發(fā)布時間：2018-07-25 11:59

【摘要】：基于上游壟斷、下游雙寡頭競爭的縱向市場結(jié)構(gòu),在討價還價博弈的框架下,構(gòu)建了下游零售商均無買方抗衡勢力和單個零售商具有買方抗衡勢力兩種情況下的,上游供應商最優(yōu)定價形式?jīng)Q策模型,分析了買方抗衡勢力對供應商定價形式?jīng)Q策的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):從供應商利潤角度來說,當零售商均無買方抗衡勢力時,兩部收費制和RPM(轉(zhuǎn)售價格維持)是等價的,且都優(yōu)于線性定價;當單個零售商具有買方抗衡勢力時,RPM優(yōu)于兩部收費制,同時也優(yōu)于線性定價,但是兩部收費制與線性定價之間的關(guān)系不確定。在此結(jié)論之上,本文還討論了政府對RPM采用不同規(guī)制政策時,供應商最優(yōu)的定價形式選擇。
[Abstract]:Based on the vertical market structure of upstream monopoly and downstream duopoly competition, under the framework of bargaining game, this paper constructs two situations in which there is no buyer countervailing power for downstream retailers and single retailer has buyer countervailing power. This paper analyzes the influence of buyer's countervailing power on supplier's optimal pricing form decision. From the point of view of supplier profit, when retailers have no buyer countervailing power, the two-part charging system and RPM (resale price maintenance) are equivalent, and both are superior to linear pricing; When a single retailer has the power to compete with the buyer, RPM is superior to the two-part charging system and the linear pricing system, but the relationship between the two-part charging system and the linear pricing is uncertain. On the basis of this conclusion, this paper also discusses the optimal pricing form of the supplier when the government adopts different regulation policies on RPM.
【作者單位】： 東北大學工商管理學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金資助項目(71172150,71472032)
【分類號】：F224.32;F274
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本文編號：2143753