中美影子銀行監(jiān)管的比較研究
[Abstract]:In 2007, the subprime mortgage crisis occurred in the United States. Since then, shadow banking has attracted the attention of theoretical circles and regulatory authorities. Shadow banking in the United States mainly includes money market mutual funds, credit hedge funds, structured investment companies, limited purpose financial companies and so on. These financial intermediaries are mainly engaged in credit, maturity and liquidity conversion, but not. In 2010, the United States promulgated the Dodd-Frank Act to alleviate the impact of shadow banks on the U.S. financial system, establishing the Federal Reserve as the main regulatory body. To strictly control the shadow banking institutions and businesses.
Shadow banking in China mainly includes two parts: one is the off-balance-sheet business of traditional banks, such as entrusted loans, trust financing, financial leasing, financial products, banking and credit cooperation; the other is non-bank non-governmental financial activities, such as private lending, underground money banks, private equity funds, Internet finance and so on. Under the strict supervision system, the financial innovation ability of our financial institutions has been greatly weakened.
This paper compares the shadow banks in China and the United States from various aspects, such as the composition of shadow banks, the size of shadow banks and the characteristics of shadow banks. In addition, it also introduces the supervision systems and modes of shadow banks in China and the United States, and compares the differences between them. The shadow banks of the two countries have constructed a set of index system to evaluate the effectiveness of shadow banking supervision, and used this index system to evaluate the effectiveness of shadow banking supervision of the two countries respectively. At the same time, the paper compares the effectiveness of shadow banking supervision between the two countries, and draws a conclusion that the effectiveness of shadow banking supervision in China is better than that in the United States. The conclusion is that the effectiveness of regulation is low.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F832.1;F837.12
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 邊衛(wèi)紅;;次貸危機(jī)對美國銀行業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整影響研究[J];金融論壇;2010年01期
2 鄭振龍;孫清泉;;歐美CDS市場改革與中國信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)緩釋工具的市場制度設(shè)計(jì)[J];金融論壇;2012年01期
3 賀川;劉曉妍;;關(guān)于杠桿率監(jiān)管的邏輯思考[J];東方企業(yè)文化;2011年10期
4 周莉萍;;論影子銀行體系國際監(jiān)管的進(jìn)展、不足、出路[J];國際金融研究;2012年01期
5 許華偉;;影子銀行體系最新發(fā)展趨勢及監(jiān)管啟示[J];管理現(xiàn)代化;2012年04期
6 于菁;;影子銀行問題研究述評[J];山東工商學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2013年01期
7 秦嶺;;“影子銀行系統(tǒng)”的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與監(jiān)管——以美國為例的探討[J];國際經(jīng)濟(jì)法學(xué)刊;2010年01期
8 鐘燕;;美國影子銀行體系的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳導(dǎo)及監(jiān)管分析[J];福建金融;2013年03期
9 張秀文;;加強(qiáng)我國商業(yè)銀行流動性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)管研究[J];財(cái)政監(jiān)督;2012年10期
10 朱宏春;;理性看待中國的影子銀行[J];南方金融;2013年06期
本文編號:2204838
本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/jingjilunwen/guojijinrong/2204838.html