吉峰農(nóng)機(jī)連鎖股份有限公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-11-24 14:06
【摘要】：本文按照提出問題、分析問題、解決問題的思路，將民營上市公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)問題作為研究對象，以典型代表吉峰農(nóng)機(jī)連鎖股份有限公司的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)為案例進(jìn)行研究。首先論文提出了此次調(diào)研的社會背景意義和思維方式等，為之后論文的相關(guān)研究奠定了理論基礎(chǔ)。接著對民營企業(yè)以及公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行界定，并以公司治理理論為基礎(chǔ)作為調(diào)研的知識框架，其中的委托代理理論、利益相關(guān)理論、信息不對稱理論以及交易費(fèi)用理論等作為論文的理論框架。然后引入中國民營企業(yè)吉峰農(nóng)機(jī)連鎖股份有限公司的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)問題進(jìn)行研究。同時(shí)論文還對國際上主要的三種公司治理模式進(jìn)行了總結(jié)介紹，包括以英美國家為主的外部監(jiān)控模式和以德日為主的內(nèi)部監(jiān)控模式及以東亞國家為主的家族控制模式，為我國民營企業(yè)公司治理模式提供了借鑒。最后論文從優(yōu)化股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、法人主體方面，內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)等方面對完善吉峰農(nóng)機(jī)連鎖股份有限公司治理提出了對策建議。 本文研究的主要結(jié)論是： 一、所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的高度統(tǒng)一不利于公司的長遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展。決策權(quán)、經(jīng)營權(quán)、監(jiān)督權(quán)“三權(quán)合一”使企業(yè)的命運(yùn)完全掌握在大股東手里，依靠大股東的主觀決策和經(jīng)驗(yàn)積累為公司出謀劃策，最終形成高度的集權(quán)而積累大量的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)， 二、針對股權(quán)集中狀況，可以采取建立完善適當(dāng)分權(quán)的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)模式，高度重視保護(hù)中小股東的利益，改革獨(dú)立董事制度等策略，減輕股權(quán)集中對治理的負(fù)面影響。 三、民營上市公司股東與管理層高度一致在很大程度上緩解了內(nèi)部人控制問題；監(jiān)事會制度設(shè)置與股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的內(nèi)在矛盾性，，導(dǎo)致了監(jiān)事會形同虛設(shè)，但獨(dú)立董事制度對此缺陷起到了部分彌補(bǔ)作用。 四、重點(diǎn)建構(gòu)對控股股東或?qū)嶋H控制人的監(jiān)控制度。樹立“影子董事”的概念，只要是實(shí)際控制或者對公司作出決策的人，即使不是董事會成員，也必須擔(dān)責(zé)董事相關(guān)的責(zé)任和義務(wù) 本文的創(chuàng)新之處在于系統(tǒng)地分析了民營上市公司吉峰農(nóng)機(jī)的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)模式，代表了對民營企業(yè)家族治理模式的考察，研究了其形成的現(xiàn)實(shí)原因。提出了民營上市公司完善內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的可借鑒性發(fā)展對策，對我國民營上市公司的健康發(fā)展乃至整個(gè)資本市場的穩(wěn)定發(fā)展都具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)指導(dǎo)意義。
[Abstract]:According to the ideas of putting forward, analyzing and solving the problems, this paper takes the governance structure of the private listed companies as the research object, and takes the corporate governance structure, which is a typical representative of Jifeng Agricultural Machinery chain Co., Ltd., as a case study. Firstly, the paper puts forward the social background significance and thinking mode of the research, which lays a theoretical foundation for the related research. Then define the private enterprises and corporate governance structure, and take the corporate governance theory as the knowledge framework, including principal-agent theory, interest related theory, Information asymmetry theory and transaction cost theory are the theoretical framework of this paper. Then introduce the Chinese private enterprise Jifeng Agricultural Machinery chain Co., Ltd corporate governance structure to study. At the same time, the paper also summarizes and introduces three main models of corporate governance in the world, including the external monitoring mode based on the Anglo-American countries, the internal monitoring model based on Germany and Japan, and the family control model dominated by the East Asian countries. For our private enterprise corporate governance model to provide reference. Finally, the paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to improve the governance of Jifeng Agricultural Machinery Co., Ltd. from the aspects of optimizing the ownership structure, the main body of legal person and the internal governance structure. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: first, the high unity of ownership and management is not conducive to the long-term development of the company. The decision-making power, the management right and the supervision power make the fate of the enterprise completely in the hands of the large shareholders, relying on the subjective decision-making and experience accumulation of the major shareholders to give advice to the company, and finally forming a high degree of centralization and accumulating a large number of risks. Secondly, aiming at the situation of equity concentration, we can establish and perfect the equity structure model with proper decentralization, attach great importance to the protection of the interests of minority shareholders, reform the independent director system, and mitigate the negative impact of equity concentration on governance. Third, the high consistency between shareholders and management of private listed companies alleviates the problem of insider control to a great extent; The inherent contradiction between the institution of the board of supervisors and the ownership structure leads to the virtual existence of the board of supervisors, but the system of independent directors partly compensates for this defect. Fourth, focus on the construction of controlling shareholders or actual controllers of the monitoring system. Establish the concept of "shadow directors", even if they are not members of the board, as long as they are actually in control or who make decisions about the company, The innovation of this paper lies in the systematic analysis of the corporate governance structure of Jifeng Agricultural Machinery, a private listed company, which represents the investigation of the family governance model of private enterprises. The practical reasons for its formation are studied. The paper puts forward the development countermeasures of improving the internal governance structure of the private listed companies, which has important practical guiding significance for the healthy development of the private listed companies in China and the stable development of the whole capital market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：四川師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F426.4;F271
本文編號：2354008
[Abstract]:According to the ideas of putting forward, analyzing and solving the problems, this paper takes the governance structure of the private listed companies as the research object, and takes the corporate governance structure, which is a typical representative of Jifeng Agricultural Machinery chain Co., Ltd., as a case study. Firstly, the paper puts forward the social background significance and thinking mode of the research, which lays a theoretical foundation for the related research. Then define the private enterprises and corporate governance structure, and take the corporate governance theory as the knowledge framework, including principal-agent theory, interest related theory, Information asymmetry theory and transaction cost theory are the theoretical framework of this paper. Then introduce the Chinese private enterprise Jifeng Agricultural Machinery chain Co., Ltd corporate governance structure to study. At the same time, the paper also summarizes and introduces three main models of corporate governance in the world, including the external monitoring mode based on the Anglo-American countries, the internal monitoring model based on Germany and Japan, and the family control model dominated by the East Asian countries. For our private enterprise corporate governance model to provide reference. Finally, the paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to improve the governance of Jifeng Agricultural Machinery Co., Ltd. from the aspects of optimizing the ownership structure, the main body of legal person and the internal governance structure. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: first, the high unity of ownership and management is not conducive to the long-term development of the company. The decision-making power, the management right and the supervision power make the fate of the enterprise completely in the hands of the large shareholders, relying on the subjective decision-making and experience accumulation of the major shareholders to give advice to the company, and finally forming a high degree of centralization and accumulating a large number of risks. Secondly, aiming at the situation of equity concentration, we can establish and perfect the equity structure model with proper decentralization, attach great importance to the protection of the interests of minority shareholders, reform the independent director system, and mitigate the negative impact of equity concentration on governance. Third, the high consistency between shareholders and management of private listed companies alleviates the problem of insider control to a great extent; The inherent contradiction between the institution of the board of supervisors and the ownership structure leads to the virtual existence of the board of supervisors, but the system of independent directors partly compensates for this defect. Fourth, focus on the construction of controlling shareholders or actual controllers of the monitoring system. Establish the concept of "shadow directors", even if they are not members of the board, as long as they are actually in control or who make decisions about the company, The innovation of this paper lies in the systematic analysis of the corporate governance structure of Jifeng Agricultural Machinery, a private listed company, which represents the investigation of the family governance model of private enterprises. The practical reasons for its formation are studied. The paper puts forward the development countermeasures of improving the internal governance structure of the private listed companies, which has important practical guiding significance for the healthy development of the private listed companies in China and the stable development of the whole capital market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：四川師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F426.4;F271
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 林曦;;弗里曼利益相關(guān)者理論評述[J];商業(yè)研究;2010年08期
2 王明琳;周生春;;控制性家族類型、雙重三層委托代理問題與企業(yè)價(jià)值[J];管理世界;2006年08期
3 林毅夫 ,蔡f ,李周;產(chǎn)權(quán)制度改革不能解決國企問題[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究參考;1997年95期
4 楊大楷,蔡菊芳;中小企業(yè)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)及其融資研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)緯;2004年01期
5 徐曉東,陳小悅;第一大股東對公司治理、企業(yè)業(yè)績的影響分析[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2003年02期
6 蘇啟林,朱文;上市公司家族控制與企業(yè)價(jià)值[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2003年08期
7 何浚;上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的實(shí)證分析[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;1998年05期
8 秦鋰,姚曉芳;中國民營企業(yè)上市現(xiàn)狀及分析[J];科學(xué)學(xué)與科學(xué)技術(shù)管理;2001年11期
9 魏海田;公股的流通問題及其他[J];改革;1994年05期
10 張承耀;“內(nèi)部人控制”問題與中國企業(yè)改革[J];改革;1995年03期
本文編號：2354008
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/jingjilunwen/gongyejingjilunwen/2354008.html
最近更新
教材專著
