本文選題：眾籌融資 + 回報(bào)方案��； 參考：《北京外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著信息通信技術(shù)的高速發(fā)展以及互聯(lián)網(wǎng)金融的不斷創(chuàng)新,眾籌這一新興的融資方式為中小企業(yè)和創(chuàng)業(yè)者解決融資難問(wèn)題提供了新思路。眾籌的發(fā)展允許一些有創(chuàng)意的企業(yè)通過(guò)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)發(fā)起公眾籌資,同時(shí)也為普通大眾提供了更多投資機(jī)會(huì),實(shí)現(xiàn)資金的優(yōu)化配置。雖然近幾年在國(guó)內(nèi)外,眾籌融資模式都有了快速的發(fā)展,但是在國(guó)內(nèi)眾籌融資模式還處于本土化階段,相關(guān)法律法規(guī)的制定及眾籌平臺(tái)的建設(shè)還不夠完善。有關(guān)眾籌方面的學(xué)術(shù)研究層出不窮,通過(guò)總結(jié)發(fā)現(xiàn),主要是基于眾籌平臺(tái)數(shù)據(jù)的實(shí)證研究,而關(guān)于眾籌融資過(guò)程的數(shù)理分析較為缺乏。因此,本文從眾籌融資過(guò)程中的籌資者、投資者和眾籌融資平臺(tái)出發(fā),通過(guò)建立他們的效用和收益函數(shù),研究不同參與主體眾籌融資過(guò)程中的博弈,并最終實(shí)現(xiàn)效用或收益的最大化。在模型的拓展中,分析了闕值機(jī)制下,眾籌項(xiàng)目發(fā)起者所采納的不同的回報(bào)方案,以及不同方案對(duì)投資者決策的影響,旨在為籌資者選擇最優(yōu)的激勵(lì)方案提供理論依據(jù);另外還對(duì)投資者效用函數(shù)中的個(gè)人回報(bào)進(jìn)行拓展。研究結(jié)果顯示:(1)眾籌融資過(guò)程涉及的三大融資主體——籌資者、投資者和眾籌融資平臺(tái),具有相容的激勵(lì),他們都希望吸引更多潛在投資者參與眾籌活動(dòng),提高融資金額總量,三者在融資過(guò)程中的利益并不存在沖突。(2)由于眾籌融資模式的闕值機(jī)制,投資者在效用最大化的投資額無(wú)法使項(xiàng)目最終成立的情況下,有意愿犧牲部分效用,加大投資金額,使項(xiàng)目最終成立。(3)當(dāng)融資目標(biāo)值確定時(shí),眾籌項(xiàng)目籌資者可以通過(guò)調(diào)整眾籌方案中的回報(bào)系數(shù),從而改變投資者的決策,最終促成眾籌項(xiàng)目取得成功,并獲取最大化收益。(4)當(dāng)個(gè)人回報(bào)為二次型時(shí),能夠激勵(lì)投資者加大投資金額,使得籌資者能夠獲取更高的收益。本文在最后結(jié)合我國(guó)眾籌發(fā)展的現(xiàn)狀,以研究結(jié)果為理論依據(jù),為眾籌融資過(guò)程三大主體分別提出了建設(shè)性建議。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of information and communication technology and the continuous innovation of Internet finance, crowdfunding provides a new way for SMEs and entrepreneurs to solve the financing problem. The development of crowdfunding allows some creative companies to launch public fundraising via the Internet, while also providing more investment opportunities for the general public to optimize the allocation of funds. Although in recent years, the mode of crowdfunding has developed rapidly at home and abroad, but in the domestic mode of crowdfunding is still in the localization stage, the formulation of relevant laws and regulations and the construction of crowdfunding platform is not perfect. There are many academic researches on crowdfunding. It is found that the empirical research is mainly based on the data of crowdfunding platform, but the mathematical analysis of crowdfunding process is lacking. Therefore, this paper studies the game in the process of crowdfunding of different participants by establishing their utility and income function, starting from the financing platform of crowdfunding, investors and crowdfunding in the process of raising funds by crowdfunding, and by establishing their utility and income functions, this paper studies the game in the process of crowdfunding of different participants. And the ultimate realization of utility or revenue maximization. In the development of the model, this paper analyzes the different return schemes adopted by the sponsors of multi-funding projects under the threshold mechanism, as well as the influence of different schemes on investors' decision-making, in order to provide the theoretical basis for the financiers to choose the optimal incentive schemes. In addition, the investors utility function in the personal return on the expansion. The research results show that the three major financing players involved in the crowdfunding process, the investors and the crowdfunding platform, have compatible incentives. They all want to attract more potential investors to participate in crowdfunding activities and increase the total amount of financing. There is no conflict between the interests of the three in the financing process. (2) because of the threshold mechanism of the mode of crowdfunding, investors are willing to sacrifice some utility and increase the amount of investment when the investment of utility maximization cannot make the project finally set up. When the financing target value is determined, the crowdfunding project financier can change the investor's decision by adjusting the return coefficient in the crowdfunding scheme, and ultimately contribute to the success of the crowdfunding project. When the personal return is quadratic, it can encourage investors to increase the amount of investment, so that the financier can obtain higher returns. In the end, according to the current situation of the development of crowdfunding in China, and based on the theoretical basis of the research results, this paper puts forward some constructive suggestions for the three main bodies in the process of crowdfunding.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F724.6;F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 王琰;朱小棟;;獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)型眾籌項(xiàng)目成功的影響因素研究——以“眾籌網(wǎng)”為例[J];管理現(xiàn)代化;2016年05期

2 汪宏程;;眾籌模式的創(chuàng)新發(fā)展及金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究[J];華北金融;2016年05期

3 呂正英;顧鋒;李毅;鄭嘉;;眾籌產(chǎn)品定價(jià)策略研究[J];管理現(xiàn)代化;2016年01期

4 黃玲;周勤;岳中剛;;眾籌平臺(tái)的雙邊市場(chǎng)性質(zhì)與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略:分析框架及研究進(jìn)展[J];外國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理;2015年11期

5 夏恩君;李森;趙軒維;;國(guó)外眾籌研究綜述與展望[J];技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì);2015年10期

6 葉芳;杜朝運(yùn);;眾籌參與者的行為決策機(jī)制:一個(gè)兩階段理論模型分析[J];金融經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究;2015年04期

7 劉志迎;程倩倩;;眾籌中創(chuàng)新項(xiàng)目質(zhì)量和報(bào)酬率的激勵(lì)效應(yīng)研究[J];上海管理科學(xué);2015年03期

8 尹芳;吳敏;;基于信息瀑布模型的回報(bào)式眾籌中的羊群行為分析[J];知識(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì);2015年10期

9 王曙光;賀瀟;賈鏑;;眾籌模式的激勵(lì)相容、運(yùn)作機(jī)制與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)管——兼論中國(guó)式眾籌的問(wèn)題與趨勢(shì)[J];金融與經(jīng)濟(jì);2015年03期

10 張小濤;岳文華;張學(xué)鋒;;中國(guó)股權(quán)類(lèi)眾籌發(fā)展的制約因素及風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究[J];河南科學(xué);2014年11期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 郭倩倩;我國(guó)眾籌融資模式的應(yīng)用分析[D];天津商業(yè)大學(xué);2015年

2 張耀東;基于消費(fèi)者視角眾籌項(xiàng)目融資影響因素研究[D];江蘇科技大學(xué);2015年

3 魏可新;大眾參與眾籌行為影響因素的實(shí)證研究[D];浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2013年

，

本文編號(hào)：1916369