本文關(guān)鍵詞： 會(huì)計(jì)選擇變更 動(dòng)因分析 經(jīng)濟(jì)后果　出處：《石河子大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：根據(jù)契約理論,會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則本質(zhì)上是政府與企業(yè)以會(huì)計(jì)政策和方法為內(nèi)容制定的契約。然而,在經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的過(guò)程中,由于市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境的不穩(wěn)定性、經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)務(wù)內(nèi)容的復(fù)雜多樣性,使得契約具有一定的不完備性。契約賦予企業(yè)擁有選擇權(quán),但在實(shí)務(wù)中,這種選擇權(quán)卻成為企業(yè)謀取私利、追求自身利益最大化的工具。近年來(lái),會(huì)計(jì)選擇變更行為在上市公司成為普遍現(xiàn)象,通過(guò)會(huì)計(jì)選擇變更實(shí)現(xiàn)盈余管理、平滑利潤(rùn)等目的的案例也屢見(jiàn)不鮮。這些存在特殊目的的行為,不利于上市公司長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展,也會(huì)阻礙我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)良性發(fā)展。然而,由于我國(guó)特殊的國(guó)情,借鑒國(guó)外關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)選擇變更研究發(fā)展起來(lái)的研究理論不能很好的為我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)服務(wù),因此,有必要根據(jù)我國(guó)具體經(jīng)濟(jì)形態(tài)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)選擇變更進(jìn)行研究。本文將案例與理論結(jié)合,綜合運(yùn)用數(shù)據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)法與財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)法,通過(guò)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)選擇變更現(xiàn)狀發(fā)現(xiàn)其普遍性特征,再通過(guò)個(gè)例-中遠(yuǎn)海能的會(huì)計(jì)估計(jì)變更與會(huì)計(jì)政策變更具體內(nèi)容,結(jié)合契約理論、代理理論、經(jīng)濟(jì)后果論等,探索上市公司會(huì)計(jì)選擇變更動(dòng)因、經(jīng)濟(jì)后果以及背后存在的問(wèn)題,以期為解決問(wèn)題提供一定建議。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)上市公司的會(huì)計(jì)選擇變更行為具有普遍性,呈逐年增長(zhǎng)的趨勢(shì),且更容易發(fā)生在固定資產(chǎn)規(guī)模較大的企業(yè),變更的項(xiàng)目主要集中于固定資產(chǎn)折舊、應(yīng)收賬款壞賬準(zhǔn)備及投資性房地產(chǎn)的后續(xù)計(jì)量。(2)中遠(yuǎn)海能進(jìn)行會(huì)計(jì)選擇變更的主要手段是,調(diào)整船舶的預(yù)計(jì)使用壽命和凈殘值、將投資性房地產(chǎn)后續(xù)計(jì)量模式由成本模式改為公允價(jià)值模式。其變更行為主要是受盈余管理、增加薪酬、促進(jìn)融資等經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)機(jī)的驅(qū)使。(3)從中遠(yuǎn)海能會(huì)計(jì)選擇變更產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果來(lái)看,會(huì)計(jì)選擇變更只能改變企業(yè)短期的財(cái)務(wù)狀況和經(jīng)營(yíng)成果,但無(wú)法改變實(shí)際的經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況。這種信息的可靠性存在問(wèn)題可能會(huì)對(duì)債權(quán)人、投資者等信息使用者的經(jīng)濟(jì)決策產(chǎn)生誤導(dǎo),損害其利益,也不利于證券市場(chǎng)的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展。(4)中遠(yuǎn)海能可以隨意進(jìn)行會(huì)計(jì)選擇變更,操縱利潤(rùn)。一是我國(guó)的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則制度內(nèi)容與披露制度不夠完善;二是上市公司自身的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、獨(dú)立董事制度與經(jīng)理績(jī)效機(jī)制存在問(wèn)題;三是外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制方面,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的獨(dú)立性受到約束;證券市場(chǎng)對(duì)上司公司績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)單一,對(duì)不當(dāng)行為懲罰力度不夠,社會(huì)媒體監(jiān)督作用不強(qiáng)。
[Abstract]:According to the contract theory, the accounting standard is essentially a contract between the government and the enterprise based on accounting policies and methods. However, in the process of economic development, due to the instability of the market economy environment. The complex diversity of economic business content makes the contract has certain incompleteness. The contract gives enterprises the right to choose, but in practice, this option becomes the enterprise to seek private interests. In recent years, accounting choice change behavior has become a common phenomenon in listed companies, through accounting choice change to achieve earnings management. Smooth profit and other purposes of the case is common. These exist special purpose behavior, which is not conducive to the long-term development of listed companies, but also hinder the benign development of our securities market. However, due to the special situation of our country. Learning from the foreign research on the change of accounting choice developed the research theory can not be very good for our economy, so. It is necessary to study the change of accounting choice according to the specific economic form of our country. This paper combines the case with the theory, and synthetically applies the data statistics method and the financial index method. Through the status quo of accounting choice change of listed companies to find its universal characteristics, and then through the case of accounting estimation changes and accounting policy changes, combined with contract theory, agency theory. The economic consequence theory and so on, explores the listed company accountant choice change reason, the economic consequence as well as behind the existence question. In order to provide some suggestions for solving the problem. The study found that the behavior of accounting choice change of listed companies is universal, with a trend of increasing year by year, and more likely to occur in enterprises with large scale of fixed assets. The main means to change accounting choice is to concentrate on depreciation of fixed assets, preparation of accounts receivable bad debts and follow-up measurement of investment real estate. Adjust the expected service life and net residual value of the ship, change the investment real estate follow-up measurement model from the cost model to the fair value model. From the point of view of the economic consequences of the change of accounting choice, the change of accounting choice can only change the short-term financial situation and operating results of the enterprise. However, it is impossible to change the actual operating situation. The reliability of this kind of information may mislead the economic decisions of creditors, investors and other information users and harm their interests. It is also not conducive to the long-term development of the securities market. Secondly, there are some problems in the ownership structure of the listed company, the independent director system and the manager performance mechanism; Thirdly, the independence of CPA is restricted in the aspect of external supervision mechanism; The stock market has a single performance evaluation index for the boss company, not enough punishment for misconduct, and social media supervision is not strong.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F552.6;F550.66

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