帶資金約束的部分條件延期支付策略模型
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2019-04-25 17:40
【摘要】:隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展和市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的日益加劇,商家會(huì)采取各種各樣的促銷模式來(lái)提高商品的市場(chǎng)占有率以增強(qiáng)其市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,而延期支付是常見的一種方式.延期支付是指客戶或零售商在訂購(gòu)貨物時(shí)無(wú)需立即支付貨款,而是在供應(yīng)商規(guī)定的期限內(nèi)延期支付.延期支付可以刺激零售商加大訂貨量,進(jìn)而減少零售商的補(bǔ)貨次數(shù)和供應(yīng)商的訂單處理費(fèi)用,提高整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈的效益.延期支付策略已被廣泛應(yīng)用于各類商業(yè)活動(dòng)中.本文在相關(guān)研究的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)帶資金約束的延期支付策略進(jìn)行研究.考慮到零售商的資本約束,通過引入價(jià)格折扣,建立一個(gè)條件延期支付策略模型.它是一個(gè)由供應(yīng)商主導(dǎo)的斯坦伯格博弈模型.通過分析雙方的最優(yōu)決策,為供應(yīng)商提供了一個(gè)帶閥值的庫(kù)存管理模型.該模型不僅可以刺激零售商增加訂貨量,當(dāng)零售商處于良好的財(cái)務(wù)狀況時(shí)還能激勵(lì)零售商分批付款,從而減少供應(yīng)商的資金壓力.另一方面,與傳統(tǒng)的訂單批量模型相比,零售商的利益并未減少.因此,新的模式使供應(yīng)鏈更加穩(wěn)定,可以實(shí)現(xiàn)雙贏.數(shù)值算例和靈敏度分析驗(yàn)證了模型的有效性.
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy and the aggravation of market competition, merchants will adopt a variety of promotion models to improve the market share of goods to enhance their market competitiveness, and deferred payment is a common way. Deferred payment means that a customer or retailer does not have to pay immediately when ordering the goods, but rather within the time limit specified by the supplier. Deferred payments can stimulate retailers to increase order volume, thereby reducing retailers' replenishment times and supplier's order processing costs, and improving the efficiency of the entire supply chain. Deferred payment strategy has been widely used in various commercial activities. Based on the related research, this paper studies the delayed payment strategy with capital constraints. Considering the capital constraints of retailers, a conditional deferred payment strategy model is established by introducing price discount. It is a supplier-led Steinberg game model. By analyzing the optimal decision of both sides, this paper provides a inventory management model with threshold value for suppliers. The model can not only stimulate retailers to increase order volume, but also stimulate retailers to pay in batches when retailers are in good financial condition, thus reducing the financial pressure of suppliers. On the other hand, compared with the traditional order volume model, the profit of retailers is not reduced. Therefore, the new model makes the supply chain more stable, can achieve win-win. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis verify the effectiveness of the model.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:曲阜師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號(hào)】:F724.2;F274
本文編號(hào):2465327
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy and the aggravation of market competition, merchants will adopt a variety of promotion models to improve the market share of goods to enhance their market competitiveness, and deferred payment is a common way. Deferred payment means that a customer or retailer does not have to pay immediately when ordering the goods, but rather within the time limit specified by the supplier. Deferred payments can stimulate retailers to increase order volume, thereby reducing retailers' replenishment times and supplier's order processing costs, and improving the efficiency of the entire supply chain. Deferred payment strategy has been widely used in various commercial activities. Based on the related research, this paper studies the delayed payment strategy with capital constraints. Considering the capital constraints of retailers, a conditional deferred payment strategy model is established by introducing price discount. It is a supplier-led Steinberg game model. By analyzing the optimal decision of both sides, this paper provides a inventory management model with threshold value for suppliers. The model can not only stimulate retailers to increase order volume, but also stimulate retailers to pay in batches when retailers are in good financial condition, thus reducing the financial pressure of suppliers. On the other hand, compared with the traditional order volume model, the profit of retailers is not reduced. Therefore, the new model makes the supply chain more stable, can achieve win-win. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis verify the effectiveness of the model.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:曲阜師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號(hào)】:F724.2;F274
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條
1 張義剛;唐小我;;現(xiàn)金折扣和資金約束下的零售商延遲支付訂貨策略[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2009年01期
,本文編號(hào):2465327
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