本文選題：合同能源管理　切入點(diǎn)：節(jié)能服務(wù)公司　出處：《中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：能源是社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的命脈,節(jié)約能源更是促進(jìn)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)可持續(xù)發(fā)展最重要也是最有效的手段之一�，F(xiàn)如今,能源問(wèn)題(能源短缺、能源浪費(fèi))在很大程度上制約著我國(guó)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,而合同能源管理機(jī)制正是解決這一問(wèn)題的有效辦法。 本文研究分析了合同能源管理實(shí)施過(guò)程中的兩個(gè)難點(diǎn)問(wèn)題,即客戶與能源服務(wù)公司之間的合同設(shè)計(jì)以及客戶對(duì)于能源服務(wù)公司的選擇機(jī)制。目的在于分別找到一種合作機(jī)制和選擇機(jī)制來(lái)協(xié)調(diào)客戶和節(jié)能服務(wù)公司之間的決策,從而使雙方實(shí)現(xiàn)合作共贏。 在客戶與能源服務(wù)公司一對(duì)一的情況下,我們引入了利潤(rùn)共享的代銷(xiāo)合同來(lái)研究分析雙方的合作問(wèn)題。在該合同下,節(jié)能服務(wù)公司決定提供的節(jié)能量以及單位節(jié)能量的投入成本,客戶則設(shè)定合同的參數(shù),包括投入成本和節(jié)能收益的分?jǐn)偙壤�。在提出的模型�?我們假設(shè)非合作情況下客戶和節(jié)能服務(wù)公司進(jìn)行斯坦伯格博弈,客戶是主導(dǎo)者,節(jié)能服務(wù)公司是跟隨者。通過(guò)證明我們可以發(fā)現(xiàn),非合作的情況下,雙方的決策不能夠使得合同能源管理的整個(gè)過(guò)程達(dá)到最大效益。利用納什討價(jià)還價(jià)模型,我們得出了一種合作機(jī)制,以此來(lái)協(xié)調(diào)雙.方的決策,從而最優(yōu)化整體利潤(rùn),達(dá)到合作共贏的效果。最后,通過(guò)數(shù)例分析,我們考察了一些參數(shù)對(duì)于最優(yōu)決策的影響,在此基礎(chǔ)上為客戶選擇節(jié)能服務(wù)公司提出了一定的建議。 在客戶與能源服務(wù)公司一對(duì)多的情況下,我們基于多屬性逆向拍賣(mài)模型研究了客戶對(duì)于節(jié)能服務(wù)公司的選擇問(wèn)題,節(jié)能服務(wù)公司的投標(biāo)集由三個(gè)屬性決定,即節(jié)能量、項(xiàng)目完成期以及節(jié)能收益共享比例。本文以政府作為節(jié)能服務(wù)需求方,通過(guò)政府和多個(gè)節(jié)能服務(wù)公司間的非合作博弈,推導(dǎo)出各節(jié)能服務(wù)公司的最優(yōu)投標(biāo)策略；在此基礎(chǔ)上,提出一種適用于政府挑選合作節(jié)能服務(wù)公司的選擇機(jī)制,這種機(jī)制回避了節(jié)能收益分配的談判,限制了節(jié)能服務(wù)公司間的惡意競(jìng)爭(zhēng),從而提高了整個(gè)合同能源管理過(guò)程的運(yùn)作效率。最后,以某地方政府對(duì)全市范圍內(nèi)辦公機(jī)構(gòu)大樓的中央空調(diào)系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行節(jié)能改造為例,分析驗(yàn)證了上述拍賣(mài)機(jī)制的有效性,并指出在利用逆向拍賣(mài)的方式選擇合作的節(jié)能服務(wù)公司之前,政府應(yīng)該設(shè)定一些資格標(biāo)準(zhǔn)以限定參與投標(biāo)的節(jié)能服務(wù)公司的數(shù)目。 本文通過(guò)研究合同能源管理過(guò)程中的合作共贏問(wèn)題,促進(jìn)了客戶和節(jié)能服務(wù)公司雙方的合作,從而有利于合同能源管理的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展推廣。然而,本文提出的模型建立在很多假設(shè)的基礎(chǔ)之上,這在一定程度上沒(méi)能很好的表現(xiàn)實(shí)際情況,這就需要未來(lái)的研究做進(jìn)一步的深入探討。
[Abstract]:Energy is the lifeblood of social and economic development. Energy conservation is one of the most important and effective means to promote the sustainable development of social economy. Energy waste to a large extent restricts the development of social economy in China, and the contract energy management mechanism is an effective way to solve this problem. This paper studies and analyzes two difficult problems in the implementation of contract energy management. That is, the contract design between the customer and the energy service company and the customer's choice mechanism for the energy service company. The aim is to find a cooperation mechanism and a selection mechanism to coordinate the decision between the customer and the energy-saving service company. So that the two sides to achieve win-win cooperation. In the case of a one-to-one relationship between customers and energy services companies, we have introduced a profit-sharing contract to study and analyze the issue of cooperation between the two parties. Energy-efficient service companies decide to provide energy saving and unit energy saving input costs, while customers set contract parameters, including the share of input costs and energy efficiency benefits. We assume that in a non-cooperative situation, the customer and the energy-saving service company play the Steinberg game, the customer is the leader, the energy-saving service company is the follower. The decision-making of both sides can not make the whole process of contract energy management achieve the maximum benefit. Using Nash bargaining model, we have come up with a cooperative mechanism to coordinate the decisions of the two parties, thereby optimizing the overall profits. Finally, through the analysis of several examples, we investigate the influence of some parameters on the optimal decision, and put forward some suggestions for the customer to choose the energy-saving service company. In the case of one-to-many customer and energy service company, we study the customer's choice of energy-saving service company based on multi-attribute reverse auction model. The bidding set of energy-saving service company is determined by three attributes, that is, energy saving. This paper takes the government as the demand side of energy-saving services, through the non-cooperative game between the government and several energy-saving service companies, deduces the optimal bidding strategy of each energy-saving service company. This paper proposes a selection mechanism suitable for the government to select cooperative energy-saving service companies, which avoids negotiations on the distribution of energy efficiency benefits and limits malicious competition among energy-saving service companies. Thus, the efficiency of the whole contract energy management process is improved. Finally, taking a local government for example, the energy-saving transformation of the central air conditioning system of office buildings in the whole city is taken as an example, and the effectiveness of the auction mechanism mentioned above is analyzed and verified. It is also pointed out that before selecting cooperative energy-saving service companies by reverse auction, the government should set some qualification criteria to limit the number of energy-saving service companies participating in bidding. By studying the win-win cooperation in the process of contract energy management, this paper promotes the cooperation between customers and energy-saving service companies, which is beneficial to the further development and promotion of contract energy management. The model proposed in this paper is based on many hypotheses, which to a certain extent can not well represent the actual situation, which needs to be further studied in the future.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274;F426.2

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本文編號(hào)：1609716