基于隨機(jī)合作博弈的PPP項(xiàng)目風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)機(jī)制分析
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-05-30 15:43
本文選題:PPP模式 + 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān); 參考:《青島大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文
【摘要】:近年來,我國(guó)大力發(fā)展PPP模式并積累了一定的項(xiàng)目經(jīng)驗(yàn),但對(duì)于PPP項(xiàng)目風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的識(shí)別、評(píng)估及應(yīng)對(duì)方式,仍然沒有達(dá)成共識(shí)。通常情況下,確定項(xiàng)目實(shí)施方案后的招標(biāo)環(huán)節(jié)社會(huì)資本才真正介入到具體的PPP項(xiàng)目中,此時(shí),政府已對(duì)PPP項(xiàng)目中的大部分風(fēng)險(xiǎn)從有利于自身的角度進(jìn)行了初步分配,社會(huì)資本就顯得相對(duì)被動(dòng),且談判能力不足。這種情況不僅會(huì)降低私營(yíng)部門的積極性,也會(huì)影響項(xiàng)目的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)效率,導(dǎo)致風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)不合理甚至影響整個(gè)項(xiàng)目的成敗。因此,合理的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)對(duì)PPP項(xiàng)目的成功有著至關(guān)重要的作用。本文對(duì)PPP項(xiàng)目風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)模式進(jìn)行了比較深入的探究。首先,從PPP模式的概念、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)研究脈絡(luò)進(jìn)行了文獻(xiàn)梳理和總結(jié),為后續(xù)的研究提供了理論基礎(chǔ)和相關(guān)的研究思路。其次,利用文獻(xiàn)資料法和德爾菲法對(duì)項(xiàng)目中可能發(fā)生的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行了識(shí)別,同時(shí)將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分為單一主體承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和共擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),以便于后續(xù)對(duì)共擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)比例的研究。接著,構(gòu)建了基于隨機(jī)合作博弈的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)模型,根據(jù)Shapley值理論和隨機(jī)合作博弈理論計(jì)算出使整體效用最大時(shí)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)比例。最后進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,將基于隨機(jī)合作博弈的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)模型和利用層次分析法構(gòu)建的基于Shapley值修正的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)模型進(jìn)行比較,對(duì)構(gòu)建的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)模型進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證。本文結(jié)合已有學(xué)者的經(jīng)驗(yàn),對(duì)PPP項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)的研究,且應(yīng)用更加客觀的隨機(jī)合作博弈模型,改變了傳統(tǒng)方式上依賴專家主觀認(rèn)識(shí)的方式,豐富了項(xiàng)目風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)理論,為實(shí)際操作中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)提供了有效借鑒。
[Abstract]:In recent years, China has vigorously developed the PPP model and accumulated some project experience, but there is still no consensus on how to identify, evaluate and deal with the risk of PPP projects. Usually, the social capital of the bidding link after the implementation of the project is really involved in the specific PPP project. At this time, the government has initially allocated most of the risks in the PPP project from the perspective of its own advantage. The social capital appears relatively passive, and the negotiation ability is insufficient. This situation will not only reduce the enthusiasm of the private sector, but also affect the efficiency of the project risk-taking, lead to unreasonable risk sharing and even affect the success or failure of the whole project. Therefore, reasonable risk sharing plays an important role in the success of PPP project. In this paper, the PPP project risk sharing model is deeply explored. First of all, from the concept of PPP model, risk management, risk sharing research context of literature review and summary, for the follow-up research provides a theoretical basis and related research ideas. Secondly, the paper uses the method of literature and Delphi to identify the possible risks in the project, at the same time, the risk is divided into a single subject to bear the risk and a shared risk, so as to facilitate the subsequent study on the proportion of shared risks. Then, the risk-sharing model based on stochastic cooperative game is constructed, and the risk-sharing ratio when the overall utility is maximized is calculated according to the Shapley value theory and the stochastic cooperative game theory. Finally, the risk sharing model based on stochastic cooperative game is compared with the risk sharing model based on modified Shapley value, which is constructed by AHP, and the risk sharing model is verified. Based on the experience of scholars, this paper studies the risk sharing of PPP projects, and applies a more objective stochastic cooperative game model, which changes the traditional way of relying on the subjective knowledge of experts, and enriches the theory of project risk sharing. It provides an effective reference for risk sharing in practice.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:青島大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號(hào)】:F283
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 閆江奇;;中國(guó)式PPP的存在性、基本特征及其發(fā)展趨勢(shì)[J];建筑經(jīng)濟(jì);2015年11期
2 周正祥;張秀芳;張平;;新常態(tài)下PPP模式應(yīng)用存在的問題及對(duì)策[J];中國(guó)軟科學(xué);2015年09期
3 姚東e,
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