本文選題：農(nóng)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整　切入點(diǎn)：基層政府行為　出處：《社會(huì)學(xué)研究》2017年05期 　論文類(lèi)型：期刊論文

【摘要】：為什么一些地區(qū)的農(nóng)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整陷入了新產(chǎn)業(yè)-低效運(yùn)作-新產(chǎn)業(yè)的重復(fù)低效的怪圈之中?本文將這種重復(fù)低效現(xiàn)象稱(chēng)為"積極的惰性"。本研究以南方A縣的農(nóng)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整歷程為例,發(fā)現(xiàn)對(duì)于經(jīng)濟(jì)條件較差地區(qū)的基層政府而言,頻繁更換產(chǎn)業(yè)是在強(qiáng)激勵(lì)與弱懲罰的激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)下的理性行為。內(nèi)容競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、時(shí)間壓力等強(qiáng)激勵(lì)驅(qū)動(dòng)基層政府上馬新產(chǎn)業(yè),并"大干"、"快干";而歸因困難、非正式關(guān)系介入等弱懲罰則讓基層政府面臨軟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)約束,從而降低了更換成本。
[Abstract]:Why is the adjustment of agricultural structure in some areas trapped in the cycle of duplication and inefficiency of new industries-inefficient operation-new industries? This paper calls this phenomenon "positive inertia". Taking the agricultural structure adjustment course of A County in the South as an example, it is found that for the grass-roots governments in areas with poor economic conditions, The frequent change of industry is rational behavior under the incentive structure of strong incentive and weak punishment. The content competition, time pressure and other strong incentives drive the grass-roots government to start new industries, and "big work", "quick work", but the attribution is difficult. Weak penalties, such as informal involvement, put grass-roots governments under soft risk constraints, thus reducing replacement costs.
【作者單位】： 中山大學(xué)中國(guó)公共管理研究中心政治與公共事務(wù)管理學(xué)院;中山大學(xué)政治與公共事務(wù)管理學(xué)院;山東大學(xué)政治學(xué)與公共管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：2016年度教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)重點(diǎn)研究基地重大項(xiàng)目“社會(huì)政策創(chuàng)新與共享發(fā)展”(16JJD630011)的研究成果
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D630
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本文編號(hào)：1642814