (4) on the basis of (3), further research on internal control defects in the previous year, but whether the company that has been rectify and rectify the defects in the year will be in financial distress and accruals, The impact of real earnings management? (5) on the basis of internal control construction, the intention of disclosure of internal control information is divided into voluntary disclosure and compulsory disclosure. On this basis, the research on whether different disclosures will affect financial distress and accrual, real earnings management, and the greater force of the two is: (1) although some scholars have studied The relationship between the financial distress and the accrued earnings management, but the research on the real earnings management of the financial distress companies is relatively small. This paper mainly studies the relationship between real earnings management and financial distress, while adding the accrued earnings management indicators as a contrast to measure the financial distress company's counterplan and the real surplus. The choice of management and what motivation is to verify the implementation validity of the new accounting standards; (2) although there are many studies on internal control at present, they are only concerned with one of the perspectives, and this article is based on the different angles of internal control defects, defect types, defects rectification and internal control information disclosure. The logic of expansion, more comprehensive research on internal control, but also fully demonstrated the validity of the implementation of the policy. (3) in the definition of the variables, the main variables were defined and measured from multiple perspectives, in favor of the reliability of the results.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275

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