本文選題：電子廢棄物 + 技術(shù)創(chuàng)新��； 參考：《杭州電子科技大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著電子產(chǎn)品普及率的提升，電子廢棄物數(shù)量也不斷增長(zhǎng)。然而，我國(guó)尚未形成有一套完善有效的電子廢棄物回收利用系統(tǒng)，正規(guī)回收處理渠道在回收價(jià)格、處理成本及政策持續(xù)性等方面缺乏優(yōu)勢(shì)，大部分電子廢物流入非正規(guī)回收處理渠道。本文針對(duì)正規(guī)渠道回收量不足的現(xiàn)狀，對(duì)正規(guī)回收渠道的激勵(lì)及非正規(guī)回收渠道的約束機(jī)制展開(kāi)研究。 首先，構(gòu)建了政府和非正規(guī)回收商策略的演化博弈模型，對(duì)于非正規(guī)回收商而言，有“轉(zhuǎn)型”和“不轉(zhuǎn)型”兩種策略，對(duì)于政府而言，有“管制”和“不管制”兩種策略。通過(guò)對(duì)博弈的演化穩(wěn)定性分析得知：在市場(chǎng)機(jī)制下，追求短期利潤(rùn)最大化的非正規(guī)回收商會(huì)采取“不轉(zhuǎn)型”的策略。在政府管制下，政府和回收商采取混合策略的演化呈現(xiàn)周期性特征，且回收商策略的選擇取決于政府采取“管制”策略概率的大小。 其次，為了探索回收商競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的獲取途徑，本文構(gòu)建了兩回收商群體之間的演化博弈模型。分析回收商群體采取不同經(jīng)營(yíng)模式下的演化穩(wěn)定趨勢(shì)，結(jié)果表明：從競(jìng)爭(zhēng)博弈角度而言，回收商采取引進(jìn)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的經(jīng)營(yíng)模式有利于提高所有回收商群體的回收價(jià)、回收量和回收利潤(rùn)，而技術(shù)創(chuàng)新領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的獲取取決于創(chuàng)新溢出率的大小。從演化博弈角度而言，當(dāng)創(chuàng)新溢出率較小時(shí)，市場(chǎng)上的有限理性的回收商群體都會(huì)選擇技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)模型。當(dāng)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新溢出率較大時(shí)，回收商群體經(jīng)營(yíng)模式的選擇取決于政府補(bǔ)貼力度的大小。在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文采用數(shù)值仿真的方法，，進(jìn)一步探索了技術(shù)創(chuàng)新效率、創(chuàng)新溢出率、回收競(jìng)爭(zhēng)系數(shù)、政府補(bǔ)貼力度等參數(shù)對(duì)群體演化結(jié)果的影響。仿真結(jié)果表明：減少創(chuàng)新溢出率、增加政府補(bǔ)貼力度及保持適當(dāng)?shù)幕厥崭?jìng)爭(zhēng)都有利于提高演化穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)下采取技術(shù)創(chuàng)新經(jīng)營(yíng)模式的回收商群體比例。 最后，為了促進(jìn)回收商往規(guī)�；较虬l(fā)展，采用三階段博弈的方法，建立了政府和不同規(guī)�；厥丈痰牟┺哪Ｐ�，用逆向歸納法求出三階段博弈的均衡結(jié)果，確定了政府的最優(yōu)補(bǔ)貼率。研究表明，在回收商擴(kuò)大規(guī)模過(guò)程中政府補(bǔ)貼有效降低了行業(yè)門(mén)檻，激發(fā)了回收商的積極性，促使更多的小型回收企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)闊o(wú)害化處理的大型規(guī)模企業(yè)，進(jìn)而有效的減少了電子廢棄物處理過(guò)程中的環(huán)境污染問(wèn)題。
[Abstract]:With the popularization of electronic products, the number of electronic wastes is also increasing. However, China has not yet formed a set of perfect and effective electronic waste recycling system, and the formal recycling channels lack advantages in the aspects of recovery price, treatment cost and policy sustainability, etc. Most e-waste flows into informal recycling channels. In this paper, the incentive mechanism of the formal recovery channel and the restraint mechanism of the informal recovery channel are studied according to the current situation of the lack of recovery in the formal channel. Firstly, the evolutionary game model of government and informal recycler strategy is constructed. For informal recycler, there are two strategies: "transformation" and "no transformation", and for government, there are two strategies: "control" and "no regulation". Through the analysis of the evolutionary stability of the game, it is concluded that under the market mechanism, the informal recyclers pursuing the maximization of short-term profits adopt the strategy of "no transformation". Under government control, the evolution of mixed strategy between government and recycler is cyclical, and the choice of recycler strategy depends on the probability of government adopting "control" strategy. Secondly, in order to explore the way to obtain the competitive advantage of the recyclers, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the two groups of recyclers. This paper analyzes the evolution and stability of the recycler group under different business models. The results show that from the point of view of competitive game, the recycler adopts the business model of introducing technology innovation to increase the recovery price of all the recyclers. Payback and profit recovery, and technological innovation leader's competitive advantage depends on innovation spillover rate. From the point of view of evolutionary game, when the innovation spillover rate is small, the limited rational recycler group in the market will choose the enterprise management model of technological innovation. When the spillover rate of technological innovation is large, the choice of business model of recycler group depends on the degree of government subsidy. On this basis, the paper further explores the effects of technological innovation efficiency, innovation spillover rate, recovery competition coefficient, government subsidy and other parameters on the results of population evolution by using the method of numerical simulation. The simulation results show that reducing innovation spillover rate, increasing government subsidies and maintaining appropriate recycling competition are all beneficial to the proportion of recyclers adopting technological innovation business model in evolutionary and stable state. Finally, in order to promote the scale development of the recycler, the game model of the government and the recycler of different scale is established by using the three-stage game method, and the equilibrium result of the three-stage game is obtained by the reverse induction method. The government's optimal subsidy rate is determined. The research shows that government subsidies effectively lower the industry threshold, stimulate the enthusiasm of recyclers, and promote more small recycling enterprises to transform into large scale enterprises with harmless treatment in the process of expanding the scale of recyclers. And then effectively reduce the problem of environmental pollution in the process of electronic waste disposal.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：杭州電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F713.2;F224.32

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