國資改革與混合所有制——基于委托代理理論視角
發(fā)布時間:2019-01-26 10:14
【摘要】:黨的十八屆三中全會確定了國資改革重心由"管資產(chǎn)為主"轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)?管資本為主",并進一步明確了混合所有制改革為國企改革的"重要突破口";谛轮贫冉(jīng)濟學的委托代理理論,闡述了混合所有制改革有助于解決國有資本沒有可以追溯的"最終委托人"的核心問題,澄清了"國有資本投資運營公司"有助于降低代理成本,并提出應進一步完善市場經(jīng)濟法制建設(shè),做實混合所有制企業(yè)的董事會,發(fā)揮好市場經(jīng)濟的監(jiān)督作用。
[Abstract]:The third Plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee decided that the focus of state capital reform should be changed from "managing assets mainly" to "managing capital", and further clarified that the reform of mixed ownership was an "important breakthrough point" for the reform of state-owned enterprises. Based on the principal-agent theory of new institutional economics, this paper expounds that the reform of mixed ownership can help to solve the core problem of "final client", which is not traceable to state-owned capital. This paper clarifies that "state-owned capital investment and operation company" is helpful to reduce agency cost, and puts forward that the legal construction of market economy should be further improved, the board of directors of mixed ownership enterprises should be established, and the supervision function of market economy should be brought into full play.
【作者單位】: 北京大學經(jīng)濟學院;
【分類號】:F123.7
[Abstract]:The third Plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee decided that the focus of state capital reform should be changed from "managing assets mainly" to "managing capital", and further clarified that the reform of mixed ownership was an "important breakthrough point" for the reform of state-owned enterprises. Based on the principal-agent theory of new institutional economics, this paper expounds that the reform of mixed ownership can help to solve the core problem of "final client", which is not traceable to state-owned capital. This paper clarifies that "state-owned capital investment and operation company" is helpful to reduce agency cost, and puts forward that the legal construction of market economy should be further improved, the board of directors of mixed ownership enterprises should be established, and the supervision function of market economy should be brought into full play.
【作者單位】: 北京大學經(jīng)濟學院;
【分類號】:F123.7
【相似文獻】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 王錚;;發(fā)展混合所有制,激發(fā)企業(yè)內(nèi)生活力和動力——訪國務院國資委研究中心主任楚序平[J];上海國資;2014年05期
2 馬建軍;;混合所有制企業(yè)國有產(chǎn)權(quán)管理問題探析[J];廣東科技;2014年08期
3 吳偉;丁承;魯陽晉;;混合所有制背景下的PPP模式與投行創(chuàng)新思路[J];新金融;2014年07期
4 劉紀鵬;;國資退出:叫停MBO的理由[J];中外管理;2003年10期
5 嚴學鋒;;祛魅“國資流失”正當時[J];董事會;2014年06期
6 ;湖北國資“混合所有制”試水 整合成立兩大新集團[J];中國招標;2014年24期
7 焦?jié)M金;國有產(chǎn)權(quán)委托代理的市場化探討[J];發(fā)展;2005年05期
8 王中昭;陳喜強;曾憲友;;社區(qū)政府與社區(qū)組織的委托代理關(guān)系模型[J];統(tǒng)計與決策;2006年04期
9 張前榮;張語桐;曾鳳章;;基于博弈的委托代理關(guān)系分析[J];商場現(xiàn)代化;2007年07期
10 蘇琦;陳法仁;彭,
本文編號:2415388
本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/jingjifazhanlunwen/2415388.html
最近更新
教材專著