本文關(guān)鍵詞：南北技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移、專利保護(hù)與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

南北技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移、專利保護(hù)與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)

North-to-South Technology Transfers, Patent Protections and Economic Growth

[1] [2] [3]

Luo Deming, Zhou Yanran and Shi Jinchuan （ Zhejiang University）

浙江大學(xué)民營(yíng)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究中心,310027

文章摘要：本文建立一個(gè)基于羅默模型的動(dòng)態(tài)一般均衡，引入技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移損失及其差異性、南北雙方最終產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)技術(shù)的同構(gòu)性、南方最終產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)技術(shù)同構(gòu)性隨最優(yōu)專利制度的遞增性質(zhì)，，在南北技術(shù)貿(mào)易的框架下，考察南方的最優(yōu)專利保護(hù)制度，及其對(duì)南北雙方經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的影響。技術(shù)損失與最終產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)的同構(gòu)性決定了南方存在最優(yōu)專利保護(hù)，并且最優(yōu)專利保護(hù)是部分的。技術(shù)損失、同構(gòu)性及技術(shù)選擇與最優(yōu)專利制度的遞增性質(zhì)，共同決定了南北雙方均衡經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率是最優(yōu)專利保護(hù)的增函數(shù)。給定南方一定程度的最優(yōu)專利保護(hù)，在技術(shù)水平損失下，南北雙方的均衡增長(zhǎng)率相同，而人均GDP不同，這反映了南北經(jīng)濟(jì)條件收斂觀念。在水平增長(zhǎng)率損失下，南方的均衡增長(zhǎng)率較低，南方人均GDP遠(yuǎn)低于北方，這反映了南北經(jīng)濟(jì)極化觀念。

Abstr：This paper introduces the technology transfer loss, the technology isomorphism in final product production, and the monotonicity property of technology isomorphism with respect to the optimal patent protection into a classical Romer model, and discusses the South＇s optimal patent policy and its impact on both North and South＇s economic growth. We show that the technology transfer loss, the technology isomorphism, and the monotonicity of technology isomorphism choice with respect to the optimal patent protection interact together and shape the relationship between the optimal patent protection and equilibrium growth rate, and determine the South＇s optimal patent protection, which is lower than that in the North. When the transfer loss is at the technology level, both the North and the South share the same growth rate while GDP per capita in the South is smaller, which is consistent with the relative convergence theory. When there exists the growth rate loss in the technology transfer, the South has a lower growth rate and has a quite lower GDP per capita, which is consistent with the polarization theory. Our conclusion implies that the traditional wisdom which claims that the South has no incentive to protect patent might be wrong, and associated trade and intellectual protection policies may damage both the South and the North＇s welfare.

文章關(guān)鍵詞：

Keyword：:Patent Protections Technology Isomorphism Technology Transfers Economic Growth

課題項(xiàng)目：本研究獲得浙江省自然科學(xué)基金（LY13G030002）、浙江省哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)規(guī)劃課題（11JCLJ01YB）、浙江大學(xué)2013年青年教師交叉研究種子基金（JCZZ-2013002）、2014年度AFR金融學(xué)科發(fā)展課題（XK14008）、浙江�。㈠X江人才計(jì)劃＂（QJC1402004）、浙江大學(xué)恒逸基金、浙江省教育廳課題（Y201225671）、CRPE中國(guó)民營(yíng)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展研究課題資助.

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：南北技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移、專利保護(hù)與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。