【摘要】：導(dǎo)致2008年金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)的部分原因是對(duì)復(fù)雜的金融衍生品進(jìn)行投機(jī)性投資。在制定《多德-弗蘭克法》過(guò)程中,美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)曾試圖尋求解決投機(jī)的辦法,卻僅僅把權(quán)力轉(zhuǎn)移到各機(jī)構(gòu),始終未找到切實(shí)可行的解決方案。目前大多數(shù)觀點(diǎn)都集中于交易所和結(jié)算所的使用及信息披露。然而,我們認(rèn)為這種強(qiáng)制披露制度幾乎沒(méi)有作用,因?yàn)榻鹑跈C(jī)構(gòu)投資了大量資金開(kāi)發(fā)金融產(chǎn)品,并借此進(jìn)行博弈和監(jiān)管套利,而這兩種行為都只能造成社會(huì)資源的浪費(fèi)。因此,我們建議當(dāng)投資機(jī)構(gòu)創(chuàng)造出新的金融產(chǎn)品時(shí),在獲得政府機(jī)構(gòu)的許可之前應(yīng)該被禁止銷(xiāo)售,該政府機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該沿用美國(guó)食品與藥物管理局檢查創(chuàng)新藥品的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)檢查新的金融衍生品。只有當(dāng)新開(kāi)發(fā)的金融衍生品通過(guò)了社會(huì)效用測(cè)試,才可獲準(zhǔn)投放市場(chǎng)。
[Abstract]:Part of the reason for the 2008 financial crisis was speculative investment in complex derivatives. In the process of formulating Dodd-Frank Act, the United States Congress tried to find a solution to speculation, but only transferred power to institutions, and never found a practical solution. Most current views focus on the use and disclosure of exchanges and clearing houses. However, we think this kind of compulsory disclosure system has little effect because financial institutions invest a lot of money to develop financial products and carry out game and regulatory arbitrage, both of which can only lead to the waste of social resources. So, we suggest that when investment agencies create new financial products, they should be banned from selling until they get permission from government agencies. The agency should follow the FDA's standards for inspection of innovative drugs to examine new derivatives. New derivatives are allowed to market only if they pass the Social Utility Test.
【作者單位】： 美國(guó)芝加哥大學(xué)法學(xué)院;美國(guó)芝加哥大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)系;華東政法大學(xué);
【基金】：上海市教委科研創(chuàng)新項(xiàng)目“2008年金融危機(jī)背景下美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)立法及其借鑒”(項(xiàng)目批準(zhǔn)號(hào):12YS096)的研究成果
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F831.5;R95
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本文編號(hào)：2358163