【摘要】：基于上游壟斷、下游雙寡頭競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的縱向市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu),在討價(jià)還價(jià)博弈的框架下,構(gòu)建了下游零售商均無買方抗衡勢(shì)力和單個(gè)零售商具有買方抗衡勢(shì)力兩種情況下的,上游供應(yīng)商最優(yōu)定價(jià)形式?jīng)Q策模型,分析了買方抗衡勢(shì)力對(duì)供應(yīng)商定價(jià)形式?jīng)Q策的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):從供應(yīng)商利潤角度來說,當(dāng)零售商均無買方抗衡勢(shì)力時(shí),兩部收費(fèi)制和RPM(轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持)是等價(jià)的,且都優(yōu)于線性定價(jià);當(dāng)單個(gè)零售商具有買方抗衡勢(shì)力時(shí),RPM優(yōu)于兩部收費(fèi)制,同時(shí)也優(yōu)于線性定價(jià),但是兩部收費(fèi)制與線性定價(jià)之間的關(guān)系不確定。在此結(jié)論之上,本文還討論了政府對(duì)RPM采用不同規(guī)制政策時(shí),供應(yīng)商最優(yōu)的定價(jià)形式選擇。
[Abstract]:Based on the vertical market structure of upstream monopoly and downstream duopoly competition, under the framework of bargaining game, this paper constructs two situations in which there is no buyer countervailing power for downstream retailers and single retailer has buyer countervailing power. This paper analyzes the influence of buyer's countervailing power on supplier's optimal pricing form decision. From the point of view of supplier profit, when retailers have no buyer countervailing power, the two-part charging system and RPM (resale price maintenance) are equivalent, and both are superior to linear pricing; When a single retailer has the power to compete with the buyer, RPM is superior to the two-part charging system and the linear pricing system, but the relationship between the two-part charging system and the linear pricing is uncertain. On the basis of this conclusion, this paper also discusses the optimal pricing form of the supplier when the government adopts different regulation policies on RPM.
【作者單位】： 東北大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71172150,71472032)
【分類號(hào)】：F224.32;F274
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本文編號(hào)：2143753