政企關(guān)系和銀企關(guān)系對企業(yè)融資約束影響效應研究
[Abstract]:It is of great significance to study the financing constraints of listed enterprises in China and the influence of government-enterprise relationship and bank-enterprise relationship on the degree of financing constraints of listed enterprises in China. Financing strategy can support the normal development of enterprises; on the other hand, it can provide a theoretical basis for enterprises to reduce their financing constraints by building government-enterprise relations and bank-enterprise relations. Ring energy can provide guidance for national macro-control and policy formulation.
Based on the previous studies, this paper constructs three Cash-Cash flow sensitivity models based on the relationship between government and enterprise, which are based on the basic model of Cash-Cash flow sensitivity, the modified model of Cash-Cash flow sensitivity and the extended model of Cash-Cash flow sensitivity. In this study, we also pay attention to the different market environment, macroeconomic environment, property rights attributes and dual differentiated environment (i.e. differentiated market environment and macroeconomic environment, differentiated market environment and property rights attributes, and differentiated macroeconomic environment). The results show that: on the whole, the listed enterprises in China have obvious financing constraints, and the relationship between government and enterprises can reduce the degree of financing constraints of listed enterprises in China; however, the relationship between government and enterprises can reduce the degree of financing constraints of listed enterprises in China. In different market environments, macroeconomic environments and property rights attributes, the degree of financing constraints of Listed Companies in China is different, and the difference is more obvious in the dual differentiation environment; at the same time, the influence of government-enterprise relationship and bank-enterprise relationship on different types of enterprises is also different, generally speaking, the higher the degree of financing constraints of enterprises. The government-enterprise relationship and the bank-enterprise relationship alleviate their financing constraints more obviously, but there are also some special situations, such as the lower degree of marketization, the higher degree of financial constraints of enterprises, but the government-enterprise relationship alleviates their financing constraints less than the higher degree of marketization.
The main innovations of this paper are as follows: Firstly, the Cash-Cash flow sensitivity model is used to study the influence of government-enterprise relationship and bank-enterprise relationship on financing constraints. It is found that both government-enterprise relationship and bank-enterprise relationship can alleviate the financing constraints of enterprises, and the government-enterprise relationship can alleviate the degree of financing constraints of enterprises directly. Secondly, further research finds that there are differences in the degree of financing constraints between enterprises in different market environments, macroeconomic environments, property rights attributes and dual-differentiated environments, and the influence of government-enterprise relationship and bank-enterprise relationship on different types of enterprises is also different, usually with higher degree of financing constraints. Third, in the empirical analysis of different types of enterprises, it is found that government-enterprise relationship and bank-enterprise relationship can alleviate the degree of financing constraints of most types of enterprises, but have no effect on the financing constraints of individual types of enterprises, or even increase it. The degree of financing constraints of some types of enterprises, so different enterprises need to develop different types of strategies to ease their financing constraints according to their own characteristics.
【學位授予單位】:華僑大學
【學位級別】:博士
【學位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F275;F832.3;D630
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