本文選題：投資效率　切入點：政府控制企業(yè)　出處：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：長期以來,政府控制企業(yè)的投資效率低于非政府控制企業(yè)被認(rèn)為是我國企業(yè)投資行為中的典型現(xiàn)象。本文利用2001-2012年上海和深圳交易所市場中A股主板和中小板制造業(yè)企業(yè)投資數(shù)據(jù),發(fā)現(xiàn)政府控制背景的確對企業(yè)投資效率有顯著影響。政府控制背景顯著降低了企業(yè)投資效率,并且政府控制企業(yè)的非效率投資行為主要集中于投資機會較差、內(nèi)部現(xiàn)金流水平較低時的過度投資行為。本文進一步研究了我國制造業(yè)上市公司投資支出與現(xiàn)金流水平之間的關(guān)系,得出我國制造業(yè)企業(yè)的投資與現(xiàn)金流之間存在U型曲線關(guān)系,并且政府控制企業(yè)的投資-現(xiàn)金流敏感性較低(U型曲線相對平緩)；而當(dāng)現(xiàn)金流為負(fù)時,政府控制企業(yè)的現(xiàn)金流敏感性顯著增加,在現(xiàn)金流減少時反而有擴大投資規(guī)模的傾向。基于以上研究結(jié)果,本文認(rèn)為,政府控制企業(yè)在政府影響下承擔(dān)了部分社會經(jīng)濟目標(biāo)、有政策導(dǎo)向性的投資行為可能是導(dǎo)致其投資效率偏離最優(yōu)水平的原因；政府控制背景帶來的隱形擔(dān)保和預(yù)算軟約束問題,是加劇政府控制企業(yè)投資非效率的潛在因素。
[Abstract]:For a long time, The investment efficiency of government-controlled enterprises is lower than that of non-government-controlled enterprises, which is considered to be a typical phenomenon in the investment behavior of Chinese enterprises. In this paper, the investment data of A-share main board and small and medium-sized board manufacturing enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2012 are used. It is found that the background of government control does have a significant impact on the investment efficiency of enterprises, and the background of government control significantly reduces the investment efficiency of enterprises, and the inefficient investment behavior of government controlled enterprises is mainly focused on the poor investment opportunities. This paper further studies the relationship between investment expenditure and cash flow level of listed manufacturing companies in China. It is concluded that the relationship between investment and cash flow of manufacturing enterprises in China is U-shaped, and the sensitivity of investment-cash flow of government-controlled enterprises is relatively low, but when the cash flow is negative, The sensitivity of cash-flow of government-controlled enterprises is significantly increased, but they tend to expand the scale of investment when the cash-flow decreases. Based on the above results, this paper argues that government-controlled enterprises bear some social and economic objectives under the influence of the government. The policy-oriented investment behavior may be the reason for the deviation of investment efficiency from the optimal level, and the implicit guarantee and soft budget constraints brought by the background of government control are the potential factors that aggravate the non-efficiency of government investment control.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F406.7;F424

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本文編號：1657137