本文選題：政府補(bǔ)貼 + 制度環(huán)境　； 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：投資活動(dòng)是企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)的重要組成部分,高效的企業(yè)投資是企業(yè)資源配置的合理性的有力體現(xiàn)。目前我國(guó)正處在產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級(jí)的關(guān)鍵時(shí)期,完善的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體系還沒(méi)有完全建立,企業(yè)的投資行為受到來(lái)自外部制度環(huán)境多方面的影響,非效率投資現(xiàn)象普遍存在。政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)于企業(yè)的投資活動(dòng)中發(fā)揮著重要的刺激和引導(dǎo)作用。那么,不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的企業(yè)獲得的政府補(bǔ)貼是否會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)投資效率產(chǎn)生不同的影響?在不同的制度環(huán)境下,政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)于企業(yè)投資效率的影響又會(huì)有什么不同?鑒于此,本文把政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)企業(yè)投資效率的影響作為研究對(duì)象,在第二章對(duì)現(xiàn)有的研究成果進(jìn)行歸納論述的基礎(chǔ)上,第三章進(jìn)行了理論分析并據(jù)此提出研究假設(shè)。本文在委托代理理論和信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)理論的基礎(chǔ)上,將非效率投資行為劃分為過(guò)度投資與投資不足,分別分析政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)于不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的企業(yè)投資效率的影響機(jī)制,然后加入外部制度環(huán)境因素,分析在不同的制度環(huán)境水平下,政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)于企業(yè)投資效率的影響的不同表現(xiàn)形式,并據(jù)此提出本文的研究假設(shè)。在第四章提出本文的實(shí)證研究設(shè)計(jì),本文選擇了 2007年-2015年的新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則實(shí)施后的A股上市公司樣本,經(jīng)過(guò)數(shù)據(jù)篩選后得到12520個(gè)有效樣本數(shù)據(jù).本文數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)自于CSMAR數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)和巨潮資訊網(wǎng)下載的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告獲。借鑒現(xiàn)有理論和研究成果建立模型,利用Excel對(duì)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行整理后借助SPSS22.0與Stata12.0檢驗(yàn)政府補(bǔ)貼與企業(yè)投資效率之間的關(guān)系,并在第五章中通過(guò)描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析和回歸分析對(duì)實(shí)證結(jié)果進(jìn)行解讀。在理論分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,本文得出以下的研究結(jié)論:政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)企業(yè)的投資效率有顯著的影響作用。一方面政府補(bǔ)貼能夠加劇國(guó)有企業(yè)的過(guò)度投資行為,但對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)的投資不足行為無(wú)顯著影響;另一方面政府補(bǔ)貼能夠加劇非國(guó)有企業(yè)的投資不足行為,但對(duì)非國(guó)有企業(yè)的過(guò)度投資行為無(wú)顯著影響。在制度環(huán)境較差的地區(qū),對(duì)于國(guó)有企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō),政府補(bǔ)貼加劇了國(guó)有企業(yè)的過(guò)度投資行為和投資不足行為,而對(duì)于非國(guó)有企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō),政府補(bǔ)貼加劇了非國(guó)有企業(yè)的投資不足行為。而在制度環(huán)境較好的地區(qū),政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)于國(guó)有企業(yè)和非國(guó)有企業(yè)的非效率投資行為均無(wú)顯著影響;總而言之,政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)于國(guó)有企業(yè)的過(guò)度投資行為和投資不足行為均有正向的作用,而政府補(bǔ)貼僅對(duì)非國(guó)有企業(yè)的投資不足行為有正向的影響作用。通過(guò)研究得到的結(jié)論,本文認(rèn)為政府和企業(yè)可以從以下三個(gè)方面改善外部經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境和投資效率,政策建議如下:一是建立完善的政府補(bǔ)貼分配機(jī)制;二是轉(zhuǎn)變政府職能、加強(qiáng)法制和金融體系建設(shè);三是完善公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制,加強(qiáng)對(duì)管理層的監(jiān)管和激勵(lì)。
[Abstract]:The investment activity is an important part of the enterprise management activity, and the efficient enterprise investment is the rational embodiment of the enterprise resource allocation. At present, our country is in the key period of industrial transformation and upgrading, the perfect market economy system has not been completely established, the investment behavior of enterprises is influenced by many aspects from the external institutional environment, and the phenomenon of inefficient investment exists generally. Government subsidies play an important role in stimulating and guiding enterprises' investment activities. So, will the government subsidies obtained by enterprises with different property rights have different effects on the investment efficiency of enterprises? In different institutional environments, how will government subsidies affect the efficiency of enterprise investment? In view of this, this paper takes the effect of government subsidy on the investment efficiency of enterprises as the research object, on the basis of summarizing and discussing the existing research results in the second chapter, the third chapter makes a theoretical analysis and puts forward the research hypotheses accordingly. Based on the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper divides the inefficient investment behavior into overinvestment and underinvestment, and analyzes the influence mechanism of government subsidies on the investment efficiency of enterprises with different property rights. Then the external institutional environmental factors are added to analyze the different forms of the effects of government subsidies on the investment efficiency of enterprises under different institutional environment levels, and the research hypotheses of this paper are put forward accordingly. In the fourth chapter, the empirical research design of this paper is put forward. The sample of A-share listed companies after the implementation of the new accounting standards from 2007 to 2015 is selected in this paper. After data screening, 12520 valid sample data are obtained. The data in this article are obtained from the financial reports downloaded from the CSMAR database and the Giant Tide Information Network. Based on the existing theories and research results, this paper establishes a model, uses Excel to collate the data, and tests the relationship between government subsidies and enterprise investment efficiency by means of SPSS22.0 and Stata12.0. In the fifth chapter, the empirical results are interpreted by descriptive statistical analysis and regression analysis. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical test, this paper draws the following conclusions: government subsidies have a significant impact on the investment efficiency of enterprises. On the one hand, the government subsidy can aggravate the excessive investment behavior of the state-owned enterprises, but it has no significant effect on the underinvestment behavior of the state-owned enterprises; on the other hand, the government subsidy can aggravate the underinvestment behavior of the non-state-owned enterprises. However, there is no significant effect on the over-investment behavior of non-state-owned enterprises. In areas with poor institutional environment, for state-owned enterprises, government subsidies aggravate the over-investment behavior and underinvestment behavior of state-owned enterprises, while for non-state-owned enterprises, government subsidies aggravate the underinvestment behavior of non-state-owned enterprises. However, in areas where the institutional environment is better, government subsidies have no significant impact on the inefficient investment behavior of both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. Government subsidies have a positive effect on the overinvestment behavior and underinvestment behavior of state-owned enterprises, while government subsidies only have a positive effect on the underinvestment behavior of non-state-owned enterprises. Through the conclusion of the study, this paper holds that the government and enterprises can improve the external economic environment and investment efficiency from the following three aspects: first, to establish a sound mechanism for the allocation of government subsidies; second, to transform the functions of the government. Strengthen the legal system and financial system construction; third, perfect the internal governance mechanism of the company, strengthen the supervision and incentive to the management.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 郭田勇;趙亮;;上市公司政府補(bǔ)貼的完善之道[J];人民論壇;2012年26期

2 邱國(guó)斌;;不同政府補(bǔ)貼模式對(duì)制造商與零售商決策的影響[J];科學(xué)決策;2013年07期

3 羅艾奇;;政府補(bǔ)貼——救命稻草還是致命鴉片?[J];時(shí)代金融;2013年20期

4 ;2006年度上海市政府補(bǔ)貼培訓(xùn)項(xiàng)目說(shuō)明[J];成才與就業(yè);2006年04期

5 唐清泉;羅黨論;;政府補(bǔ)貼動(dòng)機(jī)及其效果的實(shí)證研究——來(lái)自中國(guó)上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];金融研究;2007年06期

6 徐斌;;技術(shù)領(lǐng)先者進(jìn)入下的本土企業(yè)R&D合作與政府補(bǔ)貼[J];工業(yè)技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì);2008年01期

7 湯敏;;政府補(bǔ)貼可少給企業(yè)多給居民[J];先鋒隊(duì);2013年08期

8 楊子山;;1998-2012年全球棉花政府補(bǔ)貼總計(jì)(所有項(xiàng)目)[J];中國(guó)棉花;2013年06期

9 王一卉;;政府補(bǔ)貼、研發(fā)投入與企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績(jī)效——基于所有制、企業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)與地區(qū)差異的研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題探索;2013年07期

10 崔銳;;政治聯(lián)系與政府補(bǔ)貼關(guān)系述評(píng)[J];商;2013年04期

相關(guān)會(huì)議論文 前2條

1 章桂紅;陳澤華;;中小企業(yè)政府補(bǔ)貼的策略選擇[A];行政管理學(xué)視閾中縣域經(jīng)濟(jì)與中小企業(yè)健康成長(zhǎng)之路（湖北行政管理論壇2009）[C];2009年

2 王一濤;;教育與公共產(chǎn)品——對(duì)一種錯(cuò)誤觀點(diǎn)的澄清[A];2006年中國(guó)教育經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)年會(huì)會(huì)議論文集[C];2006年

相關(guān)重要報(bào)紙文章 前10條

1 德商;歐盟委員會(huì)公布政府補(bǔ)貼情況[N];國(guó)際經(jīng)貿(mào)消息;2002年

2 本報(bào)記者普布旺堆 實(shí)習(xí)生夏玉娟;我地為12家困難企業(yè)發(fā)放政府補(bǔ)貼資金251.8萬(wàn)元[N];山南報(bào)(漢);2009年

3 吳文彪　李杏;全國(guó)政協(xié)委員建言規(guī)范政府補(bǔ)貼行為[N];人民政協(xié)報(bào);2012年

4 本報(bào)記者 桂小筍;受益1.25億政府補(bǔ)貼 澳洋科技2012年扭虧為盈[N];證券日?qǐng)?bào);2013年

5 記者 劉艷 整理;變味的政府補(bǔ)貼當(dāng)休矣[N];經(jīng)濟(jì)參考報(bào);2014年

6 潘清;近九成上市公司獲政府補(bǔ)貼 “免費(fèi)補(bǔ)藥”考問(wèn)公平[N];中華建筑報(bào);2014年

7 本報(bào)評(píng)論員 張立偉;應(yīng)該對(duì)部分地方政府補(bǔ)貼進(jìn)行效果評(píng)估[N];21世紀(jì)經(jīng)濟(jì)報(bào)道;2014年

8 江德斌;政府補(bǔ)貼居家養(yǎng)老是一個(gè)好政策[N];嘉興日?qǐng)?bào);2014年

9 符向軍;政府補(bǔ)貼“居家養(yǎng)老”值得提倡[N];上海金融報(bào);2014年

10 石勇生邋吳潛鋒;今年拆解改造可享受政府補(bǔ)貼[N];中國(guó)水運(yùn)報(bào);2007年

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 呂曉軍;政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的影響研究[D];武漢大學(xué);2015年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前10條

1 呂鐲;補(bǔ)貼對(duì)裝備制造企業(yè)創(chuàng)新水平的影響研究[D];大連理工大學(xué);2015年

2 程然;地方政府補(bǔ)貼下跨區(qū)域綠色供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的效率與公平研究[D];浙江工商大學(xué);2015年

3 陶真嬋;企業(yè)獲取政府補(bǔ)貼的影響因素[D];浙江工業(yè)大學(xué);2014年

4 毛逸菲;政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)企業(yè)進(jìn)入的影響研究[D];南京大學(xué);2016年

5 洪琳;大氣治理、真實(shí)盈余管理和政府補(bǔ)貼[D];暨南大學(xué);2016年

6 趙悅祺;政府補(bǔ)貼與知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)對(duì)企業(yè)R&D投資的影響研究[D];華南理工大學(xué);2016年

7 胡彬;政府補(bǔ)貼與企業(yè)創(chuàng)新持續(xù)性研究[D];華僑大學(xué);2016年

8 彭超;政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)和出口貿(mào)易的影響研究[D];東華大學(xué);2016年

9 楊艷娟;政府補(bǔ)貼對(duì)遼寧省裝備制造業(yè)企業(yè)R&D投入的影響研究[D];遼寧大學(xué);2016年

10 周紫薇;基于博弈論的公共自行車(chē)企業(yè)政府補(bǔ)貼模型研究[D];湖南大學(xué);2016年

，

本文編號(hào)：1904330