發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-24 19:58

【摘要】：針對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)拍賣中賣方通常將拍品委托給拍賣行進(jìn)行拍賣,建立了帶傭金率和保留價(jià)的一口價(jià)拍賣模型.運(yùn)用博弈理論,首先分析了投標(biāo)者的均衡策略,然后在給定傭金率的前提下研究了賣方的最優(yōu)保留價(jià)和最優(yōu)一口價(jià),接著在給定保留價(jià)和一口價(jià)的前提下研究了拍賣行的最優(yōu)傭金率研究發(fā)現(xiàn):與不考慮傭金率的情形不同,在考慮傭金率的模型中,一口價(jià)有正的概率被投標(biāo)者選擇,即賣方在拍賣中設(shè)置一口價(jià)可以提高其收益,且賣方的最優(yōu)保留價(jià)大于不設(shè)置一口價(jià)的模型中的最優(yōu)保留價(jià);拍賣行的最優(yōu)傭金率小于不設(shè)置一口價(jià)的模型中的最優(yōu)傭金率.
[Abstract]:The seller usually entrusts the lot to the auction house to carry on the auction in the realistic auction, and establishes the one-mouthed auction model with commission rate and reserve price. Based on the game theory, the equilibrium strategy of the bidder is first analyzed, and then the optimal reserve price and the optimal price of the seller are studied under the premise of the given commission rate. Then we study the optimal commission rate of the auction house on the premise of given reserve price and one price. It is found that different from the case of not considering commission rate, in the model of considering commission rate, there is a positive probability of a price being chosen by the bidder. That is, the seller's best reserve price is larger than the optimal reserve price in the model without one price, and the optimal commission rate of the auction house is less than the optimal commission rate in the model without one mouthful price.
【作者單位】： 重慶大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金(70701040,71071171)~~
【分類號(hào)】：F724.59

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本文編號(hào)：2201872