【摘要】：雙邊平臺具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性、不對稱定價、用戶多歸屬等雙邊市場所特有的特征,這些特征使得雙邊平臺的競爭模式與傳統(tǒng)企業(yè)有所區(qū)別,平臺用戶數(shù)量是平臺企業(yè)的主要競爭目標(biāo)。但用戶選擇受需求偏好、賣方用戶的經(jīng)營規(guī)模、平臺定價等因素的影響,這些因素使得用戶決策的不確定性增加,容易造成用戶流失,進而影響平臺競爭優(yōu)勢。因此本文的目的是通過研究雙邊平臺發(fā)展策略來吸引和維持用戶,為平臺發(fā)展提供思路,幫助其選擇適合的競爭策略,以實現(xiàn)效用最大化,提高競爭優(yōu)勢。本文主要運用雙邊市場理論來對寡頭平臺競爭問題進行研究。模型分析中將雙邊市場的典型特征-網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性作為主要變量。主要分析了在雙邊市場中寡頭平臺采取縱向一體化的動機及平臺實施縱向一體化前后平臺利潤和用戶數(shù)量的變化。同時分析了平臺雙邊用戶如何根據(jù)自己效用最大化來選擇加入哪個平臺進行交易。研究結(jié)果表明,實施了縱向一體化策略的平臺不管在利潤還是用戶數(shù)量上均優(yōu)于未實施縱向一體化策略的平臺,這是因為平臺實施縱向一體化后一部分賣方用戶被鎖定在該平臺,在網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性的作用下用戶數(shù)量較以前增加,更多的用戶會轉(zhuǎn)移到縱向一體化平臺進行交易。因此,縱向一體化平臺就在競爭中獲得更多用戶和更高的利潤,競爭優(yōu)勢也凸顯出來。
[Abstract]:The bilateral platform is characterized by network externality, asymmetric pricing, multiple user ownership and so on. These characteristics make the competition mode of bilateral platform different from that of traditional enterprises. The number of platform users is the main competition target of platform enterprises. However, the choice of users is influenced by the demand preference, the scale of the seller's operation, the pricing of the platform, and so on. These factors make the uncertainty of the user's decision increase, and easily lead to the loss of users, and then affect the competitive advantage of the platform. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to attract and maintain users through the research of bilateral platform development strategies, to provide ideas for platform development, to help them to choose suitable competitive strategies, in order to maximize utility and improve competitive advantage. This article mainly uses the bilateral market theory to carry on the research to the oligopoly platform competition problem. In the model analysis, the typical feature of bilateral market, network externality, is taken as the main variable. This paper mainly analyzes the motivation of adopting vertical integration of oligopoly platform in bilateral market and the changes of platform profit and number of users before and after the implementation of vertical integration. At the same time, it analyzes how the bilateral users of the platform choose which platform to trade according to their own utility maximization. The results show that the platform with vertical integration strategy is superior to the platform without vertical integration strategy in terms of profit and number of users. This is because after the vertical integration of the platform, some of the seller users are locked in the platform, and the number of users increases under the effect of network externality, and more users will move to the vertical integration platform for transaction. Therefore, vertical integration platform in the competition to obtain more users and higher profits, the competitive advantage is also highlighted.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北方工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F724.6;F274

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