中興通訊股權(quán)激勵方案設(shè)計研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-10-20 12:48
【摘要】：在公司治理中,股權(quán)激勵是比較重要的制度。股權(quán)激勵通過讓管理人員持有一定數(shù)量的股票,使管理層和股東的利益趨于一致,從而緩解委托人和代理人之間的利益沖突。國外實行股權(quán)激勵已有數(shù)十年歷史,而我國引入股權(quán)激勵的時間還不長。第一個規(guī)范意義上的股權(quán)激勵方案是1997年萬科施行的。隨著《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法(試行)》的正式出臺,股權(quán)激勵這一激勵制度在我國已經(jīng)開始被很多企業(yè)采用,但是總的來說,由于資本市場不完善,上市公司的治理環(huán)境也普遍較差,實施效果并不十分成功。中興通訊是較早實施股權(quán)激勵的國有上市公司。雖然其股權(quán)激勵計劃相對來說比較完整,方案的設(shè)計和實施的程序也比較規(guī)范,同時在核心知識員工的激勵和引入個人績效指標(biāo)等方面具有一定的特色和借鑒意義,但是仍然存在很多問題,需要改進。 本文采用文獻研究和理論研究相結(jié)合的方法,選取中興通訊股權(quán)激勵計劃作為主要研究對象,通過分析方案實施前后中興通訊公司業(yè)績表現(xiàn),發(fā)現(xiàn)股權(quán)激勵方案設(shè)計當(dāng)中的問題,并通過分析方案本身,尋找問題產(chǎn)生的根源,在總結(jié)中興通訊股權(quán)激勵方案所存在問題的基礎(chǔ)上,對股權(quán)激勵方案進行改進設(shè)計。 研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),中興通訊的股權(quán)激勵計劃并沒有發(fā)揮應(yīng)有的作用,公司的業(yè)績并沒有質(zhì)的提升。股權(quán)激勵方案本身存在激勵模式不適合、力度過大、公平性欠缺、行權(quán)指標(biāo)單一、價格確定不合理等方面問題�；诖�,本文從模式選擇、對象選擇、股票和資金來源、價格確定、數(shù)量安排、時間安排、機制安排、行權(quán)條件等8個角度對中興通訊股權(quán)激勵方案的設(shè)計提出改進意見,并在此基礎(chǔ)上,提出完善我國股權(quán)激勵計劃實施的政策性意見。
[Abstract]:In corporate governance, equity incentive is a more important system. By allowing managers to hold a certain number of stocks, equity incentives make the interests of management and shareholders converge, thus easing the conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent. Foreign countries have carried out equity incentive for decades, but the time of introducing equity incentive in our country is not long. The first normative equity incentive scheme was implemented by Vanke in 1997. With the formal introduction of the "measures for Stock incentive Management of listed companies (trial)", the incentive system of equity incentive has been adopted by many enterprises in China, but in general, because of the imperfect capital market, The governance environment of listed companies is also generally poor, the implementation effect is not very successful. ZTE is the early implementation of equity incentives of the state-owned listed companies. Although its equity incentive plan is relatively complete, the program design and implementation procedures are also more standardized, at the same time in the core knowledge of staff incentives and the introduction of personal performance indicators and other aspects of certain characteristics and reference significance. But there are still many problems that need to be improved. This paper adopts the method of combining literature research with theoretical research, selects ZTE's equity incentive plan as the main research object, and analyzes the performance of ZTE before and after the implementation of the scheme. Find out the problems in the design of the equity incentive scheme, and through the analysis of the scheme itself, find out the root of the problem, on the basis of summing up the existing problems of the equity incentive scheme of ZTE, improve the design of the equity incentive scheme. The research found that ZTE's equity incentive plan did not play its due role, and the company's performance did not improve qualitatively. The equity incentive scheme itself has some problems, such as inappropriate incentive mode, excessive intensity, lack of fairness, single exercise index, unreasonable price determination and so on. Based on this, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the design of ZTE's equity incentive scheme from the aspects of mode selection, object selection, stock and fund source, price determination, quantity arrangement, time arrangement, mechanism arrangement, exercise condition, etc. And on this basis, put forward to improve the implementation of China's equity incentive plan policy advice.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.92;F275;F426.63
本文編號：2283233
[Abstract]:In corporate governance, equity incentive is a more important system. By allowing managers to hold a certain number of stocks, equity incentives make the interests of management and shareholders converge, thus easing the conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent. Foreign countries have carried out equity incentive for decades, but the time of introducing equity incentive in our country is not long. The first normative equity incentive scheme was implemented by Vanke in 1997. With the formal introduction of the "measures for Stock incentive Management of listed companies (trial)", the incentive system of equity incentive has been adopted by many enterprises in China, but in general, because of the imperfect capital market, The governance environment of listed companies is also generally poor, the implementation effect is not very successful. ZTE is the early implementation of equity incentives of the state-owned listed companies. Although its equity incentive plan is relatively complete, the program design and implementation procedures are also more standardized, at the same time in the core knowledge of staff incentives and the introduction of personal performance indicators and other aspects of certain characteristics and reference significance. But there are still many problems that need to be improved. This paper adopts the method of combining literature research with theoretical research, selects ZTE's equity incentive plan as the main research object, and analyzes the performance of ZTE before and after the implementation of the scheme. Find out the problems in the design of the equity incentive scheme, and through the analysis of the scheme itself, find out the root of the problem, on the basis of summing up the existing problems of the equity incentive scheme of ZTE, improve the design of the equity incentive scheme. The research found that ZTE's equity incentive plan did not play its due role, and the company's performance did not improve qualitatively. The equity incentive scheme itself has some problems, such as inappropriate incentive mode, excessive intensity, lack of fairness, single exercise index, unreasonable price determination and so on. Based on this, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the design of ZTE's equity incentive scheme from the aspects of mode selection, object selection, stock and fund source, price determination, quantity arrangement, time arrangement, mechanism arrangement, exercise condition, etc. And on this basis, put forward to improve the implementation of China's equity incentive plan policy advice.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.92;F275;F426.63
【參考文獻】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 張宗益,宋增基;上市公司經(jīng)理持股與公司績效實證研究[J];重慶大學(xué)學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2002年06期
2 徐文新;我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵方式的分類比較研究[J];華東經(jīng)濟管理;2003年S1期
3 潘穎;劉廣生;;雙重委托治理框架下股權(quán)激勵效應(yīng)研究[J];經(jīng)濟經(jīng)緯;2009年06期
4 劉國亮,王加勝;上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、激勵制度及績效的實證研究[J];經(jīng)濟理論與經(jīng)濟管理;2000年05期
5 張維迎,吳有昌 ,馬捷;公有制經(jīng)濟中的委托人—代理人關(guān)系:理論分析和政策含義[J];經(jīng)濟研究;1995年04期
6 魏剛;高級管理層激勵與上市公司經(jīng)營績效[J];經(jīng)濟研究;2000年03期
7 周建波,孫菊生;經(jīng)營者股權(quán)激勵的治理效應(yīng)研究——來自中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)[J];經(jīng)濟研究;2003年05期
8 周璐;;高管人員股權(quán)激勵與公司業(yè)績的實證分析[J];內(nèi)江科技;2006年05期
9 李增泉;激勵機制與企業(yè)績效——一項基于上市公司的實證研究[J];會計研究;2000年01期
10 張俊瑞 ,趙進文 ,張建;高級管理層激勵與上市公司經(jīng)營績效相關(guān)性的實證分析[J];會計研究;2003年09期
，本文編號：2283233
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/jingjilunwen/gongyejingjilunwen/2283233.html
最近更新
教材專著
