EPR模式下的廢舊電子產(chǎn)品再制造銷售激勵研究
發(fā)布時間:2018-01-15 05:33
本文關(guān)鍵詞:EPR模式下的廢舊電子產(chǎn)品再制造銷售激勵研究 出處:《華東師范大學》2017年碩士論文 論文類型:學位論文
更多相關(guān)文章: EPR模式 銷售激勵 廢舊電子產(chǎn)品 回收再制造
【摘要】:在可持續(xù)發(fā)展號召下,資源供求矛盾使得發(fā)展循環(huán)經(jīng)濟迫在眉睫。隨著消費者的消費觀念日益改善,電子再制造產(chǎn)品的市場規(guī)模快速增長。制造商通過對電子再制造產(chǎn)品的銷售激勵,不僅能提高電子再制造產(chǎn)品銷量以促進廢舊電子產(chǎn)品回收再制造,更能為自身創(chuàng)造更多的利潤。在電子電器行業(yè),制造商責任延伸制度(Extended Producer Responsibility)已經(jīng)是當今社會的發(fā)展熱點,以美國和日本為代表的先進EPR管理實踐證實可以極大地提升廢舊電子產(chǎn)品的回收再利用效率。本文立足于EPR模式,也就是制造商回收再制造再銷售模式,探究制造商如何對電子再制造產(chǎn)品進行銷售激勵以實現(xiàn)自身利潤最大化。根據(jù)管理學、產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟學、博弈論的相關(guān)知識,構(gòu)建了無銷售激勵的基準模型和引入銷售激勵的四個擴展模型,得出了制造商在考慮銷售渠道和薪酬模式的四種情形下對新品和電子再制造產(chǎn)品的最優(yōu)銷售激勵,并分析了銷售激勵對制造商利潤的影響。本文按照新品和再制造品的銷售渠道模式是獨立渠道模式或者統(tǒng)一渠道模式、制造商對銷售人員的薪酬激勵函數(shù)是線性薪酬模式或者折線型薪酬模式來區(qū)分這四種情形。通過模型求解和算例驗證,本文得到主要結(jié)論:(1)制造商對新品的銷售激勵力度始終大于對再制造產(chǎn)品的銷售激勵力度。線性薪酬模式和折線型薪酬模式下的銷售激勵力度相等。(2)制造商的銷售激勵力度在獨立銷售渠道模式和統(tǒng)一銷售渠道模式下是不相同的,在統(tǒng)一渠道下,制造商會對銷售人員設(shè)計更高的傭金回報。(3)當制造商部分再制造時,折線型薪酬模式的銷售量配額M與電子再制造產(chǎn)品的折舊程度相關(guān)。折舊程度越大(回收產(chǎn)品越新),M的取值就越大;折舊程度越小,M的取值就越小。制造商的銷售量配額設(shè)置得不宜過大。(4)當制造商生產(chǎn)的電子產(chǎn)品是高成本的,新品和再制造產(chǎn)品放在獨立渠道銷售對制造商更有利;當生產(chǎn)的電子產(chǎn)品是低成本的,新品和再制造產(chǎn)品放在統(tǒng)一渠道銷售對制造商更有利。(5)銷售激勵不是在任何時候都能提高制造商利潤,當新品成本處于0cN≤1/2范圍內(nèi),若制造商采用獨立銷售渠道模式,銷售激勵反而會削弱制造商利潤。其余情形下,銷售激勵都能促進制造商利潤獲得提高。(6)銷售激勵不僅能提高新品產(chǎn)量,也能提高電子再制造產(chǎn)品的產(chǎn)量。綜上所述,在EPR模式下,制造商對新品和電子再制造產(chǎn)品進行合理的銷售激勵會有效地提高利潤。本文為制造商根據(jù)自身產(chǎn)品特點選擇合理的渠道模式和薪酬模式提供了理論支持。
[Abstract]:Under the call of sustainable development, the contradiction between supply and demand of resources makes the development of circular economy imminent. The market scale of electronic remanufacturing products is growing rapidly. Manufacturers can not only increase the sales volume of electronic remanufacturing products but also promote the recycling and remanufacturing of used electronic products by encouraging the sales of electronic remanufacturing products. More can create more profits for themselves. In the electronics industry. The extended Producer responsibility system has become a hot spot in the society. The advanced EPR management practice represented by the United States and Japan proves that it can greatly improve the recycling efficiency of used electronic products. This paper is based on the EPR model. That is to say, the manufacturer remakes and resells the product, and explores how the manufacturer encourages the electronic remanufacturing product to maximize their profit. According to the relevant knowledge of management, industrial economics and game theory. The benchmark model of no sales incentive and the four extended models of introducing sales incentive are constructed. The optimal sales incentives for new products and electronic remanufactured products are obtained under the four situations of considering the sales channel and compensation model. It also analyzes the impact of sales incentives on manufacturers' profits. According to the new and remanufactured sales channel model is the independent channel model or unified channel mode. The compensation incentive function of the manufacturer to the salesperson is a linear compensation model or a broken line compensation model to distinguish these four cases. The main conclusion of this paper is: 1) the manufacturer's incentive to new products is always greater than that to remanufactured products. The linear compensation model and the broken line compensation model have equal sales incentives. 2) the sales incentives of manufacturers are different under the independent sales channel model and the unified sales channel mode. Under the unified channel, the manufacturer designs a higher commission return for the salesperson. 3) when the manufacturer partially remanufactures. The sales quota M of the broken line salary model is related to the depreciation degree of the electronic remanufactured product. The greater the depreciation degree is, the greater the value of the new product is. The smaller the depreciation, the smaller the value of M. The manufacturer's sales quota should not be set too large) when the manufacturer produces electronics at a high cost. New and remanufactured products are sold through independent channels to the benefit of manufacturers; When manufactured electronics are low-cost, new and remanufactured products are sold in a single channel that is better for manufacturers.) sales incentives do not always increase manufacturers' profits. When the cost of the new product is in the range of 0CN 鈮,
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