本文選題：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性　切入點(diǎn)：管理層權(quán)力　出處：《浙江工商大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：2008年全球金融危機(jī)爆發(fā),一直推崇公允價(jià)值計(jì)量的雷曼兄弟因?yàn)樘崆按_認(rèn)收益虛增資產(chǎn),最終走上了宣告破產(chǎn)的不歸路。與之相反,堅(jiān)持采用穩(wěn)健性會(huì)計(jì)政策的陽獅集團(tuán),在金融危機(jī)初露端倪時(shí)做出謹(jǐn)慎的決定,不盲目確認(rèn)收益、過度投資,經(jīng)受住金融危機(jī)的洗禮,屹立到最后,成為廣告界的巨人。由此可見會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性對(duì)于公司的長期發(fā)展起到了不可忽視的作用。在此背景下,關(guān)于穩(wěn)健性根源的探討以及會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的影響因素研究得到學(xué)者們?cè)絹碓蕉嗟年P(guān)注。對(duì)于影響會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性因素的深入了解,有利于改善公司治理,促進(jìn)資本市場的發(fā)展。在眾多影響會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的因素當(dāng)中,管理層權(quán)力是其中重要而不可忽略的因素。在公司治理的框架下,由于第一類代理問題的存在,管理層有動(dòng)機(jī)并有機(jī)會(huì)利用所掌握的權(quán)力,對(duì)公司的財(cái)務(wù)信息施加影響,以達(dá)到利己的目的,從而影響會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性。除了微觀層面管理層權(quán)力的影響,會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)告的穩(wěn)健性水平很大程度上基于不健全的制度安排,制度環(huán)境越好,則法制對(duì)于公司的威懾和管理層的行為約束能力越強(qiáng),對(duì)于投資者的保護(hù)水平隨之越高,增強(qiáng)了公司對(duì)于穩(wěn)健性會(huì)計(jì)的需求。而在我國現(xiàn)實(shí)國情中,國有企業(yè)和民營企業(yè)差異巨大,在兩大類型企業(yè)陣營中,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的表現(xiàn)也是值得探究之處�；谏鲜鲞@些問題,本文運(yùn)用理論分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)相結(jié)合的方法進(jìn)行后續(xù)研究。在理論分析中,本文從會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性、管理層權(quán)力和制度環(huán)境三個(gè)方面回顧了國內(nèi)外相關(guān)的研究成果�？偨Y(jié)與研究有關(guān)的經(jīng)濟(jì)人假說、信息不對(duì)稱理論和委托代理理論,在這些理論的指導(dǎo)下,深入分析制度環(huán)境、管理層權(quán)力與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性之間的作用機(jī)理,并提出兩大主要假設(shè),即上市公司中管理層權(quán)力越大、會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性水平越低;其他條件相同的情況下,制度環(huán)境越差,管理層權(quán)力對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的負(fù)面影響越明顯。同時(shí),結(jié)合我國特殊背景,研究不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)下,制度環(huán)境、管理層權(quán)力與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性之間的影響是否相同。在實(shí)證研究中,本文利用主成分分析法構(gòu)建管理層權(quán)力綜合指標(biāo)。以A股上市公司2009-2014年間的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本,構(gòu)建相關(guān)模型,對(duì)假設(shè)進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究,得出以下結(jié)論:(1)管理層權(quán)力與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性負(fù)相關(guān),管理層權(quán)力越大的公司會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性水平越低,且在國有企業(yè)中表現(xiàn)更加明顯;(2)制度環(huán)境對(duì)管理層權(quán)力影響會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性有著正向調(diào)節(jié)作用,且在國有企業(yè)中作用更加明顯。最后,在上述研究的基礎(chǔ)上,本文提出了完善公司治理和信息披露機(jī)制,加強(qiáng)法律制度建設(shè)和對(duì)國有企業(yè)管理層的監(jiān)督等政策建議。并對(duì)本文研究的不足之處進(jìn)行總結(jié)以及對(duì)未來繼續(xù)研究的展望。
[Abstract]:In 2008, when the global financial crisis erupted, Lehman Brothers, which has been a champion of fair value measures, ended up on the path of bankruptcy because of its early recognition of earnings as a bullish asset.On the contrary, the sun lion group, which insists on adopting prudent accounting policies, made a prudent decision when the financial crisis emerged, did not blindly recognize returns, overinvested, withstood the baptism of the financial crisis, and stood firm until the end.Become a giant in advertising.It can be seen that accounting conservatism plays an important role in the long-term development of the company.Under this background, scholars pay more and more attention to the research on the origin of conservatism and the influencing factors of accounting conservatism.Understanding the factors influencing accounting conservatism is helpful to improve corporate governance and promote the development of capital market.Among the many factors affecting accounting conservatism, management power is an important factor that can not be ignored.Under the framework of corporate governance, because of the existence of the first kind of agency problem, the management has the motive and the opportunity to exert influence on the financial information of the company, so as to achieve the purpose of self-interest and thus affect the accounting conservatism.In addition to the influence of management power at the micro level, the level of conservatism of accounting reports is largely based on imperfect institutional arrangements. The better the institutional environment, the stronger the legal system can deter the company and restrain the behavior of the management.The higher the level of protection for investors, the stronger the company's demand for conservatism accounting.In the reality of our country, there are great differences between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, and the performance of accounting conservatism is also worth exploring in the camp of two types of enterprises.Based on these problems, this paper uses the method of theoretical analysis and empirical test to carry out follow-up research.In the theoretical analysis, this paper reviews the domestic and foreign related research results from three aspects of accounting conservatism, management power and institutional environment.This paper summarizes the economic man hypothesis, information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory related to the research. Under the guidance of these theories, it deeply analyzes the system environment, the mechanism between management power and accounting conservatism, and puts forward two major hypotheses.That is, the greater the power of management in listed companies, the lower the level of accounting conservatism; under the same conditions, the worse the institutional environment, the more obvious the negative impact of management power on accounting conservatism.At the same time, according to the special background of our country, this paper studies whether the influence of system environment, management power and accounting conservatism is the same under different property rights.In the empirical study, this paper uses principal component analysis to construct the comprehensive index of management power.Taking the financial data of A-share listed companies from 2009-2014 as the research sample, this paper constructs a relevant model and makes an empirical study of the hypotheses, and draws the following conclusions: (1) the negative correlation between management power and accounting conservatism.The higher the power of management, the lower the level of accounting conservatism, and the more obvious it is in state-owned enterprises.) the institutional environment has a positive regulating effect on the influence of management power on accounting conservatism, and it plays a more obvious role in state-owned enterprises.Finally, on the basis of the above research, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions, such as perfecting the mechanism of corporate governance and information disclosure, strengthening the construction of legal system and supervising the management of state-owned enterprises.And the shortcomings of this study and future research prospects.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D630;F275;F272.91

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