上市公司高管薪酬強(qiáng)制性披露研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-18 19:59
【摘要】：上市公司信息的"強(qiáng)制性披露"與"自愿性披露"之爭(zhēng)由來(lái)已久。我國(guó)上市公司高管薪酬的信息披露的現(xiàn)實(shí)狀況是強(qiáng)制性披露制度不健全,自愿性信息披露不足,無(wú)法滿足投資者的信息需求。"市場(chǎng)失靈"和"委托代理"等強(qiáng)制性信息披露的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論基礎(chǔ)表明,高管薪酬信息應(yīng)該堅(jiān)持以強(qiáng)制性披露為主的原則。美國(guó)高管薪酬強(qiáng)制性披露制度的變遷,可以說(shuō)是一部"監(jiān)管"與"反監(jiān)管"的歷史。近年來(lái),美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)在高管薪酬披露的建設(shè)上取得重要進(jìn)展。借鑒美國(guó)成功的經(jīng)驗(yàn),立足于我國(guó)當(dāng)前的制度背景,我國(guó)可從幾個(gè)方面完善我國(guó)上市公司薪酬強(qiáng)制披露制度:一是充分、完整地披露高管薪酬具體構(gòu)成項(xiàng)目;二是要求披露薪酬討論與分析報(bào)告,并以圖表形式說(shuō)明高管薪酬與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)之間的關(guān)系;三是積極穩(wěn)妥地推進(jìn)薪酬與公司風(fēng)險(xiǎn)披露制度的建設(shè)。
[Abstract]:The dispute between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure of listed company information has a long history. The reality of information disclosure of executive compensation of listed companies in China is that the mandatory disclosure system is not perfect and the voluntary information disclosure is insufficient to meet the information needs of investors. " The economic theoretical basis of mandatory information disclosure, such as market failure "and" principal-agent ", shows that executive compensation information should adhere to the principle of mandatory disclosure. The change of mandatory disclosure system of executive compensation in the United States can be said to be a history of "supervision" and "anti-regulation". In recent years, the Securities and Exchange Commission has made important progress in the construction of executive compensation disclosure. Drawing on the successful experience of the United States and based on the current system background of our country, we can perfect the compulsory disclosure system of compensation of listed companies in China from several aspects: first, fully and completely disclose the specific components of executive compensation; The second is to require disclosure of salary discussion and analysis report, and to illustrate the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in the form of charts; third, to actively and steadily promote the construction of compensation and corporate risk disclosure system.
【作者單位】： 廈門大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)系;
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.51
[Abstract]:The dispute between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure of listed company information has a long history. The reality of information disclosure of executive compensation of listed companies in China is that the mandatory disclosure system is not perfect and the voluntary information disclosure is insufficient to meet the information needs of investors. " The economic theoretical basis of mandatory information disclosure, such as market failure "and" principal-agent ", shows that executive compensation information should adhere to the principle of mandatory disclosure. The change of mandatory disclosure system of executive compensation in the United States can be said to be a history of "supervision" and "anti-regulation". In recent years, the Securities and Exchange Commission has made important progress in the construction of executive compensation disclosure. Drawing on the successful experience of the United States and based on the current system background of our country, we can perfect the compulsory disclosure system of compensation of listed companies in China from several aspects: first, fully and completely disclose the specific components of executive compensation; The second is to require disclosure of salary discussion and analysis report, and to illustrate the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in the form of charts; third, to actively and steadily promote the construction of compensation and corporate risk disclosure system.
【作者單位】： 廈門大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)系;
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.51
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
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1 呂長(zhǎng)江;趙宇恒;;國(guó)有企業(yè)管理者激勵(lì)效應(yīng)研究——基于管理者權(quán)力的解釋[J];管理世界;2008年11期
相關(guān)重要報(bào)紙文章 前1條
1 本報(bào)記者 林U啞∮諂，
本文編號(hào)：2190526
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