非上市中小民營企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制探析
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-04-05 06:54
本文選題:股權(quán)激勵(lì) 切入點(diǎn):非上市 出處:《華中師范大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文
【摘要】:隨著我國經(jīng)濟(jì)的不斷發(fā)展,市場經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境的不斷完善,我國企業(yè)的發(fā)展迎來了很多機(jī)遇,但與此同時(shí)也面臨著嚴(yán)峻的挑戰(zhàn)。如何在充滿競爭的市場環(huán)境中,確保企業(yè)核心員工團(tuán)結(jié)一致、齊心協(xié)力抓住機(jī)遇迎接挑戰(zhàn),成為了眾多企業(yè)考慮的核心問題。在傳統(tǒng)的工資獎(jiǎng)金核算中,在特定時(shí)間內(nèi)完成特定目標(biāo)是考核經(jīng)理人并核對(duì)其收入的重要組成部分。此種方式更關(guān)注的是企業(yè)在短期內(nèi)的業(yè)績發(fā)展,顧及不到企業(yè)的長期發(fā)展,也就意味著經(jīng)理人存在放棄企業(yè)的長遠(yuǎn)利益而完成個(gè)人的短期業(yè)績的可能性。但企業(yè)股東,尤其是快速發(fā)展中的企業(yè),相比較于短期利益,更加關(guān)心企業(yè)的長期價(jià)值。要想達(dá)到經(jīng)理人和企業(yè)股東一樣關(guān)注企業(yè)長遠(yuǎn)價(jià)值發(fā)展的效果,需要將經(jīng)理人的利益與企業(yè)股東的利益緊密地聯(lián)系在一起。股權(quán)激勵(lì)正好能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)這一點(diǎn)。股權(quán)激勵(lì)是一種長效機(jī)制,它能夠促使經(jīng)營管理者和公司股東具有高度統(tǒng)一的價(jià)值追求,從而長期有效地激勵(lì)經(jīng)營管理者為企業(yè)的長遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展積極努力。不管是管理層、技術(shù)核心還是業(yè)務(wù)骨干都需要關(guān)注企業(yè)長期的利益進(jìn)而實(shí)現(xiàn)個(gè)人的利益,相應(yīng)地,他們也必須在某種程度上以某種特定的方式承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。然而并非只有大型上市公司面臨著此類問題,眾多非上市企業(yè)尤其是中小民營企業(yè)同樣需要凝聚核心人才與企業(yè)共發(fā)展。但是目前對(duì)于非上市中小民營企業(yè)而言,由于股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施環(huán)境存疑、相關(guān)法律制度不夠健全,股票定價(jià)變現(xiàn)難度大,存在諸多困難,實(shí)施難度較大。本文立足于解決諸多非上市中小型民營企業(yè)所面臨的人才流失、管理激勵(lì)不夠的問題,站在這類企業(yè)的角度,對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制進(jìn)行探析。本文還以FT能源有限公司為例,通過調(diào)查統(tǒng)計(jì)分析,結(jié)合其現(xiàn)狀初步設(shè)計(jì)了股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施方案,旨在為國內(nèi)諸多非上市中小民營企業(yè)提供相關(guān)參考。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of our economy and the continuous improvement of the market economy environment, the development of Chinese enterprises ushered in a lot of opportunities, but at the same time, it is also facing severe challenges.In the competitive market environment, how to ensure the unity of the core employees and seize the opportunities to meet the challenges has become the core issue considered by many enterprises.In the traditional salary and bonus accounting, it is an important part of checking the manager's income to complete the specific goal in a certain time.This kind of way pays more attention to the enterprise's performance development in the short term, does not take into account the enterprise's long-term development, also means that the manager has the possibility to give up the long-term interests of the enterprise and complete the individual's short-term performance.But shareholders, especially those in rapid development, are more concerned about the long-term value than the short-term benefits.In order to achieve the effect that managers and shareholders pay attention to the development of long-term value of enterprises, it is necessary to closely link the interests of managers with those of shareholders.Equity incentives do just that.Equity incentive is a kind of long-term mechanism, which can urge managers and shareholders to pursue the value of a high degree of unity, thus effectively motivating managers to make positive efforts for the long-term development of enterprises.Both the management, the technical core and the business backbone need to pay attention to the long-term interests of the enterprise and realize the individual interests. Accordingly, they must take the risks in a certain way to a certain extent.However, there are not only large listed companies facing such problems, many non-listed enterprises, especially small and medium-sized private enterprises, also need to pool core talents and enterprises to develop together.However, for the non-listed small and medium-sized private enterprises, due to the doubt of the implementation environment of equity incentive, the relevant legal system is not perfect, the stock pricing is difficult to realize, there are many difficulties, and the implementation is difficult.This paper is based on solving the problem of brain drain and insufficient management incentive faced by many non-listed small and medium-sized private enterprises. From the angle of this kind of enterprises, this paper analyzes the equity incentive mechanism.This paper also takes FT Energy Co., Ltd as an example, through investigation and statistical analysis, combined with its current situation, the preliminary design of the implementation of equity incentives, aiming to provide a number of non-listed small and medium-sized private enterprises in China to provide relevant reference.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:華中師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2016
【分類號(hào)】:F276.5;F272.92
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