【摘要】：上市公司集中了我國(guó)的優(yōu)質(zhì)資產(chǎn),是我國(guó)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的中流砥柱,更是參與國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的主力軍。然而,生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)不善、管理制度不健全、資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率高、償債能力差等問(wèn)題,已成為制約我國(guó)上市公司發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵因素。尤其是在目前我國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展減緩的情況下,上市公司的問(wèn)題日益突出。破產(chǎn)重整為解決上市公司的諸多問(wèn)題提供了一種有效且可行的方法。目前我國(guó)瀕臨退市的上市公司中,絕大部分都采用破產(chǎn)重整的方式來(lái)自救,但是重整的結(jié)果卻不盡相同,并且大多數(shù)重整完成后的上市公司并未迎來(lái)期待中的發(fā)展拐點(diǎn),而是在短暫的風(fēng)光之后,再次陷入困境。上市公司破產(chǎn)重整實(shí)施效果的差異性與不確定性成為破產(chǎn)重整具有爭(zhēng)議的關(guān)鍵性因素。 破產(chǎn)重整是上市公司資本運(yùn)作的重要內(nèi)容,也一直是各國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)理論研究的熱點(diǎn)問(wèn)題之一。在過(guò)去的幾十年里,各國(guó)學(xué)者對(duì)上市公司破產(chǎn)重整進(jìn)行了廣泛而深入的研究。目前,我國(guó)上市公司破產(chǎn)重整無(wú)論從重整次數(shù)上看,還是從交易金額上看,都已經(jīng)達(dá)到了一定的規(guī)模。與此同時(shí),上市公司的重整方式也層出不窮。越來(lái)越多的ST公司選擇進(jìn)行重整,試圖通過(guò)整合自身資源,來(lái)改善并提高業(yè)績(jī)。但重整是否可以促進(jìn)ST公司股東財(cái)富的增加,是否可以改善ST公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況,目前理論界對(duì)此并未達(dá)成共識(shí)。破產(chǎn)重整的實(shí)施效果涉及股東、重組方、債權(quán)人、債務(wù)人、政府甚至是社會(huì)公眾的利益。成功的破產(chǎn)重整不僅僅使上市公司達(dá)到保殼的目的,更應(yīng)該使破產(chǎn)重整的各參與方達(dá)到利益的均衡。那么,上市公司破產(chǎn)重整案件中,各個(gè)利益相關(guān)者是如何保護(hù)自身利益,同時(shí)又為達(dá)成自身目的付出了怎樣的代價(jià),他們的重整效應(yīng)如何,是否實(shí)現(xiàn)了各方利益的均衡,值得一探究竟。破產(chǎn)重整的實(shí)施對(duì)于上市公司而言是“飲鴆止渴”還是“起死回生、脫胎換骨”?對(duì)于各參與方而言是“投資有道”還是“血本無(wú)歸”?等等,這些問(wèn)題這些都是我國(guó)上市公司和各參與方在選擇是否進(jìn)行破產(chǎn)重整時(shí)必須慎重考慮的重要問(wèn)題。因此,對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司及其各參與方的破產(chǎn)重整效應(yīng)進(jìn)行研究,為上市公司破產(chǎn)重整的實(shí)施提供理論支持,是一個(gè)關(guān)系到我國(guó)上市公司健康發(fā)展的大問(wèn)題,對(duì)規(guī)范我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的有序運(yùn)行,推動(dòng)我國(guó)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康發(fā)展具有重要意義。 文章將研究范圍鎖定在我國(guó)上市公司之一的金城股份,通過(guò)實(shí)證分析與理論分析相結(jié)合的方法,對(duì)金城股份重整前后各個(gè)利益相關(guān)者的財(cái)務(wù)效應(yīng)進(jìn)行詳盡分析。同時(shí),在研究方法的運(yùn)用上把定性與定量研究有機(jī)地結(jié)合起來(lái),為破產(chǎn)重整財(cái)務(wù)效應(yīng)的研究構(gòu)建了一個(gè)規(guī)范性框架。 論文的研究?jī)?nèi)容主要分為五個(gè)部分： 第一部分是緒論。首先,提出論文選題背景和選題意義。其次,從破產(chǎn)程序的選擇、破產(chǎn)成本和破產(chǎn)與代理問(wèn)題三個(gè)方面介紹國(guó)外研究現(xiàn)狀；按照時(shí)間順序?qū)?guó)內(nèi)關(guān)于破產(chǎn)重整的文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行綜述。再次,介紹了文章的結(jié)構(gòu)安排,并列示所采用的研究方法。最后,指出本文研究的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)與不足。 第二部分是破產(chǎn)重整效應(yīng)理論基礎(chǔ)。首先,對(duì)交易成本理論作了簡(jiǎn)單描述。其次,對(duì)信號(hào)傳遞理論做了必要說(shuō)明。本部分為全文的展開(kāi)提供了理論基礎(chǔ)。 第三部分是金城股份破產(chǎn)重整內(nèi)容。首先,從公司概況和公司重大事件兩個(gè)方面介紹了金城股份破產(chǎn)重整的背景。其次,詳盡分析了金城股份破產(chǎn)重整的動(dòng)機(jī),認(rèn)為主要原因是保留上市資格、優(yōu)化資本結(jié)構(gòu)和引入戰(zhàn)略投資者。最后,從股權(quán)重整、業(yè)務(wù)重整和債務(wù)重整三個(gè)方面列示金城股份的破產(chǎn)重整方案,并在此基礎(chǔ)上歸納總結(jié)出金城股份破產(chǎn)重整案風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較大、控制權(quán)兩度易主和政府大力支持等特點(diǎn)。 第四部分是金城股份破產(chǎn)重整效應(yīng)。采用理論分析與實(shí)證分析相結(jié)合、定性分析與定量分析相結(jié)合的方法,基于財(cái)務(wù)視角,從債權(quán)人、股東、重組方以及公司自身四個(gè)方面,對(duì)破產(chǎn)重整各參與方的效應(yīng)進(jìn)行了全面分析。首先,從破產(chǎn)行為的選擇、正面效應(yīng)和反面效應(yīng)三個(gè)方面對(duì)債權(quán)人破產(chǎn)重整效應(yīng)進(jìn)行分析,認(rèn)為破產(chǎn)重整是債權(quán)人為了挽回一定程度的損失之下的無(wú)奈之舉。其次,對(duì)股東的效應(yīng)進(jìn)行了分析,認(rèn)為對(duì)于股東而言,破產(chǎn)重整避免了顆粒無(wú)收的結(jié)果,甚至?xí)驗(yàn)橹卣捻樌瓿啥@得資本溢價(jià),特別是對(duì)于原始的大股東,在看似虧本的情況下,實(shí)則收獲頗豐。再次,對(duì)重組方的效應(yīng)進(jìn)行分析,認(rèn)為在證券市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管日趨嚴(yán)苛的情況下,重組方“借殼上市”目的雖然不易實(shí)現(xiàn),但是仍然可從中牟利。最后,從盈利能力、償債能力、營(yíng)運(yùn)能力和發(fā)展能力四個(gè)方面對(duì)金城股份破產(chǎn)重整的績(jī)效進(jìn)行分析,認(rèn)為破產(chǎn)重整的實(shí)施并未能全面改善其現(xiàn)狀,公司未來(lái)要長(zhǎng)久健康發(fā)展,還需今后妥善的經(jīng)營(yíng)與管理。 第五部分是金城股份破產(chǎn)重整啟示。結(jié)合金城股份破產(chǎn)重整案的特點(diǎn),從加強(qiáng)融資監(jiān)管、完善退市機(jī)制、弱化政府干預(yù)等三個(gè)方面提出提高我國(guó)上市公司重整效率的建議。
[Abstract]:The listed companies are the mainstay of our country's national economy, which are the mainstay of our national economy and the main force to participate in the international competition. However, the problems of poor production and management, unsound management system, high asset liability rate and poor solvency have become the key factors that restrict the development of the listed companies in our country. As the economic development slows down, the problem of listed companies is becoming more and more prominent. Bankruptcy reorganization provides an effective and feasible method to solve many problems of listed companies. At present, most of the listed companies on the verge of delisting in China come from the way of bankruptcy reorganization, but the results of the reorganization are not the same, and most of them are reformed. After the completion of the reorganization, the listed companies did not meet the developing inflection point of expectation, but were in a difficult situation again after a short period of view. The difference and uncertainty of the implementation effect of the listed companies' bankruptcy reorganization has become the key factor in the disputation of the bankruptcy reorganization.
Bankruptcy reorganization is an important part of the capital operation of the listed companies, and has always been one of the hot issues in the theoretical research of the securities market. In the past few decades, many scholars have carried out extensive and deep research on the bankruptcy reorganization of listed companies. At present, the reorganization of listed companies in China is not only from the number of reorganization, but also from the transaction. At the same time, it has reached a certain scale. At the same time, the reorganization of listed companies is also emerging. More and more ST companies have chosen to restructure their own resources to improve and improve their performance. But whether reorganization can promote the increase of the wealth of the shareholders of ST companies and whether it can improve the financial situation of ST companies. At present, the theoretical circle has not reached a consensus. The effect of the bankruptcy reorganization involves the interests of the shareholders, the reorganization parties, the creditors, the debtors, the government and even the public. The successful bankruptcy reorganization not only makes the listed companies achieve the purpose of protecting the shell, but also makes the parties of the bankruptcy reorganization reach the balance of interest. In the case of production reorganization, how can each stakeholder protect its own interests and pay the price for its own purpose, and how the effect of their reorganization and the balance of the interests of all parties is worth exploring. The implementation of the bankruptcy reorganization is "drinking poison to quench thirst" or "taking off death" It is an important problem that China's listed companies and participants must consider carefully when choosing whether to carry out bankruptcy and reorganization. Therefore, the research on the bankruptcy reorganization effect of Chinese listed companies and their participating parties is carried out. Providing theoretical support for the implementation of the bankruptcy reorganization of the listed companies is a big problem related to the healthy development of the listed companies in China, which is of great significance to standardizing the orderly operation of our capital market and promoting the healthy development of our national economy.
In this paper, the research scope is locked up in Jincheng stock of one of the listed companies in China. Through the combination of empirical analysis and theoretical analysis, the financial effect of each stakeholder before and after the reorganization of Jincheng is analyzed in detail. At the same time, the qualitative and quantitative research is organically combined in the application of the research method to restructure the bankruptcy. The study of financial effects has constructed a normative framework.
The research content of this paper is divided into five parts:
The first part is the introduction. First, it puts forward the background and significance of the topic. Secondly, it introduces the status of foreign research from the three aspects of the selection of bankruptcy procedures, the cost of bankruptcy and the problem of bankruptcy and agency, and summarizes the domestic literature on bankruptcy reorganization according to the time sequence. Finally, it points out the innovation and deficiency of this research.
The second part is the basis of the theory of the effect of bankruptcy reorganization. First, it gives a simple description of the transaction cost theory. Secondly, the necessary explanation is made on the theory of signal transmission. This part provides a theoretical basis for the full text.
The third part is the content of Jincheng's share bankruptcy reorganization. First, it introduces the background of Jincheng's stock bankruptcy reorganization from two aspects of the company's general situation and the major events of the company. Secondly, it analyzes the motive of the reorganization of Jincheng's shares in detail, and thinks that the main reason is to retain the listing qualification, optimize the capital structure and introduce the strategic investor. Finally, from the stock right. The reorganization, the business reorganization and the debt restructuring are listed in three aspects to show the bankruptcy reorganization plan of Jincheng stock, and on the basis of this, it summarizes and summarizes the characteristics of the large risk, the two degree of control and the strong support of the government.
The fourth part is the effect of the reorganization of Jincheng's stock. By combining the theoretical analysis with the empirical analysis, the combination of qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, based on the financial perspective, the effects of the creditors, shareholders, reorganization parties and the company themselves are analyzed comprehensively from the four aspects of the creditor, the shareholder, the reorganization party and the company itself. First, from the bankruptcy behavior. The effect of the creditor's bankruptcy reorganization is analyzed in three aspects: the choice, the positive effect and the negative effect. The bankruptcy reorganization is the helplessness of the creditor in order to redeem a certain degree of loss. Secondly, the effect of the shareholders is analyzed. With the successful completion of the reorganization, the capital premium is obtained, especially for the original large shareholders. In the case of a seemingly loss, the restructure is very fruitful. Again, the effect of the reorganized party is analyzed. It is believed that the restructured "backdoor listing" is not easy to realize in the case of the increasingly severe supervision of the securities market, but it still can profit from it. Finally, from four aspects of profitability, solvency, operating ability and development ability, the paper analyzes the performance of Jincheng's joint stock reorganization, and believes that the implementation of the bankruptcy reorganization has failed to improve its current situation in an all-round way. The company will have a long and healthy development in the future, and it also needs proper management and management in the future.
The fifth part is the revelation of Jincheng's share bankruptcy reorganization. Combined with the characteristics of Jincheng's stock bankruptcy reorganization case, it puts forward some suggestions to improve the efficiency of the reorganization of Chinese listed companies from three aspects, such as strengthening the financing supervision, perfecting the delisting mechanism and weakening the government intervention.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長(zhǎng)江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F426.83;F271;F406.7

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