本文選題：囚徒困境　切入點(diǎn)：委托代理問題　出處：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著我國改革開放三十多年經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展,廣告產(chǎn)業(yè)也隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長迅猛發(fā)展,廣告行業(yè)經(jīng)歷了從無到有、從小到大的發(fā)展過程。中國的廣告行業(yè)形成了產(chǎn)業(yè)化規(guī)模之后,相應(yīng)的價(jià)值鏈也已經(jīng)形成,這在中國的產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論分析中是很具有研究價(jià)值的,尤其是當(dāng)前我國廣告中普遍存在的廣告泛濫的問題。很多廣告誘使消費(fèi)者去購買他們根本不太需要的產(chǎn)品,進(jìn)而誤導(dǎo)消費(fèi)者做出最優(yōu)的購買決策。新古典經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)派代表人物馬歇爾認(rèn)為,廣告,特別是誘導(dǎo)性廣告,只不過是把某種產(chǎn)品的消費(fèi)需求從一個(gè)品牌轉(zhuǎn)移到了另一個(gè)品牌上而己,并不能增加社會(huì)的總需求,廣告投入本身就是一種社會(huì)資源的浪費(fèi)。本文認(rèn)為了適度的廣告能夠擴(kuò)大內(nèi)需,促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長；而過度的廣告投放將會(huì)造成資源配置的扭曲,造成資源浪費(fèi)的觀點(diǎn)。 本文首先論述了在微觀層面上廣告商投放廣告可以增加消費(fèi)者對其產(chǎn)品的需求,從而增加企業(yè)的銷售量,對廣告能夠樹立品牌形象增加其產(chǎn)品的市場份額起到積極作用。然后用科斯提出的“交易費(fèi)用”的概念從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度解釋了壟斷競爭廠商和寡頭廠商廣告存在的必然性。企業(yè)廣告投放一方面可以使消費(fèi)者了解該產(chǎn)品并增加企業(yè)的知名度,減少投入大量的人力物力與消費(fèi)者進(jìn)行溝通使其購買該產(chǎn)品的成本；另一方面,由于廣告投放具有外部性,正如馬歇爾所言企業(yè)投放廣告之后增加的銷售額是以減少同行業(yè)競爭者的產(chǎn)品市場份額為代價(jià)的,所以其他競爭者為了減少這種外部性對其銷售額帶來的損失,通過談判或者是訴諸法律是不能湊效的,唯一有效的辦法就是也投入廣告來奪回自己失去的市場份額。某一行業(yè)企業(yè)之間競爭的激烈程度決定了該行業(yè)廣告投放的規(guī)模的大小,科斯認(rèn)為競爭程度越高交易費(fèi)用越低,反之競爭程度越低交易費(fèi)用越高,如果市場是完全競爭的,那么廠商不需要投放任何廣告,相反在寡頭市場,寡頭廠商為了增加自己的銷售額擴(kuò)大自己的市場份額,就會(huì)競相投放廣告來達(dá)到壟斷整個(gè)市場的目的,這種情況下的廣告投放規(guī)模就會(huì)很大。本文又通過博弈論的有關(guān)原理分析了寡頭市場會(huì)出現(xiàn)廣告投放過度的原因。假設(shè)存在兩個(gè)沒有合謀的寡頭企業(yè),根據(jù)古諾模型,每個(gè)寡頭廠商都是根據(jù)對方的決策來調(diào)整自己的產(chǎn)量,以使自己利潤達(dá)到最大化。每個(gè)廠商的決策變量一個(gè)是產(chǎn)量,另一個(gè)是廣告投放額。兩廠商之間博弈的納什均衡結(jié)果使其處于囚徒困境狀態(tài)：兩廠商都投放廣告,但是其利潤要小于兩廠商都不投放廣告時(shí)的情況。從整個(gè)社會(huì)的福利角度看,處于囚徒困境時(shí)的均衡結(jié)果的產(chǎn)量要小于寡頭廠商都不投放廣告時(shí)的情況,進(jìn)而推出兩廠商投放廣告時(shí)的市場均衡量要大于廣告的最適投放量。因此減少了消費(fèi)者的福利水平,所以寡頭企業(yè)通過廣告這種非價(jià)格競爭給社會(huì)造成的損失不僅僅是廣告投放額。本文又介紹了我國電視臺(tái)的“事業(yè)單位,企業(yè)化管理”的經(jīng)營模式,在這種模式下會(huì)出現(xiàn)委托-代理問題。我國電視臺(tái)這種“事業(yè)單位企業(yè)化管理”的經(jīng)營模式就會(huì)導(dǎo)致電視臺(tái)違背了政府和公眾的意愿,以電視臺(tái)的利潤最大化為動(dòng)機(jī)來進(jìn)行經(jīng)營,這就出現(xiàn)了“委托-代理”問題,這就使廣告在供給方出現(xiàn)泛濫提供了一個(gè)天然的土壤。寡頭廠商通過投放廣告來壟斷市場的行為屬于“尋租”行為,能夠造成社會(huì)資源配置的扭曲。首先,廠商投放大量的廣告造成了資源浪費(fèi),使產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)成本上升,減少了消費(fèi)者剩余；然后寡頭廠商通過投放廣告之后對某一產(chǎn)品占有了大部分的市場份額形成了壟斷之后,憑借其形成規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)的優(yōu)勢就會(huì)失去技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的動(dòng)力并且降低了生產(chǎn)效率,這也就是尋租理論中壟斷所造成的社會(huì)福利凈損失；其次寡頭廠商的投放廣告的這種尋租競爭會(huì)阻礙能夠提高生產(chǎn)率促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的技術(shù)競爭；最后廣告的大量投放對新進(jìn)入的企業(yè)造成了進(jìn)入壁壘,新興企業(yè)要想打入市場就需要投入大量的廣告來吸引消費(fèi)者的注意,因此弱化了市場上的競爭。最后本文提出了一些政策建議。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy in thirty years of China's reform and opening up, the advertising industry also along with the growth of the economy rapid development, the advertising industry has experienced from scratch, from small to large development process. After the China advertising industry formed the scale of industrialization, the value chain has been formed, is very valuable in the Chinese industry the theory of organizations, especially the current prevalence of advertisement problem. Many advertising to induce consumers to buy the products they don't need too, and mislead consumers make the optimal purchase decision. The new classical economic school representative Marshall believes that advertising, especially by advertising, is only a consumer demand for products from one brand to another brand and that does not increase the total social demand, this is a body of advertising It's a waste of social resources. This paper thinks that moderate advertising can expand domestic demand and promote economic growth, and excessive advertising will lead to distortion of resource allocation and waste of resources.
This paper discusses on the micro level advertisers advertising can increase consumer demand for its products, thereby increasing sales of enterprises, positive effects on brand image advertising can increase the market share of the product. And then use the concept of Coase proposed the "transaction cost" to explain the inevitability of the existence of monopolistic competition and oligopoly manufacturers manufacturers of advertising from the perspective of economics. On the one hand, corporate advertising can make consumers understand the product and increase the visibility of the enterprise, reduce a lot of manpower and material resources to communicate with consumers to buy the product cost; on the other hand, because advertising has externality, as Marshall said after business advertising increase sales is to reduce the competitors in the same industry in the product market share at the expense of other competitors, so in order to reduce the Department of sales for its losses, through negotiations or recourse to the law is not valid, the only effective way is also put ads to regain their lost market share. The competition between a certain industries and enterprises of the industry decide the size of advertising, Kos believes that the higher degree of competition the transaction cost is low, and the degree of competition in the lower transaction cost is higher, if the market is completely competitive, so manufacturers do not need to put any advertising, instead in the oligopoly market, oligopoly to increase sales expansion of its own market share, will compete in advertising to monopolize the whole market, in this case the size of advertising will be great. This article through the relevant principle of the game theory analysis of the oligopoly market will appear excessive advertising reasons. Without assuming the existence of two The collusion oligopoly enterprises, according to the Cournot model, each oligopoly is to adjust their production according to the other side of the decision, in order to make their own profit maximization. Each firm decision variable is a production, another is the amount of advertising. Nash equilibrium of the game between the two manufacturers in the state of prisoner's dilemma two manufacturers of advertising, but its profit is less than two manufacturers are not advertising situation. From the whole social welfare perspective, in the prisoner's dilemma when the equilibrium results yield less than the oligopoly firms do not put advertising situation, which launched the two manufacturers market equilibrium amount of advertising the optimal investment is greater than the advertising volume. Thus reducing the welfare of consumers, so firms through advertising the non price competition, the loss to society is not only the ads in this paper. It introduces the institution of our country television "enterprise management" management mode, in this mode will appear under the principal-agent problem. China's TV this "enterprise management" mode of operation will lead to television against the government and the public's willingness to TV profits as a motivation to carry out business, which appeared in the "principal-agent" problem, which makes the advertisement on the supply side appears to provide a natural soil flooding. Oligopoly belongs to "Rent-seeking" by advertising to monopolize the market behavior, can cause distortions in the allocation of social resources. First, put a large number of manufacturers advertising caused the waste of resources, production costs rise, reducing the consumer surplus; then after oligopoly through advertising of a product occupy most of the market share form a ridge After the break, by virtue of its power to form the advantage of scale economy will lose its technological innovation and reduce the production efficiency, this is the net loss of social welfare caused by monopoly rent-seeking theory; the rent-seeking competition advertising by oligopoly will hinder technological competition can increase productivity to promote economic growth; finally put a lot of advertising the new firms created barriers to entry, new enterprises to enter the market requires a lot of advertisements to attract the attention of consumers, thus weakening the competition in the market. Finally, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F713.8

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