本文關(guān)鍵詞：特變電工股權(quán)激勵(lì)對研發(fā)創(chuàng)新的影響研究　出處：《石河子大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 股權(quán)激勵(lì) 研發(fā)支出 專利申請

【摘要】：隨著全球企業(yè)競爭程度不斷加劇,提高企業(yè)核心競爭力成為首要目標(biāo),決定企業(yè)核心競爭力和可持續(xù)發(fā)展的重大因素之一便是企業(yè)內(nèi)部的研發(fā)能力。研發(fā)投資能力的高低決定企業(yè)脫離險(xiǎn)惡處境的難易。但是現(xiàn)實(shí)中實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司不斷出現(xiàn)高管辭職套現(xiàn)、貪污巨額激勵(lì)資金致使公司連續(xù)虧損等負(fù)面現(xiàn)象,引發(fā)人們對股權(quán)激勵(lì)有效性產(chǎn)生懷疑。因此,制定一套合理的激勵(lì)機(jī)制能夠促進(jìn)企業(yè)研發(fā)投入和高效產(chǎn)出變得十分迫切,那么如何根據(jù)企業(yè)自身特點(diǎn),制定更貼和企業(yè)實(shí)際情況的股權(quán)激勵(lì),對企業(yè)有舉足輕重的作用。本文以新疆特變電工股權(quán)激勵(lì)為具體內(nèi)容進(jìn)行案例研究。首先,闡述本論文的研究背景及意義,并歸納總結(jié)了國內(nèi)外研究者對于股權(quán)激勵(lì)的研究程度;其次,對相關(guān)的概念及理論依據(jù)進(jìn)行了總結(jié),并查找和歸納了目前有關(guān)股權(quán)激勵(lì)對研發(fā)投入和產(chǎn)出方面影響的替代變量;再次,對文章涉及的目標(biāo)案例企業(yè)進(jìn)行相關(guān)方面介紹,包括股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施的背景、動因、方案主要內(nèi)容;接下來,分別運(yùn)用事件研究法和財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)分析法分析公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)前、激勵(lì)中和激勵(lì)后在研發(fā)投入與產(chǎn)出的替代變量的變化,比如專利申請通過數(shù)量、研發(fā)技術(shù)人員占比情況、研發(fā)支出、研發(fā)強(qiáng)度、加權(quán)平均凈資產(chǎn)收益率等的趨勢變化,縱向?qū)Ρ裙緦?shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)前后在研發(fā)方面的變化情況。本文主要結(jié)論,股權(quán)激勵(lì)是把雙刃劍,在協(xié)調(diào)好管理層和股東間矛盾的同時(shí)要把握好激勵(lì)程度,制定合理的業(yè)績考核標(biāo)準(zhǔn),關(guān)注核心技術(shù)人員的情況,并對不能為企業(yè)帶來利潤提升空間的研發(fā)項(xiàng)目減少研發(fā)投入,從這三方面關(guān)注可以提高對研發(fā)創(chuàng)新的激勵(lì)效果。并提出以下政策性建議:(1)建立完善的考核機(jī)制,促進(jìn)企業(yè)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展。(2)培養(yǎng)品德兼優(yōu)的高層管理者作為企業(yè)的經(jīng)理人引導(dǎo)企業(yè)做出戰(zhàn)略性的決策。(3)制定完善的政策法規(guī)。
[Abstract]:With the increasing degree of global enterprise competition, improving the core competitiveness of enterprises has become the primary goal. One of the major factors that determine the core competence and sustainable development of an enterprise is the R & D capability within the enterprise. The level of R & D investment ability determines the difficulty for an enterprise to escape from a dangerous situation. But in reality, it is the public that carries out the equity incentive. The company has been resigning senior executives to cash in. The embezzlement of huge incentive funds leads to the negative phenomena such as continuous loss of the company, which leads people to doubt the validity of the equity incentive. It is very urgent to establish a set of reasonable incentive mechanism to promote R & D input and efficient output of enterprises, so how to develop equity incentive according to the characteristics of enterprises and the actual situation of enterprises. It plays an important role in the enterprise. This paper takes Xinjiang special variant electrician equity incentive as the concrete content to carry on the case study. First, expounds the research background and the significance of this paper. And summarized the domestic and foreign researchers on equity incentive research degree; Secondly, it summarizes the relevant concepts and theoretical basis, and finds and sums up the current alternative variables of the impact of equity incentive on R & D input and output. Thirdly, the paper introduces the relevant aspects of the target case, including the background, motivation and main contents of the scheme. Then, using the method of event research and financial index analysis, we analyze the change of alternative variables of R & D input and output before, after incentive and after incentive, such as the number of patent applications passed. The proportion of R & D technicians, R & D expenditure, R D intensity, weighted average net asset return and other trends, longitudinal comparison of the company before and after the implementation of equity incentives in R & D changes. The main conclusions of this paper. Equity incentive is a double-edged sword, while coordinating the contradiction between management and shareholders, we should grasp the incentive level, formulate reasonable performance evaluation standards, and pay attention to the situation of core technical personnel. And reduce R & D investment for R & D projects that can not bring profit promotion space for enterprises. From these three aspects of attention can improve the incentive effect of R & D innovation, and put forward the following policy recommendations: 1) establish a sound assessment mechanism. To promote the sustainable development of enterprises. (2) to train moral and excellent senior managers as managers of enterprises to guide enterprises to make strategic decisions. 3) to formulate perfect policies and regulations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F272.92;F273.1;F426.61

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